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viiCHAPTER 1
Introduction and summary
Monetary policy has been very successful in most countries in recent years. Average
in°ation rates have declined considerably since the 1980s. Furthermore, a number
of authors such as Stock and Watson (2002) and Martin and Rowthorn (2005) also
attribute the observed decline in macroeconomic volatility, i.e. in the variance of
in°ation and output, at least partly to better monetary policy.
But the last decade has not passed without new challenges for central banking
in theory and practice. In theory, the New Keynesian or New Neoclassical Syn-
thesis model became the standard workhorse for monetary macroeconomics and
some of its most prominent proponents such as Woodford (2003) argued for a new
`timeless-perspective' approach to policy as the allegedly optimal monetary policy.
In practice, the creation of the European Monetary Union, with the European Cen-
tral Bank (ECB) being responsible for monetary policy since 1999, represented an
enormous challenge for policy-makers in `unchartered waters' (Duisenberg, 1998).
Furthermore, the world faced several severe liquidity crises on ¯nancial markets
that threatened the stability of the ¯nancial system. This thesis develops and ap-
plies three di®erent frameworks to analyse these challenges in detail within three
self-contained chapters.
Besides the focus on frameworks for monetary policy analysis, the special role of
rules represents another unifying theme for all three essays. Chapter 2 investigates
the optimality of the timeless perspective rule in the New Keynesian model and
chapter 3 uses Taylor rules to examine if the ECB conducted a stabilising monetary
policy with respect to in°ation and output. Finally, chapter 4 studies the role of the
liquidity provision principle as an optimal response to liquidity crises on ¯nancial
markets.
1Chapter 1 Introduction and summary 2
The debate about rules in monetary policy dates at least back to the beginning of
the 19th century as reported in Flandreau (2006). Wicksell (1898) wrote a compre-
hensive treatise of monetary policy emphasising an interest rate rule that provides
the basis for the modern analysis in Woodford (2003). After the Great Depression,
Simons (1936, p. 30) argued in a similar vein as Wicksell (1898, p. 4) that
[a] monetary rule of maintaining the constancy of some price-index,
preferably an index of prices of competitively produced commodities, ap-
pears to a®ord the only promising escape from present monetary chaos
and uncertainties.
While this proposal comes already very close to current mandates of most central
banks, the thinking about rules versus discretion after the rational expectations
revolution in macroeconomics in the 1970s has been mainly shaped by Kydland
and Prescott (1977): Since private agents include expectations about future policies
in their current actions, discretionary monetary policy that follows optimal control
theory results in suboptimal economic outcomes. Hence, rule-based policy-making
can increase welfare.
The timeless perspective proposed by Woodford (1999, 2003) represents a promi-
nent modern form of such a rule in monetary policy analysis. It helps to overcome
not only the traditional in°ation bias in the sense of Barro and Gordon (1983),
but also the stabilisation bias, a dynamic loss stemming from cost-push shocks in
the New Keynesian model as described in Clarida, Gal¶ ³ and Gertler (1999). These
represent the long-run gains from rule-based policy-making in the New Keynesian
model.
Chapter 2 shows, however, that the timeless perspective is associated with short-
run costs because the monetary authority demonstrates its commitment to the time-
less perspective by not exploiting given in°ation expectations in the initial period.
Instead, it follows a policy `to which it would have been optimal to commit to at a
date far in the past,' i.e. it behaves as if the policy rule had been in place already
for a long time. This policy is strategically coherent because it avoids any initial pe-
riod e®ects that are one reason for the time inconsistency of standard commitment
solutions, but it is initially suboptimal. These short-run costs from the timeless per-
spective are the price to pay to make the commitment to it arguably more credible
than an overall optimal commitment solution that exploits given in°ation expecta-
tions. Using this framework, chapter 2 analyses under which circumstances these
short-run costs exceed the long-run gains from commitment.
After deriving a formal condition for the superiority of discretion over the time-
less perspective rule, I investigate the in°uence of structural and preference parame-
ters on the performance of monetary policy both under discretion and the timelessChapter 1 Introduction and summary 3
perspective. Discretion gains relatively to the timeless perspective rule, i.e. the
short-run losses become relatively more important, if the private sector behaves less
forward-looking or if the monetary authority puts a greater weight on output gap
stabilisation. For empirically reasonable values of price stickiness, the relative gain
from discretion rises with stickier prices. A fourth parameter which in°uences the
relative gains is the persistence of shocks: The introduction of serial correlation into
the model only strengthens the respective relative performance of policies in the
situation without serial correlation in shocks. In particular, I show conditions for
each parameter under which discretion performs strictly better than the timeless
perspective rule.
Furthermore, the framework of short-run losses and long-run gains also allows
explaining why an economy that is su±ciently far away from its steady-state suf-
fers rather than gains from implementing the timeless perspective rule. In general,
chapter 2 uses unconditional expectations of the loss function as welfare criterion, in
line with most of the literature. The analysis of initial conditions, however, requires
reverting to expected losses conditional on the initial state of the economy because
unconditional expectations of the loss function implicitly treat the economy's ini-
tial conditions as stochastic. Altogether, in the normal New Keynesian model all
conditions for the superiority of discretion need not be as adverse as one might
suspect.
Finally, I introduce an `optimal' timeless policy rule based on Blake (2001) and
Jensen and McCallum (2002). While the general in°uence of structural and pref-
erences parameters on the performance of monetary policy under this rule is not
a®ected, discretion is never better than this rule when evaluated with unconditional
expectations as it is common in the literature on monetary policy rules. The reason
is that this allegedly optimal rule optimally accounts for the use of unconditional ex-
pectations as the welfare criterion. For any timeless rule, however, initial conditions
can be su±ciently adverse to make the rule inferior to discretion.
As a policy conclusion of chapter 2, the timeless perspective in its standard for-
mulation is not optimal for all economies at all times. In particular, if an economy
is characterised by rigid prices, a low discount factor, a high preference for output
stabilisation or a su±ciently large deviation from its steady state, it should prefer
discretionary monetary policy over the timeless perspective. The critical parameter
values obtained in this paper with the simplest version of the New Keynesian model
suggest that { for a number of empirically reasonable combinations of parameters
{ the long-run losses from discretion may be less relevant than previously thought.
Furthermore, the short-run costs in this paper can be interpreted as a lower bound
for the actual costs because they are derived under the assumption of full credibilityChapter 1 Introduction and summary 4
of the monetary authority. Incomplete credibility would raise the costs from com-
mitment even further, since it takes some time until the central bank can reap the
full gains from commitment.
Another important theoretical result of the New Keynesian literature model is
that monetary policy can and should stabilise the in°ation rate around its target
rate and real output around its `natural' level, i.e. the level in the absence of nominal
rigidities. For example Woodford (2003) shows that the Taylor-rule developed by
Taylor (1993) ful¯lls both stabilisation objectives as it implies countercyclical real
interest rates in response to deviations of in°ation and output from their respective
target values. In particular, the so-called `Taylor-principle' states that the central
bank should increase the nominal interest rate by more than one for one in response
to an increase of in°ation in order to raise the real interest rate. A speci¯c advantage
of the Taylor principle is its robustness in a wide range of di®erent theoretical models.
Over the last decade, this simple instrument policy rule has become a popular
framework for evaluating monetary policy of the Federal Reserve and other central
banks. Chapter 3, which is joint work with Jan-Egbert Sturm, presents one of the
¯rst empirical studies of actual monetary policy in the euro area. By estimating
several instrument policy reaction functions for the ECB, we look back over the
`Duisenberg-era' and explore what role the output gap has played in actual ECB
policy and how actively the ECB has really responded to changes in in°ation. We
compare these results with those for the Bundesbank in order to get a clearer picture
of the new institutional monetary setting in Europe.1
Looking at contemporaneous Taylor rules, the presented evidence clearly con-
¯rms previous research and suggests that the ECB is accommodating changes in
in°ation and hence follows a destabilising policy. The di®erences between the Bun-
desbank and the ECB are signi¯cant. Such an interpretation gives rise to the con-
jecture that the ECB follows a policy quite similar to the pre-Volcker era of US
monetary policy, a time also known as the `Great In°ation' (Taylor, 1999).
One focus of chapter 3 refers to data uncertainties faced by policy-makers. They
base their decisions upon data which will most likely be revised in the future. Yet
most studies on central bank behaviour neglect this issue and use so-called `current'
or `ex-post' data, i.e. data published in the latest release, to estimate monetary
policy rules. In reality, central bankers can only use so-called `real-time' data, i.e.
data available when taking the decision. In his in°uential paper, Orphanides (2001)
1Since the ECB is a supranational institution and can set only one interest rate for the whole
euro area, it is a `natural consequence' that the ECB de¯ned its mandate of price stability in terms
of overall in°ation in the euro area (ECB, 2004, p. 51). Hence, its policy can only be reasonably
assessed in chapter 3 with data for the euro area aggregate. The consequences of nationally
heterogenous in°ation rates for the economic development of member states are discussed in Henzel
and Sauer (2006), for example.Chapter 1 Introduction and summary 5
shows that estimated policy reaction functions obtained by using the ex-post revised
data can yield misleading descriptions of historical policy in the case of the US. We
explore whether data revisions contain similar problems for the euro area. In this
line of argument, the use of survey data which are rarely being revised in the course
of time, readily available, and timely (as opposed to most o±cial data) can be very
helpful.
A second important aspect of survey data is its prevalent forward-looking per-
spective. It is well known that central banks not only respond to past information,
but use a broad range of information. In particular, they consider forecasts of in-
°ation and output in their decision process. The theoretical justi¯cation for such a
forward-looking approach is given by, e.g., Clarida et al. (1999) and Woodford (2003)
within a New Keynesian model. In addition to investigating policy reaction func-
tions based on survey data, we follow Clarida, Gal¶ ³ and Gertler (1998,1999,2000) and
estimate forward-looking Taylor rules in order to compare the relevance of real-time
versus forward-looking aspects.
The impression of a destabilising monetary policy by the ECB, which is based
on contemporaneous Taylor rules, seems to be largely due to the lack of a forward-
looking perspective. Either assuming rational expectations and using a forward-
looking speci¯cation as suggested by Clarida, Gal¶ ³ and Gertler (1998), or using
expectations as derived from surveys result in Taylor rules which do imply a sta-
bilising role of the ECB. In such forward-looking cases, the weights attached to the
in°ation rate by the Bundesbank and the ECB do no longer signi¯cantly di®er.
Furthermore, the ECB appears to have responded to real economic developments at
least as strongly as the Bundesbank.
The use of real-time industrial production data, as suggested by Orphanides
(2004), hardly in°uences the results. Estimations for an extended sample until the
end of 2006 con¯rm the results obtained for the Duisenberg-era; contemporaneous
speci¯cations ¯nd an insu±cient response to in°ation developments in the euro area,
but forward-looking rules indicate a stabilising role of the ECB.
In the low-in°ation environment of recent years, a lot of central banks have
begun to add concerns about ¯nancial stability in addition to the maintenance of
price stability and limited output and employment volatility to the top of their
agenda. The increased tendency of major central banks such as the ECB, the Bank of
England or the Swedish Riksbank to publish `Financial Stability Reports' represents
a widely visible evidence for this conjecture. The prevention of ¯nancial crises is an
important reason for this behaviour.
The model in chapter 4 helps to provide guidance for central banks in the event
of such crises. In particular, it o®ers a framework to analyse emergency liquid-Chapter 1 Introduction and summary 6
ity assistance of central banks on ¯nancial markets in response to aggregate and
idiosyncratic liquidity shocks.
Liquidity is an important concept in ¯nance and macroeconomics. The micro-
economic literature in ¯nance views liquidity roughly as the ability to sell assets
quickly and costlessly. In macroeconomics, liquidity refers to a generally accepted
medium of exchange or, in brief, money. Money is the most liquid asset due to
the fact that it does not need to be converted into anything else in order to make
purchases of real goods or other assets. This feature makes money valuable in both
perspectives.
Chapter 4 uses this common perspective of money and links liquidity risk on
an asset market with aggregate demand and aggregate supply on a goods market.
Spillover e®ects from the asset market to the goods market can justify a central
bank intervention on the asset market even if the central bank does not take the
welfare of investors on the asset market into account. Hence, the model provides
a framework to analyse the perceived insurance against severe ¯nancial turmoil by
the Federal Reserve under Alan Greenspan, which has been termed the `Greenspan
put' in the popular press and `liquidity provision principle' by Taylor (2005).
The chapter begins with a survey of empirical and historical evidence for the
relevance of liquidity for asset prices, in particular during ¯nancial crises. The
stock market crash in October 1987 or the LTCM-crisis in September 1998 represent
`°ight to quality' or `°ight to liquidity' episodes in which investors wanted to shift
from relatively illiquid medium to long-term assets such as shares into safe and
liquid government bonds or cash. While liquidity provision has been studied in the
literature with a focus on the role of ¯nancial intermediaries within `real' models,
chapter 4 develops a model in nominal units in order to look at optimal monetary
interventions on ¯nancial markets.
In the model, investors can invest on an asset market in liquid money and po-
tentially illiquid, but productive assets, in order to optimally satisfy their uncertain
consumption needs on a separated goods market over two periods. Two channels
link the goods market to the asset market: First, the amount of money held by in-
vestors determines together with the size of a liquidity shock the aggregate demand
of investors on the goods market which is subject to a cash-in-advance constraint.
Second, a dramatic decrease of the asset price negatively in°uences the goods supply
in the ¯nal period because it forces investors to costly liquidate their asset. Con-
fronted with a liquidity crisis, the central bank faces a trade-o® between injecting
liquidity and thus incurring risks to price stability and negative supply e®ects in
the future. The size of the optimal intervention increases in the size of the liquidity
shock, the weight on output relative to in°ation and the extent of negative supplyChapter 1 Introduction and summary 7
e®ects of the crisis. It decreases in the size of the associated in°ation in goods prices
which is linked to the possibility to sterilise the intervention and the amount of
liquidity initially held by investors.
Furthermore, the anticipation of central bank interventions by private investors
leads to a moral hazard e®ect in the form of less private liquidity provision and
thus an increase in the likelihood of ¯nancial crises. At the same time, less liquidity
provision means more productive investment and thus greater aggregate supply in
the absence of a ¯nancial crisis. If the central bank is able to credibly commit to
some future policy, the optimal liquidity provision rule has to take these additional
e®ects into account.
After the analysis of idiosyncratic liquidity shocks within this framework, chap-
ter 4 o®ers a thorough discussion of mechanisms that can turn small shocks into
large ones. Finally, I review the related literature on the Greenspan put, market
segmentation, market microstructure theory and the public supply of liquidity.
This summary shows that the di®erent chapters of this thesis apply a wide range
of economic methodologies to the analysis of monetary policy. Chapter 2 looks at
optimal monetary policy in the modern micro-founded New Keynesian macroeco-
nomic model, while chapter 3 o®ers an empirical investigation of monetary policy
in the euro area. The ¯nal chapter 4 combines a microeconomic model of liquidity
shocks on an asset market that includes features of market microstructure theory
with a model of the goods market inspired by nominal rigidities as common in
macroeconomic models. All three chapters are connected by the prominent role of
di®erent rules and the objective to develop and apply frameworks for the analysis
of monetary policy from a theoretical and empirical perspective.Chapter 1 Introduction and summary 8
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Discretion rather than rules?
When is discretionary policy-making
better than the timeless perspective?
Abstract
Discretionary monetary policy produces a dynamic loss in the New Keynesian model
in the presence of cost-push shocks. The possibility to commit to a speci¯c policy
rule can increase welfare. A number of authors since Woodford (1999) have argued
in favour of a timeless perspective rule as an optimal policy. The short-run costs
associated with the timeless perspective are neglected in general, however. Rigid
prices, relatively impatient households, a high preference of policy makers for output
stabilisation and a deviation from the steady state all worsen the performance of
the timeless perspective rule and can make it inferior to discretion.
2.1 Introduction
Kydland and Prescott (1977) showed that rule-based policy-making can increase
welfare. The timeless perspective proposed by Woodford (1999) represents a promi-
nent modern form of such a rule in monetary policy analysis. It helps to overcome
not only the traditional in°ation bias in the sense of Barro and Gordon (1983),
but also the stabilisation bias, a dynamic loss stemming from cost-push shocks in
the New Keynesian model as described in Clarida, Gal¶ ³ and Gertler (1999). It is,
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however, associated with short-run costs that may be larger than the long-run gains
from commitment.
After deriving a formal condition for the superiority of discretion over the timeless
perspective rule, this paper investigates the in°uence of structural and preference
parameters on the performance of monetary policy both under discretion and the
timeless perspective in the sense of Woodford (1999). Discretion gains relatively
to the timeless perspective rule, i.e. the short-run losses become relatively more
important, if the private sector behaves less forward-looking or if the monetary au-
thority puts a greater weight on output gap stabilisation. For empirically reasonable
values of price stickiness, the relative gain from discretion rises with stickier prices.
A fourth parameter which in°uences the relative gains is the persistence of shocks:
Introducing serial correlation into the model only strengthens the respective rela-
tive performance of policies in the situation without serial correlation in shocks. In
particular, we show conditions for each parameter, under which discretion performs
strictly better than the timeless perspective rule.
Furthermore, the framework of short-run losses and long-run gains also allows
explaining why an economy that is su±ciently far away from its steady-state su®ers
rather than gains from implementing the timeless perspective rule. In general, this
paper uses unconditional expectations of the loss function as welfare criterion, in
line with most of the literature. The analysis of initial conditions, however, requires
reverting to expected losses conditional on the initial state of the economy because
unconditional expectations of the loss function implicitly treat the economy's ini-
tial conditions as stochastic. Altogether, in the normal New Keynesian model all
conditions for the superiority of discretion need not be as adverse as one might
suspect.
We also introduce an `optimal' timeless policy rule based on Blake (2001), Jensen
and McCallum (2002) and Jensen (2003). While the general in°uence of structural
and preferences parameters on the performance of monetary policy under this rule is
not a®ected, discretion is never better than this rule when evaluated with uncondi-
tional expectations as it is common in the literature on monetary policy rules. The
reason is that this allegedly optimal rule optimally accounts for the use of uncondi-
tional expectations as the welfare criterion. For any timeless rule, however, initial
conditions can be su±ciently adverse to make the rule inferior to discretion.
The following section 2.2 presents the canonical New Keynesian Model. Section
2.3.1 explains the relevant welfare criteria. The analytical solution in section 2.3.2
is followed by simulation results and a thorough economic interpretation of the
performance of policies under discretion and the timeless perspective, while section
2.3.4 concludes the discussion of Woodford's timeless perspective by looking at theChapter 2 Discretion rather than rules? 12
e®ects of initial conditions. Section 2.4 introduces the optimal timeless policy rule
and repeats the analysis from section 2.3.3, whereas section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 New Keynesian Model
The New Keynesian or New Neoclassical Synthesis model has become the standard
toolbox for modern macroeconomics. While there is some debate about the exact
functional forms, the standard setup consists of a forward-looking Phillips curve, an
intertemporal IS-curve and a welfare function.1 Following, e.g., Walsh (2003), the
New Keynesian Phillips curve based on Calvo (1983) pricing is given by
¼t = ¯Et¼t+1 + ®yt + ut (2.1)
with
® ´
(1 ¡ ³)(1 ¡ ¯³)
³
: (2.2)
¼t denotes in°ation, Et the expectations operator conditional on information in
period t, yt the output gap, and ut a stochastic shock term that is assumed to follow
a stationary AR(1) process with AR-parameter ½ and innovation variance ¾2. While
the output gap refers to the deviation of actual output from natural or °exible-price
output, ut is often interpreted as a cost-push shock term that captures time-varying
distortions from consumption or wage taxation or mark-ups in ¯rms' prices or wages.
It is the source of the stabilisation bias. 0 < ¯ < 1 denotes the (private sector's)
discount factor and 0 · ³ < 1 is the constant probability that a ¯rm is not able to
reset its price in period t. A ¯rm's optimal price depends on current and (for ³ > 0)
future real marginal costs, which are assumed to be proportional to the respective
output gap.2 Hence, ³ and ® re°ect the degree of price rigidity in this model which
is increasing in ³ and decreasing in ®.










where ! ¸ 0 re°ects the relative importance of output-gap variability in policymaker
preferences. We assume zero to be the target values of in°ation and the output gap,
respectively. While the former assumption is included only for notational simplicity
and without loss of generality, the latter is crucial for the absence of a traditional
1Depending on the purpose of their paper, some authors directly use an instrument rule or a
targeting rule without explicitly maximising some welfare function.
2In (2.1), the proportionality factor is set equal to 1.Chapter 2 Discretion rather than rules? 13
in°ation bias in the sense of Barro and Gordon (1983).
The New Keynesian model also includes an aggregate demand relationship based
on consumers' intertemporal optimisation in the form of
yt = Etyt+1 ¡ b(Rt ¡ Et¼t+1) + vt; (2.4)
where Rt is the central bank's interest rate instrument and vt is a shock to pref-
erences, government spending or the exogenous natural-rate value of output, for
example.3 The parameter b > 0 captures the output gap elasticity with respect
to the real interest rate. Yet, for distinguishing between the timeless-perspective
and the discretionary solution, it is su±cient to assume that the central bank can
directly control ¼t as an instrument. Hence, the aggregate demand relationship can
be neglected below.4
2.2.1 Model Solutions
If the monetary authority neglects the impact of its policies on in°ation expectations
and reoptimises in each period, it conducts monetary policy under discretion. This
creates both the Barro and Gordon (1983) in°ation bias for positive output gap
targets and the Clarida et al. (1999) stabilisation bias caused by cost-push shocks.
To concentrate on the second source of dynamic losses in this model, a positive
in°ation bias is ruled out by assuming an output gap target of zero in the loss
function (2.3). Minimising (2.3) subject to (2.1) and to given in°ation expectations





t ¡ ¸t(¼t ¡ ¯Et¼t+1 ¡ ®yt ¡ ut) 8 t = 0;1;2;::: : (2.5)
The ¯rst order conditions
@¤t
@yt
= 2!yt + ®¸t = 0
@¤t
@¼t






If instead the monetary authority takes the impact of its actions on expectations
3vt is generally referred to as a demand shock. But in this model, yt re°ects the output gap
and not output alone. Hence, shocks to the °exible-price level of output are also included in vt.
See, e.g., Woodford (2003, p. 246).
4Formally, adding (2.4) as a constraint to the optimisation problems below gives a value of zero
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into account and possesses an exogenous possibility to credibly commit itself to some
future policy, it can minimise the loss function (2.3) over an enhanced opportunity
set. Hence, the resulting commitment solution must be at least as good as the one










t) ¡ ¸t(¼t ¡ ¯¼t+1 ¡ ®yt ¡ ut)
¤
: (2.7)
This yields as ¯rst order conditions
@¤
@yt
= 2!yt + ®¸t = 0; t = 0;1;2;:::;
@¤
@¼t
= 2¼t ¡ ¸t = 0; t = 0;
@¤
@¼t












yt¡1; t = 1;2;::: : (2.9)
The commitment solution improves the short-run output/in°ation trade-o® faced by
the monetary authority because short-run price dynamics depend on expectations
about the future. Since the authority commits to a history-dependent policy in
the future, it is able to optimally spread the e®ects of shocks over several periods.
The commitment solution also enables the policy maker to reap the bene¯ts of
discretionary policy in the initial period without paying the price in terms of higher
in°ation expectations, since these are assumed to depend on the future commitment
to (2.9). Indeed, optimal policy is identical under commitment and discretion in the
initial period. In two recent paper, Dennis and SÄ oderstrÄ om (2006) and Levine,
McAdam and Pearlman (2007) compare the welfare gains from commitment over
discretion under di®erent scenarios.
However, the commitment solution su®ers from time inconsistency in two ways:
First, by switching from (2.9) to (2.6) in any future period, the monetary author-
ity can exploit given in°ationary expectations and gain in the respective period.
Second, the monetary authority knows at t = 0 that applying the same optimisa-
tion procedure (2.7) in the future implies a departure from today's optimal plan, a
feature McCallum (2003, p. 4) calls `strategic incoherence'.
To overcome the second form of time inconsistency and thus gain true credibility,
many authors since Woodford (1999) have proposed the concept of policy-makingChapter 2 Discretion rather than rules? 15
under the timeless perspective: The optimal policy in the initial period should be
chosen such that it would have been optimal to commit to this policy at a date far in
the past, not exploiting given in°ationary expectations in the initial period.5 This







yt¡1; t = 0;1;::: : (2.10)
Hence, the only di®erence to the commitment solution lies in the di®erent policy in
the initial period, unless the economy starts from its steady-state with y¡1 = 0.6 But
since the commitment solution is by de¯nition optimal for (2.7), this di®erence causes
a loss of the timeless perspective policy compared to the commitment solution. If this
loss is greater than the gain from the commitment solution (COM) over discretion,
rule-based policy making under the timeless perspective (TP) causes larger losses
than policy under discretion (DIS):
LTP ¡ LCOM > LDIS ¡ LCOM , LTP > LDIS: (2.11)
The central aim of the rest of this paper is to compare the losses from TP and DIS.
2.2.2 Minimal state variable (MSV) solutions
Before we are able to calculate the losses under the di®erent policy rules, we need
to determine the particular equilibrium behaviour of the economy, which is given
by the New Keynesian Phillips curve (2.1)7 and the respective policy rule, i.e. DIS
(2.6) or TP (2.10). Following McCallum (1999), the minimal state variable (MSV)
solution to each model represents the rational expectations solution that excludes
bubbles and sunspots.
Under discretion, ut is the only relevant state variable in (2.1) and (2.6)





5Woodford (1999) compares this `commitment' to the `contract' under John Rawls' veil of
uncertainty.
6Due to the history-dependence of (2.10), the di®erent initial policy has some in°uence on the
losses in subsequent periods, too.
7Without loss of generality but to simplify the notation, the MSV solutions are derived based on
(2.1) without reference to (2.2). The de¯nition of ® in (2.2) is substituted into the MSV solutions
for the simulation results in section 2.3.3.Chapter 2 Discretion rather than rules? 16
so the conjectured solution is of the form
¼t;DIS = Á1ut
yt;DIS = Á2ut:
Since Et¼t+1 = Á1½ut in this case, the MSV solution is given by
¼t;DIS =
!
!(1 ¡ ¯½) + ®2ut (2.12)
yt;DIS =
¡®
!(1 ¡ ¯½) + ®2ut: (2.13)
Under the timeless perspective, yt¡1 and ut are the relevant state variables from
(2.1) and (2.10):








Hence, the conjectured solution becomes
¼t;TP = Á11yt¡1 + Á12ut (2.14)
yt;TP = Á21yt¡1 + Á22ut: (2.15)






° ¡ ¯(½ + ±)
ut (2.16)
yt;TP = ±yt¡1 ¡
®
!(° ¡ ¯(½ + ±))
ut: (2.17)
with ° ´ 1 + ¯ + ®2




2¯ . Given these MSV solutions, we are now
able to evaluate the relative performance of monetary policy under discretion and
the timeless perspective rule.
2.3 Policy Evaluation
2.3.1 Welfare criteria
Unconditional expectations: The standard approach to evaluate monetary pol-
icy performance is to compare average values for the period loss function, i.e. values
8 These calculations include a quadratic equation in Á21, of which only one root, 0 < ± < 1, is
relevant according to both the stability and MSV criteria.Chapter 2 Discretion rather than rules? 17
of the unconditional expectations of the period loss function in (2.3), denoted as
E[L].9 We follow this approach for the analysis of the in°uence of preference and
structural parameters mainly because it is very common in the literature10 and
allows an analytical solution. However, it includes several implicit assumptions.
First, ¼t and yt need to be covariance-stationary. This is not a problem in our
setup since ut is stationary by assumption and 0 < ± < 1 is chosen according to
the stability criterion, see footnote 8. Second, using unconditional expectations
of (2.3) implies treating the initial conditions as stochastic (see, e.g., King and
Wolman, 1999, p.377) and thus averages over all possible initial conditions. Third,
Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) and Dennis (2004, Appendix A) show that the
standard approach is formally correct only for lim¯ ! 1, the central bank's discount
factor being close to 1. This may in°uence the precise parameter values for which
DIS performs better than TP in section 2.3.3, but it only strengthens the general
argument with respect to the in°uence of ¯ as will be shown below.
Conditional expectations: At the same time, using unconditional expecta-
tions impedes an investigation of the e®ects of speci¯c initial conditions and tran-
sitional dynamics to the steady state on the relative performance of policy rules.
For this reason and to be consistent with the microfoundations of the New Keyne-
sian model, Kim and Levin (2005), Kim, Kim, Schaumburg and Sims (2005) and
Schmitt-Groh¶ e and Uribe (2004) argue in favour of conditional expectations as the
relevant welfare criterion. If future outcomes are discounted, i.e. ¯ < 1, the use of
conditional expectations, i.e. L in (2.3) as welfare criterion, implies that short-run
losses from TP become relatively more important to the long-run gains compared
to the evaluation with unconditional expectations.
Both concepts can be used to evaluate the performance of monetary policy under
varying parameter values and the results are qualitatively equivalent. Besides its
popularity and analytical tractability, the choice of unconditional expectations as
the general welfare measure has a third advantage: by implicitly averaging over all
possible initial conditions and treating all periods the same, we can evaluate policies
for all current and future periods and thus consider the policy problem from a `truly
timeless' perspective in the sense of Jensen (2003), that does not bias our results in
favour of discretionary policy-making. Only the analysis of the e®ects of di®erent
initial conditions requires reverting to conditional expectations.
9The unconditional expectations of the period loss function Lt are equal to the unconditional
expectations of the total loss function L in (2.3), scaled down by the factor (1 ¡ ¯).
10See, e.g., various articles in the conference volume by Taylor (1999) and Clarida et al. (1999),
Woodford (1999), Jensen and McCallum (2002).Chapter 2 Discretion rather than rules? 18
2.3.2 Analytical solution
In principle, the relative performance of DIS and TP can be solved analytically if
closed form solutions for the unconditional expectations of the period loss function
are available. This is possible, since




t;i]; i 2 fDIS; TPg (2.18)
from (2.3) and the MSV solutions in section 2.2.2 determine the unconditional vari-
ances E[¼2
t;i] and E[y2
t;i]. The MSV solution under discretion, (2.12) and (2.13) with
ut as the only state variable and E[u2
t] = 1




!(1 ¡ ¯½) + ®2
¸2 1




!(1 ¡ ¯½) + ®2
¸2 1




[!(1 ¡ ¯½) + ®2]2 ¢
1
1 ¡ ½2 ¾
2: (2.19)
For the timeless perspective, the MSV solution (2.16) and (2.17) depends on two























t] + 2Á21Á22E[yt¡1ut]: (2.20)
These two equations are solved and plugged into (2.18) in Appendix 2.A. The result
is
LTP =
2!(1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ ½) + ®2(1 + ±½)
!(1 ¡ ±2)(1 ¡ ±½)[° ¡ ¯(± + ½)]2 ¢
1
1 ¡ ½2 ¾
2: (2.21)
Hence, discretion is superior to the timeless perspective rule, if
LDIS < LTP ,
!(! + ®2)
[!(1 ¡ ¯½) + ®2]2 <
2!(1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ ½) + ®2(1 + ±½)
!(1 ¡ ±2)(1 ¡ ±½)[° ¡ ¯(± + ½)]2
, RL ´ LTP=LDIS ¡ 1 > 0: (2.22)
(2.22) allows analytical proofs of several intuitive arguments: First, the variance
of cost-push shocks 1
1¡½2 ¾2 a®ects the magnitude of absolute losses in (2.19) and
(2.21), but has no e®ect on the relative loss RL because it cancels out in (2.22).
Second, economic theory states that with perfectly °exible prices, i.e. ³ = 0 and
® ! 1, respectively, the short-run Phillips curve is vertical at yt = 0. In this case,
the short-run output/in°ation trade-o® and hence the source of the stabilisation
bias disappears completely and no di®erence between DIS, COM and TP can exist.Chapter 2 Discretion rather than rules? 19
Third, if the society behaves as an `in°ation nutter' (King, 1997) and only cares
about in°ation stabilisation, i.e. ! = 0, in°ation deviates from the target value
neither under discretion nor under rule-based policy-making. This behaviour elimi-
nates the stabilisation bias because the e®ect of shocks cannot be spread over several
periods. Shocks always enter the contemporaneous output gap completely. Further-
more, the initial conditions do not matter, since y¡1 receives a weight of 0 in (2.10)
and no short-run loss arises. The last two statements are summarised in the follow-
ing proposition.
Proposition 2.1 Discretion and Woodford's timeless perspective are equivalent for
1. perfectly °exible prices or
2. in°ation nutter - preferences.
Proof. 1. lim®!1 RL = 0. 2. lim!!0 RL = 0.
Finally, proposition 2.2 states that discretion is not always inferior to Woodford's
timeless perspective. If the private sector discounts future developments at a larger
rate, i.e. ¯ decreases, ¯rms care less about optimal prices in the future, when they
set their optimal price today. Hence, the potential to use future policies to spread
the e®ects of a current shock via the expectations channel decreases. Therefore, the
loss from the stabilisation bias under DIS, where this potential is not exploited, i.e.
the long-run gains LDIS ¡LCOM, also decreases with smaller ¯, while the short-run
costs from TP, LTP ¡ LCOM, remain una®ected under rule (2.10). In the extreme
case of ¯ = 0, expectations are irrelevant in the Phillips curve (2.1) and the source of
the stabilisation bias disappears. If the reduction in the long-run gain is su±ciently
large, conditions (2.11) and (2.22) are ful¯lled.
Proposition 2.2 There exists a discount factor ¯ small enough such that discretion
is superior to Woodford's timeless perspective as long as some weight is given to
output stabilisation and prices are not perfectly °exible.
Proof. RL is continuous in ¯ because stability requires 0 · ±;½ < 1. Furthermore,
lim¯!0 RL =
[®2+2(1¡½)!+(1+½)!](®2+!)
(®2+2!)[®2+(1¡½)!] ¡ 1 > 0 for ! > 0 ^ ® < 1.
In principle, (2.22) could be used to look at the in°uence of structural (³;½) and
preference (¯;!) parameters on the relative performance of monetary policy under
discretion and the timeless perspective rule more generally.11 Unfortunately, (2.22)
is too complex to be analytically tractable. Hence, we have to turn to results from
simulations.
11Please note that it would be conceptually nonsense to compare one policy over several values
of a preference parameter. Here, however, we always compare two policies (DIS and TP) holding
all preference and structural parameters constant.Chapter 2 Discretion rather than rules? 20
2.3.3 Simulation results
Preference (¯;!) and structural (³;½) parameters in°uence the relative performance
of monetary policy under discretion and the timeless perspective rule. To evaluate
each e®ect separately, we start from a benchmark model with parameter values
presented in table 2.1 and then vary each parameter successively.
Table 2.1: Parameter values for the benchmark model.
Parameter ¯ ! ³ ® ½
Value 0.99 0.0625 0.8722 0.02 0
If one period in the model re°ects one quarter, the discount factor of ¯ = 0:99
corresponds to an annual real interest rate of 4%. Setting ! = 1=16 implies an
equal weight on the quarterly variances of annualised in°ation and the output gap.
For ¯ = 0:99, ³ = 0:8722 corresponds to ® = 0:02, the value used in Jensen and
McCallum (2002) based on empirical estimates in Gal¶ ³ and Gertler (1999).12
Discount factor ¯: Figure 2.1 presents the results for the variation of the
discount factor ¯ as the loss from the timeless perspective relative to discretionary
policy, RL. A positive (negative) value of RL means that the loss from the timeless
perspective rule is greater (smaller) than the loss under discretion, while an increase
(decrease) in RL implies a relative gain (loss) from discretion.
The simulation shows that RL increases with decreasing ¯, i.e. DIS gains relative
to TP, if the private sector puts less weight on the future. This pattern re°ects
proposition 2.2 in the previous section. Since the expectations channel becomes
less relevant with smaller ¯, the stabilisation bias and thus the long-run gains from
commitment also decrease in ¯, whereas short-run losses remain una®ected.
In particular, DIS becomes superior to TP in the benchmark model for ¯ < 0:839,
but with ! = 1 already for ¯ < 0:975. Di®erentiating between the central bank's
and the private sector's discount factor ¯ as in section 2.4, when the optimal timeless
policy rule is derived analytically, shows that the latter drives RL because it enters
the Phillips curve, while the former is irrelevant due to the use of unconditional
expectations as the welfare criterion as discussed in section 2.3.1. But since using
the unconditional expectations of the loss function gives equal weight to all periods
and hence greater weight to future periods than actually valid for ¯ < 1, this e®ect
only strengthens the general argument.
12³ and ® are linked through the de¯nition of ® in (2.2).Chapter 2 Discretion rather than rules? 21














Figure 2.1: Variation of discount factor ¯, TP vs. DIS.
This can be shown with the value of the loss function (2.3), L = E0
P1
t=0 ¯tLt,
conditional on expectations at t = 0 instead of the unconditional expectations E[L].
As ¯gure 2.2 demonstrates, the general impact of ¯ on RL is similar to ¯gure 2.1.13
The notable di®erence is the absolute superiority of DIS over TP in our benchmark
model, independently of ¯. In order to get a critical value of ¯ for which DIS and TP
produce equal losses, other parameters of the benchmark model have to be adjusted
such that they favour TP, e.g. by reducing ! as explained below. Hence, ¯gure
2.2 provides evidence that the use of unconditional expectations does not bias the
results towards lower losses for discretionary policy. For reasons presented in section
2.3.1, we focus only on unconditional expectations from now on.
Output gap weight !: In Barro and Gordon (1983), the traditional in°ation
bias increases in the weight on the output gap, while the optimal stabilisation policies
are identical both under discretion and under commitment.14 In my intertemporal
model without structural ine±ciences, however, the optimal stabilisation policies are
di®erent under DIS and COM/TP. The history-dependence of TP in (2.10) improves
the monetary authority's short-run output/in°ation trade-o® in each period because
it makes today's output gap enter tomorrow's optimal policy with the opposite sign,
13The use of conditional expectations requires setting the initial conditions, i.e. y¡1 and u0, to
speci¯c values. In ¯gure 2.2, y¡1 = ¡0:01 and u0 = 0.
14In Barro and Gordon (1983), a larger ! increases the marginal utility of higher in°ation. Under
discretion, the marginal utility of higher in°ation must equal its marginal cost such that the ex
ante expected policy is also ex post optimal on average, which leaves the optimal stabilisation
policy una®ected.Chapter 2 Discretion rather than rules? 22















Figure 2.2: Variation of discount factor ¯ using conditional expectations of loss
function, TP vs. DIS.
but the same weight !=® in both periods. Hence, optimal current in°ation depends
on the change in the output gap under TP, but only on the contemporaneous output
gap under DIS. This way, rule-based policy-making eliminates the stabilisation bias
and reduces the relative variance of in°ation and output gap, which is a prominent
result in the literature.15
The short-run costs from TP arise because the monetary authority must be tough
on in°ation already in the initial period. These short-run costs increase with the
weight on the output gap !.16 The long-run gains from TP are caused by the size of
the stabilisation bias and the importance of its elimination given by the preferences
in the loss function. Equation (2.10) shows that increasing ! implies a softer policy
on in°ation today, but is followed by a tougher policy tomorrow. Although the
e®ect of tomorrow's policy is discounted by the private sector with ¯, the size of the
stabilisation bias, i.e. the neglection of the possibility to spread shocks over several
periods, appears to be largely independent from !. However, the reduction in the
relative variance of in°ation due to TP becomes less important the larger the weight
on the variance of the output gap in the loss function, i.e. the long-run gains from
TP decrease in !. Since short-run costs increase and long-run gains decrease in
the weight on the output gap (! "), a larger preference for output gap stabilisation
favours DIS relative to TP for reasonable ranges of parameters.
15See, e.g., Woodford (1999) and Dennis and SÄ oderstrÄ om (2006).
16The optimal output gap yt under DIS is decreasing in !, see equation (2.6).Chapter 2 Discretion rather than rules? 23
Figure 2.3: Variation of weight on the output gap !, TP vs. DIS.
In the benchmark model of ¯gure 2.3, RL initially decreases from 0 for ! = 0
with ! ".17 But for reasonable values of !, i.e. ! > 0:0009 in the benchmark model,
RL increases in the preference for output stabilisation and becomes even positive
for ! > 5:28.18
Price rigidity ³: Proposition 2.1 states that DIS and TP are equivalent for
perfectly °exible prices, i.e. ³ = 0 or ® ! 1, respectively. Increasing price rigidity,
i.e. increasing ³, has two e®ects: First, ¯rms' price-setting becomes more forward-
looking because they have less opportunities to adjust their prices. This e®ect
favours TP over DIS for ³ " because TP optimally incorporates forward-looking
expectations. Second, more rigid prices imply a °atter Phillips curve and thus the
requirement of TP to be tough on in°ation already in the initial period becomes more
costly. Hence, the left-handside of (2.11), the short-run losses from TP over DIS,
increases. Figure 2.4 demonstrates that for ³ > 0:436, the second e®ect becomes
more important, and for ³ > 0:915, the second e®ect even dominates the ¯rst.19
Gal¶ ³ and Gertler (1999) provide evidence that empirically reasonable estimates
for price rigidity lie within ® 2 [0:01;0:05], i.e. ³ 2 [0:909;0:804]. In this range,
¯gure 2.5 shows that RL increases with the ¯rms' probability of not being able to
17Note the magnifying glass in ¯gure 2.3.
18RL may approach 0 again for ! ! 1, the (unreasonable) case of an `employment nutter'.
19Since the relationship between ³ and ® given by equation (2.2) also depends on ¯, there is a
qualitatively irrelevant and quantitatively negligible di®erence between varying the probability of
no change in a ¯rm's price, ³, and directly varying the output gap coe±cient in the Phillips curve,
®.Chapter 2 Discretion rather than rules? 24












Figure 2.4: Variation of degree of price rigidity ³, TP vs. DIS.
reset their price, ³, and exceeds 0 for ³ > 0:915 or ® < 0:009.
Correlation of shocks ½: The analysis of the in°uence of serial correlation
in cost push shocks, ½, is more complex. LDIS exceeds LTP in the benchmark
model with ½ = 0 and raising ½ ceteris paribus strengthens the advantage of TP
as demonstrated in ¯gure 2.6. If shocks become more persistent, their impact on














Figure 2.5: Variation of degree of price rigidity ³ for ³ > 0:9, TP vs. DIS.Chapter 2 Discretion rather than rules? 25













Figure 2.6: Variation of degree of serial correlation ½ in the benchmark model, TP
vs. DIS.
future outcomes increases and thus TP gains relative to DIS because it accounts for
these e®ects in a superior way. The long-run gains from TP dominate its short-run
losses and RL decreases with ½.
However, the relationship between ½ and RL is not independent of the other
parameters in the model, while the relationships between RL and ¯;³ and !, re-
spectively, appear to be robust to alternative speci¯cations of other parameters.
Broadly speaking, as long as LDIS > LTP for ½ = 0, varying ½ results in a diagram
similar to ¯gure 2.6, i.e. LDIS > LTP for all ½ 2 [0;1) and RL decreases in ½. If,
however, due to an appropriate combination of ¯;³ and !, LDIS · LTP for ½ = 0,
a picture symmetric to the horizontal axis in ¯gure 2.6 emerges, as shown in ¯gure
2.7.20 That means that a higher degree of serial correlation only strengthens the
dominance of either TP or DIS already present without serial correlation. Hence,
serial correlation on its own seems not to be able to overcome the result of the
trade-o® between short-run losses and long-run gains from TP implied by the other
parameter values.21
20For parameter combinations that result in LDIS in the neighbourhood of LTP for ½ = 0,
increasing ½ has hardly any in°uence on RL, but for high degrees of serial correlation from about
½ > 0:8, RL increases rapidly.
21This shows that the results in McCallum and Nelson (2004, p. 48), who only report the
relationship visible in ¯gure 2.6, do not hold in general.Chapter 2 Discretion rather than rules? 26















Figure 2.7: Variation of degree of serial correlation ½ with ! = 10, TP vs. DIS.
2.3.4 E®ects of initial conditions
As argued in section 2.3.1, we have to use conditional expectations of L in 2.3 in
order to investigate the e®ects of the initial conditions, i.e. the previous output gap
y¡1 and the current cost-push shock u0 on the relative performance of policy rules.
Figure 2.8 presents the relative loss c RL = LTP=LDIS ¡1 conditional on y¡1 and u0.
Starting from the steady state with y¡1 = u0 = 0 where c RL = ¡0:0666 in the
benchmark model,increasing the absolute value of the initial lagged output gap jy¡1j
increases the short-run cost from following TP instead of DIS and leaves long-run
gains una®ected: While ¼0;DIS = y0;DIS = 0 from (2.12) and (2.13), ¼0;TP and
y0;TP deviate from their target values as can be seen from the history-dependence of
(2.10) or the MSV solution (2.16) and (2.17). Hence, TP becomes suboptimal under
conditional expectations for su±ciently large jy¡1j. Note also that this short-run cost
is of course symmetric to the steady-state value y¡1 = 0.
If in addition to jy¡1j > 0 a cost-push shock ju0j > 0 hits the economy, the
absolute losses both under DIS and TP increase. Since TP allows an optimal com-
bination of the short-run cost from TP, the inclusion of jy¡1j > 0 in (2.10), with the
possibility to spread the impact of the initial shock ju0j > 0 over several periods, a
larger shock u0 alleviates the short-run cost from TP. Hence, the relative loss c RL
from TP decreases in ju0j for any given jy¡1j > 0.
However, this e®ect is the weaker the closer jy¡1j is to 0, as can be seen from























Figure 2.8: c RL depending on y¡1 and u0.
on c RL any more since DIS and TP do not di®er in t = 0.22 In this case, c RL
is parallel to the u0-axis. While u0 still in°uences the absolute loss-values L under
both policies and how these losses are spread over time under TP, it has no in°uence
on the relative gain from TP as measured by c RL, which is solely determined by the
long-run gains from TP for y¡1 = 0.
Note that RL is symmetric both to y¡1 = 0 for any given u0 and to u0 = 0 for
any given y¡1. Under DIS, y¡1 has no impact because (2.6) is not history-dependent
and u0 only in°uences the respective period loss L0, which is the weighted sum of the
variances ¼2
0 and y2
0. Hence, LDIS is independent of y¡1 and symmetric to u0 = 0.
Under TP, however, the history-dependence of (2.9) makes y¡1 and u0 in°uence
current and future losses. While the transitional dynamics di®er with the relative
sign of u0 and y¡1, the total absolute loss LTP does not for any given combination of
jy¡1j and ju0j. If the economy was in a recession (y¡1 < 0), for example,23 the price
to pay under TP is to decrease ¼0 through dampening y0. In ¯gure 2.9, the shift of
the steady-state aggregate demand curve AD¤ to AD0 re°ects this policy response.
Scenario 1: If additionally a negative cost-push shock u0 < 0 hits the economy,
i.e. with the same sign as y¡1 < 0, this shock lowers ¼0 further as the Phillips curve
(2.1) is shifted downwards from its steady-state locus AS¤ to AS0
0 in ¯gure 2.9. At
22To be precise, the policy `rules' (2.6) and (2.10) do not di®er in t = 0, but the losses di®er
because of the more favourable output-in°ation trade-o® through the impact of TP on E0¼1 in
(2.1). This bene¯t of TP is part of the long-run gains, however, because it is also present under
COM.
23The following arguments run in a completely analogous manner for y¡1 > 0.Chapter 2 Discretion rather than rules? 28
Figure 2.9: AS-AD-Diagram in t = 0 for two symmetric cost-push shocks u0.
the same time, u0 < 0 increases y0 ceteris paribus,24 brings y0 closer to the target
of 0 and thus reduces the price to pay for TP in the next periods t = 1;:::. The
anticipation of this policy in turn lowers in°ation expectations E0¼1 compared to
the steady-state and thus shifts AS0
0 even further down. B denotes the resulting
equilibrium in ¯gure 2.9 and is always closer to the ¼0-axis than A.
Scenario 2: If, however, the initial cost-push shock u0 is positive, i.e. of opposite
sign to y¡1 < 0, the transitional dynamics are reversed. The Phillips curve (2.1) is
shifted upwards to AS00
0 in ¯gure 2.9. In contrast to scenario 1 with u0 < 0, this
reduces the negative impact of y¡1 on ¼0 but increases y0 to point C. Hence, the
price to pay under TP in t = 1 is larger than in scenario 1, which in turn also lowers
in°ation expectations E0¼1 by more. The additional shift of AS00
0 downwards is thus
larger than for u0 < 0 and the new equilibrium is at point D.
Figure 2.10 presents the discounted period losses under TP for both cases in the
benchmark model. The behaviour of the economy as described above causes a larger
loss in the initial period for the ¯rst scenario with sign(y¡1) = sign(u0) compared to
the case with sign(y¡1) = ¡sign(u0) because the expectations channel has a smaller
24Formally, partial derivatives of (2.16) and (2.17) with respect to both state variables (yt¡1;ut)
show that both have the same qualitative e®ect on ¼t and an opposing e®ect on yt: @¼t=@yt¡1 =
!(1¡±)
® > 0 and @¼t=@ut = 1
°¡¯(½+±) > 0 while @yt=@yt¡1 = ± > 0 and @yt=@ut = ¡®
!(°¡¯(½+±)) < 0.Chapter 2 Discretion rather than rules? 29


























Figure 2.10: Discounted per-period loss values LTP;t for jy¡1j = 0:02 and ju0j =
0:01.
impact, but a reversal of the magnitude of losses for t ¸ 1 because the price to
pay for TP then is larger until the period loss converges to its unconditional value.
Since the sum of the discounted losses, however, is equal in both scenarios, LTP is
symmetric to u0 = 0 given y¡1 and to y¡1 = 0 given u0.
To summarise, Figure 2.8 presents the in°uences of the initial conditions on the
relative performance of TP and DIS and the rest of this section provides intuitive
explanations of the e®ects present in the model. c RL becomes positive, i.e. DIS
performs better than TP, in the benchmark model for quite realistic values of the
initial conditions, e.g. c RL > 0 for jy¡1j = 0:015 and ju0j = 0:01. Hence, it may not
be welfare increasing for an economy to switch from DIS to TP if it is not close to
its steady state.
2.4 Optimal timeless policy rule
So far, we have compared policy under discretion and under the timeless perspective
rule in the sense of Woodford (1999). The latter appears to be the most common
`optimal' rule in the recent literature on monetary policy. However, as noted in
the introduction, several authors have already mentioned that TP is not always an
optimal rule - without providing an analysis of the in°uence of di®erent parameters
on the performance of TP and without an intuitive interpretation of their result,
the main objectives of this chapter. In particular, Blake (2001) and Jensen (2003)Chapter 2 Discretion rather than rules? 30
derive the optimal timeless policy (OP) based on the unconditional expectations of









Starting from the root of the problem, however, and di®erentiating between the
monetary authority's discount factor ¯MA, at which the intertemporal losses in (2.3)
are discounted, and the private sector's discount factor ¯PS, that enters the New
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This yields as ¯rst order conditions
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= 2!yt + ®¸t = 0; t = 0;1;2;:::;
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yt¡1; t = 1;2;::: : (2.26)
Again, the timeless perspective requires neglecting (2.25) and applying (2.26) in
all periods. We know from the discussion in section 2.3.1 and Dennis (2004, Appen-
dix A) that using the `truly timeless' perspective with unconditional expectations
implicitly sets ¯MA = 1. Hence, the optimal timeless rule by Blake (2001) and








This rule causes a loss under unconditional expectations of
LOP =
![1 ¡ ´2 + (¯PS ¡ ´)2] + ®2
!(1 ¡ ´2)(» ¡ ¯PS´)2 ¢ ¾
2; (2.28)
25Recall that Blake (2001) and Jensen (2003) cannot account for the di®erence between ¯PS and
¯MA because they optimise over unconditional expectations of the loss function.Chapter 2 Discretion rather than rules? 31
where » ´ 1 + ¯2
PS + ®2





2¯PS and ½ = 0 for simplicity.
Performing simulations analogous to the ones in section 2.3.3, but with the op-
timal timeless rule (2.27) instead of (2.10) and f RL ´ LOP=LDIS ¡ 1, gives graphs
with similar patterns to the respective ¯gures in section 2.3.3. The critical di®erence
is that f RL never becomes positive for any parameter combinations (see ¯gures 2.12
to 2.16 in Appendix 2.B), even for ¯gure 2.7, where RL is positive, but f RL negative
for all ½.26 This suggests that as long as the private sector is not completely my-
opic27 and some weight is given to output stabilisation and prices are not perfectly
°exible, the inclusion of ¯PS in the optimal policy rule (2.27) is superior to DIS
from a truly timeless perspective.28 The optimal policy rule reduces its reaction to
the lagged output gap in all periods and thus optimally accounts for the decreasing
potential to use future policies to spread the e®ects of a current shock both in the
initial and future periods, given that the future is not discounted in the welfare
function (¯MA = 1). The reason is that (2.27) reduces the weight on yt¡1 by ¯PS
whereby today's output gap receives exactly the same weight in tomorrow's policy
with which the private sector discounts tomorrow's policy today.29
Hence, the inclusion of ¯PS optimally accounts for the use of unconditional ex-
pectations as the welfare criterion. But the general argument, that the relative
performance of policy-making under the timeless perspective and discretion re°ects
the trade-o® between short-run losses and long-run gains in (2.11), remains valid for
two reasons: First, the general pattern of the parameter in°uences is not a®ected
by OP. Second, the in°uence of initial conditions on the relative performance is al-
leviated, but still present in the benchmark model with ¯ = 0:99 as can be seen in
¯gure 2.11, which plots c RL as in ¯gure 2.8, but with OP instead of TP compared
to DIS.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper explores the theoretical implications of di®erent policy rules and discre-
tionary policy under varying parameters in the New Keynesian model. With the
comparison of short-run gains from discretion over rule-based policy and long-run
26Here, LDIS ¸ LOP for ½ = 0 with any combination of parameters, and increasing ½ only
aggravates this situation.
27For a completely myopic private sector, i.e. ¯PS = 0, the optimal timeless rule causes a loss
equivalent to the one under discretion because equations (2.6) and (2.23) are identical for ¯PS = 0.
Hence, there is no equivalent to Proposition 2.2 for OP.
28An analytical proof of this result could be given as follows: Since lim¯PS!0 LOP = LDIS and
dLOP
d¯ < 0 for 0 < ¯ · 1, while dLDIS
d¯ = 0, LOP < LDIS for 0 < ¯ · 1. But dLOP
d¯ is too complex




























Figure 2.11: c RL =
LOP
LDIS depending on y¡1 and u0.
losses from discretion, we have provided a framework in which to think about the
impact of di®erent parameters on monetary policy rules versus discretion. This
framework allows intuitive economic explanations of the e®ects at work.
Already Blake (2001), Jensen and McCallum (2002) and Jensen (2003) provide
evidence that a policy rule following the timeless perspective can cause larger losses
than purely discretionary modes of monetary policy making in special circumstances.
But none of these contributions considers an economic explanation for this rather
unfamiliar result let alone analyses the relevant parameters as rigorously as this
chapter.
What recommendations for economic policy making can be derived? Most im-
portantly, the timeless perspective in its standard formulation is not optimal for all
economies at all times. In particular, if an economy is characterised by rigid prices,
a low discount factor, a high preference for output stabilisation or a su±ciently
large deviation from its steady state, it should prefer discretionary monetary policy
over the timeless perspective. The critical parameter values obtained in this chapter
suggest that { for a number of empirically reasonable combinations of parameters {
the long-run losses from discretion may be less relevant than previously thought.
In an overall laudatory review of Woodford (2003), Walsh (2005) argues that
Woodford's book `will be widely recognized as the de¯nitive treatise on the new
Keynesian approach to monetary policy.' He critisises the book, however, for its
lack of an analysis of the potential short-run costs of adopting the timeless perspec-
tive rule. Walsh (2005) sees these short-run costs arising from incomplete credibilityChapter 2 Discretion rather than rules? 33
of the central bank. Our analysis has completely abstracted from such credibility
e®ects and still found potentially signi¯cant short-run costs from the timeless per-
spective. Obviously, if the private sector does not fully believe in the monetary
authority's commitment, the losses from sticking to a rule relative to discretionary
policy are even greater than in the model used in this chapter. One way to incorpo-
rate such issues is to assume that the private sector has to learn the monetary policy
rule. Evans and Honkapohja (2001) provide a convenient framework to analyse this
question in more detail.Chapter 2 Discretion rather than rules? 34
Appendix
2.A Derivation of LTP
The unconditional loss for the timeless perspective, equation (2.21), can be derived
in several steps. The MSV solution (2.16) and (2.17) depends on two state variables,











t] + 2Á21Á22E[yt¡1ut]: (2.29)
E[yt¡1ut] can be calculated from (2.15) with ut = ½ut¡1 + ² as
E[yt¡1ut] = E[(Á21yt¡2 + Á22(½ut¡2 + ²t¡1))(½ut¡1 + ²t)]
= E[Á21½ yt¡2ut¡1 | {z }
=E[yt¡1ut]
+Á22(½
2 ut¡1ut¡2 | {z }
=½¾2
u
+½ut¡1²t¡1 | {z }
=¾2
)] + 3 ¢ 0; (2.30)
since the white noise shock ²t is uncorrelated with anything from the past. Solving








1 ¡ ½2 ¾
2: (2.31)
Plugging this into (2.29), using E[y2
t] = E[y2
t¡1] = E[y2] and Á21;Á22 from the



















!2(1 ¡ ±2)(1 ¡ ±½)[° ¡ ¯(± + ½)]2 ¢
1
1 ¡ ½2 ¾
2: (2.32)











t] + 2Á11Á12E[yt¡1ut]: (2.33)




(1 + ±)(1 ¡ ±½)[° ¡ ¯(± + ½)]2 ¢
1
1 ¡ ½2 ¾
2: (2.34)
Hence, LTP as the weighted sum of E[¼2] and E[y2] is given by
LTP =
2!(1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ ½) + ®2(1 + ±½)
!(1 ¡ ±2)(1 ¡ ±½)[° ¡ ¯(± + ½)]2 ¢
1
1 ¡ ½2 ¾
2: (2.35)Chapter 2 Discretion rather than rules? 35
2.B In°uence of parameters on f RL











Figure 2.12: Variation of discount factor ¯, OP vs. DIS.











Figure 2.13: Variation of weight on the output gap !, OP vs. DIS.Chapter 2 Discretion rather than rules? 36









Figure 2.14: Variation of degree of price rigidity ³, OP vs. DIS.













Figure 2.15: Variation of degree of serial correlation ½ in the benchmark model,
OP vs. DIS.Chapter 2 Discretion rather than rules? 37















Figure 2.16: Variation of degree of serial correlation ½ with ! = 10, OP vs. DIS.Chapter 2 Discretion rather than rules? 38
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Using Taylor rules to understand ECB
monetary policy¤
Abstract
Over the last decade, the simple instrument policy rule developed by Taylor (1993)
has become a popular tool for evaluating monetary policy of central banks. As an
extensive empirical analysis of the ECB's past behaviour still seems to be in its
infancy, we estimate several instrument policy reaction functions for the ECB to
shed some light on actual monetary policy in the euro area under the presidency of
Wim Duisenberg and answer questions like whether the ECB has actually followed
a stabilising or a destabilising rule so far.
Looking at contemporaneous Taylor rules, the presented evidence suggests that
the ECB is accommodating changes in in°ation and hence follows a destabilising
policy. However, this impression seems to be largely due to the lack of a forward-
looking perspective in such speci¯cations. Either assuming rational expectations
and using a forward-looking speci¯cation, or using expectations as derived from
surveys result in Taylor rules which do imply a stabilising role of the ECB. The use
of real-time industrial production data does not seem to play such a signi¯cant role
as in the case of the US.
¤This chapter is based on joint work with Jan-Egbert Sturm and provides an extended and
updated version of Sauer and Sturm (2007).
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3.1 Introduction
Over the last decade, the simple instrument policy rule developed by Taylor (1993)
has become a popular tool for evaluating monetary policy of central banks. Besides
numerous papers on the behaviour of the Federal Reserve and other central banks,2
some authors have applied this rule as a policy guide for the European Central
Bank (ECB) in advance of the introduction of the euro in 1999.3 Since then, the
Taylor rule has been used mainly as a rough guide for the evaluation of the ECB
policy by many ECB watchers in several periodicals such as `Monitoring the ECB'
by the CEPR. In contrast to that evidence and despite the end of term of the
ECB's ¯rst president, Mr. Duisenberg, an extensive empirical analysis of the ECB's
past behaviour still seems to be in its infancy. Referring to its short history, most
papers on ECB monetary policy have estimated a Bundesbank or a hypothetical
ECB reaction function prior to 1999 and then, e.g., by testing for out-of-sample
stability, compared the implied interest rates with the actual ECB policy.4 Only
few researchers, such as Four» cans and Vranceanu (2002), Gerdesmeier and Ro±a
(2003) and Ullrich (2003), have actually estimated an ECB reaction function.
We add to this latter literature by estimating several instrument policy reaction
functions for the ECB. In this way we intend to shed some light on actual monetary
policy in the euro area. Looking back over the `Duisenberg-era', we explore what role
the output gap has played in the actual ECB policy and how actively the ECB has
really responded to changes in in°ation. By comparing these results with those for
the Bundesbank, we hope to get a clearer picture of the new institutional monetary
setting in Europe.
In describing actual monetary policy of the ECB by so-called Taylor rules, we
will focus on data uncertainties faced by policy-makers. They base their decisions
upon data which will most likely be revised in the future. Still most studies on
central bank behaviour neglect this issue and use so-called `current' or `ex-post'
data, i.e. data published in the latest release, to estimate monetary policy rules.
In reality, central bankers can only use so-called `real-time' data, i.e. data available
when taking the decision. Croushore and Stark (2001) and Swanson, Ghysels and
Callan (1999) show that data revisions in the case of the US a®ect policy analysis
and economic forecasts to a substantial degree. In his in°uential paper, Orphanides
(2001) shows that estimated policy reaction functions obtained using the ex-post
revised data can yield misleading descriptions of historical policy in the case of the
2See, e.g., Clarida, Gal¶ ³ and Gertler (1998), Clarida, Gal¶ ³ and Gertler (2000), Judd and Rude-
bush (1998), Kozicki (1999), Orphanides (2001), Rudebusch (2002) and Taylor (1999).
3See, e.g., Gerlach and Schnabel (2000) and Peersman and Smets (1998).
4See, e.g., Clausen and Hayo (2002), Faust, Rogers and Wright (2001) and Smant (2002) for
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US. We explore whether data revisions contain similar problems for the euro area.
In this line of argument, the use of survey data which are rarely being revised in the
course of time, readily available, and timely (as opposed to most o±cial data) can
be very helpful.
A second important aspect of survey data is its prevalent forward-looking per-
spective. It is well known that central banks not only respond to past informa-
tion, but use a broad range of information. In particular, they consider forecasts
of in°ation and output in their decision process. The theoretical justi¯cation for
such a forward-looking approach is given by, e.g., Clarida, Gal¶ ³ and Gertler (1999)
within a New Keynesian model. In addition to investigating policy reaction func-
tions based on survey data, we follow Clarida et al. (1998, 1999, 2000) and estimate
forward-looking Taylor rules in order to compare the relevance of real-time versus
forward-looking aspects.
We conclude that, without assuming a forward-looking attitude of ECB policy-
makers, past policy rate changes are identi¯ed as having been too small with respect
to changes in in°ation and the ECB's policy reaction function does clearly di®er
from that of the Bundesbank. However, once forward-looking behaviour of the ECB
is taken into account, it has followed a stabilising course, i.e. nominal policy rate
changes were large enough to actually in°uence real short term interest rates. In
that case, it becomes more di±cult to statistically distinguish between the way the
Bundesbank has carried out its mandate of achieving price stability in the nineties
and the way the ECB has done it since. Speci¯cations using survey information, and
therefore combining a forward-looking aspect with the use of real-time data, result
in by far the best ¯t. Unlike for the US, the use of real-time { instead of ex-post
data { does not make such a clear di®erence for any of our conclusions for the euro
area.
The next section introduces the Taylor rule. Section 3.3 o®ers a short overview of
the relevant empirical literature. The following two sections present our own results.
Amongst others, we exemplify the use of real-time as well as forward-looking data
in estimating Taylor rules for the ECB. We end with some concluding remarks.
3.2 The Taylor rule
The Maastricht Treaty has made the ECB very independent. Nowadays, it is widely
believed that a high level of central bank independence and an explicit mandate
for the bank to restrain in°ation are important institutional devices to assure price
stability. It is thought that an independent central bank can give full priority to low
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price stability, which according to the Governing Council of the ECB is measured by
a year-on-year increase of the harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP) for the
euro area of below, but close to 2 per cent over the medium term. In countries with a
more dependent central bank, other considerations (notably, re-election perspectives
of politicians and a low level of unemployment) may interfere with the objective of
price stability.
The monetary policy strategy of the ECB rests on two `pillars'.5 One pillar,
the monetary analysis, gives a prominent role to money. As in°ation in the long
run is considered to be a monetary phenomenon, the ECB Governing Council has
announced a quantitative reference value for the annual growth rate of a broad
monetary aggregate (M3). The other pillar, the economic analysis, is a broadly
based assessment both of the outlook regarding price developments and of the risks
to price stability in the euro area as a whole. As noted by Issing, Caspar, Angeloni
and Tristani (2001), a wide range of economic and ¯nancial indicator variables {
like output gap measures (i.e. measures of the discrepancy between output, or its
factors of production, and their equilibrium values) { is used for this purpose.
The above suggests that, like for the US, it might be possible to describe mone-
tary policy in the euro area by a rule depending upon both in°ation and output gap
developments. A natural starting point is the rule as advocated by Taylor (1993) to
describe the monetary policy of the Federal Reserve in the US:6
it = r
¤ + ¼t + 0:5(¼t ¡ ¼
¤) + 0:5yt = (r
¤ ¡ 0:5¼
¤) + 1:5¼t + 0:5yt: (3.1)
it represents the policy interest rate, r¤ the equilibrium or natural real rate, ¼t the
rate of in°ation (as a proxy for expected in°ation), ¼¤ the in°ation target and yt
the output gap in period t.
From a theoretical point of view, Svensson (1999) shows that such a rule is
the optimal reaction function for a central bank pursuing an in°ation target in a
simple backward-looking model (using an IS and a Phillips curve).7 In line with
the economic analysis of the ECB's policy strategy, the output gap is useful in
forecasting future in°ation and therefore enters the reaction function of the central
bank even when it has a strict in°ation target.
An important question relates to the weight on in°ation. Since it is the real
5The announced changes by the ECB Governing Council on May 8th 2003 are primarily intended
to improve communication. For instance, the two pillars have been interchanged and relabelled to
stress the way in which information under the two pillars are cross-checked.
6As common in this line of literature, the nominal short-term interest rate on the money market
is considered to re°ect the stance of monetary policy.
7For other examples which motivate such a speci¯cation theoretically, we refer to Svensson
(1997), Bernanke and Woodford (1997), Ball (1999) and Woodford (2001, 2003a).Chapter 3 Using Taylor rules to understand ECB monetary policy 45
interest rate which actually drives private decisions, the size of this weight needs to
assure that { as a response to a rise in in°ation { the nominal interest rate is raised
enough to actually increase the real interest rate. This so-called `Taylor principle'
implies that this coe±cient has to be greater than 1. Appendix 3.A derives the
Taylor principle using the model of Svensson (1999) and the New Keynesian model
of chapter 2.
The idea that an `active' monetary policy that reacts strongly to in°ation de-
termines the equilibrium of an economy goes at least back to Leeper (1991). If the
central bank does not follow such a `leaning against the wind' policy, self-ful¯lling
bursts of in°ation may be possible (see, e.g., Bernanke and Woodford, 1997; Clarida
et al., 1998, 2000; Woodford, 2001, 2003a).8
In order to compare the original Taylor rule (3.1) with actual monetary policy,
we need to set the equilibrium real interest rate and the in°ation target and ¯nd
proxies for the actual stance of monetary policy, the rate of in°ation and the output
gap.9 With the ECB's in°ation target of (close to, but) under 2 per cent and a mean
ex-post real interest rate of roughly 1.5 per cent over the Duisenberg era, Taylor's
(1993) original values of ¼¤ = 2 and r¤ = 2 for the US should also do reasonably
well for the euro area. We measure actual monetary policy with the Euro Overnight
Index Average (EONIA) lending rate on the money market.10 In°ation is measured
by the year-on-year percentage change in the harmonised index of consumer prices
for the euro area, i.e. the price index used by the ECB to measure price stability.11
The most di±cult variable to quantify in this context is the output gap. Given
the relatively short time span since the introduction of the euro and the monthly
frequency in which the governing council of the ECB meets and discusses the stance
of monetary policy, we follow, e.g., Clarida et al. (1998) and Faust et al. (2001) and
use monthly data. This restricts our option with respect to an output gap measure.
In line with, e.g., Clarida et al. (1998), we take the industrial production index
8Within the literature on adaptive learning, Bullard and Mitra (2002) show that the Taylor
principle completely characterises learnability of the fundamental (minimum state variable) rational
expectations equilibrium. Honkapohja and Mitra (2004) demonstrate that policies violating the
Taylor principle lead to indeterminacy and also non-fundamental rational expectations equilibria
are then unlearnable.
9Appendix 3.B contains a list of all time series used and their sources.
10There is some discussion about what is the correct short-term interest rate for the euro area.
We focus on the EONIA as it is the European equivalent of the Federal Funds rate for the US.
Nevertheless, P¶ erez Quir¶ os and Sicilia (2002) challenge its relevance because of the relatively high
volatility when looking at a daily frequency due to short-term liquidity needs. As monthly averages
smooth out such movements, this does not appear to be relevant for our study; all results are robust
to using the 3-month EURIBOR instead.
11We use ex-post available data with respect to the in°ation rate, i.e. the major revision of the
German CPI as published in March 2003 is included. This revision has reduced in°ation rates in
the euro area up to 0.5 percentage points mainly in the year 2000. Taking older releases, however,
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Figure 3.1: The nominal interest rate and the Taylor rule in Germany and the
euro area.
Notes: The data before 1999 refer to Germany and monetary policy as conducted by the German
Bundesbank. From 1999 onwards, the data refer to the euro area and the ECB. The solid line
equals the Frankfurt overnight interest rate / EONIA, whereas the dotted line shows the three
months moving average Taylor rule, in which the in°ation rate is measured as the year-to-year
percentage change in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (for respectively Germany and
the euro area) and the output gap is measured as the deviation of (German / euro area) industrial
production from a Hodrick-Prescott ¯ltered trend.
for the euro area, apply a standard Hodrick-Prescott ¯lter (with the smoothing
parameter set at ¸ = 14;400 and calculate our measure of the output gap as the
deviation of the logarithm of actual industrial production from its trend.12 Despite
the increasing share of services in the overall economy, it is still generally believed
that the industrial sector is the `cycle maker' in the sense that it leads and in°uences
large parts of the economy.13
Using these measures, ¯gure 3.1 depicts actual monetary policy together with
the Taylor rule as given by equation (3.1).14 To enhance comparison with the Bun-
12To calculate a reliable measure of the output gap, we use data for euro area industrial produc-
tion from 1985 onwards.
13As will be discussed later, industrial production data are frequently revised. For that reason,
we will also look at real-time industrial production and at the European Sentiment Indicator
(ESIN) as measures of the output gap.
14Since our measure of the output gap based on industrial production is more volatile than
Taylor's (1993) original GDP-based output gap, it might be argued that it is more appropriate toChapter 3 Using Taylor rules to understand ECB monetary policy 47
desbank era, the same graph also shows both time series for Germany using the
Frankfurt overnight interest rate and other German counterparts for the remaining
series.15 In general, the coincidence of the actual nominal interest rate and the
Taylor rule is quite striking especially given the sometimes volatile movements in
industrial production.16 Only during three time periods, the discrepancy between
the two series appears to be relatively persistent: First, in the aftermath of Ger-
man uni¯cation and the following crisis of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism
(ERM) until mid-1993. Second, during the second half of 1998 and the ¯rst half of
1999. Hence, the change towards the euro seems to have had its e®ect on actual
monetary policy. Finally, the gap since 11 September 2001 appears to be rather
widening.
3.3 An overview of the empirical literature
Using such a simple rule for monetary policy and building on the experience of
Taylor (1993), several authors have tried to estimate the weights given to deviations
of in°ation and output from their optimum by central bankers rather than choosing
a symmetric weight of 0.5 as in equation (3.1). The general idea of such work is to
estimate:
it = ® + g¼¼t + gyyt + "t (3.2)
where the constant ® captures the term (r¤ ¡ 0:5¼¤) in equation (3.1), g¼ and gy
represent the estimated weights on in°ation and the output gap, respectively, and
"t is an i.i.d. error term.
In practice, it is commonly observed that, especially since the early 1990s, central
banks worldwide tend to move policy interest rates in small steps without reversing
direction quickly.17 To capture this so-called interest rate smoothing, equation (3.2)
is viewed as the mechanism by which the target interest rate i¤
t is determined. The
actual interest rate it partially adjusts to this target according to it = (1¡½)i¤
t+½it¡1,
where ½ is the smoothing parameter. This results in the following equation to be
use a lower weight on yt than 0.5. Adjusting this weight by the ratio of the standard deviations
of the output gaps based on GDP and industrial production (=0.68 for euro area since 1999) does
not alter ¯gure 3.1 in any relevant way.
15For the period before 1999, we have also experimented with using industrial production and in-
°ation for the euro area. The data, however, suggest that actual policy of the German Bundesbank
has been more concerned with inner German developments.
16Using quarterly data and taking deviations of GDP from its trend to measure the output gap
results in an even better ¯t. This explains why, for example, the ¯t as shown in ¯gure 3.1 is not
as perfect as in Taylor (1993) for the federal funds rate.
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estimated:
it = (1 ¡ ½)® + (1 ¡ ½)(g¼¼t + gyyt) + ½it¡1 + "t (3.3)
Table 3.1 presents a review of di®erent Taylor rule estimates for the euro area
and the Bundesbank using monthly or quarterly data.18 All regressions show that
monetary policy prior to 1999 followed the Taylor principle as g¼ exceeds 1 consis-
tently. This holds for both Germany and the hypothetical euro area.19 One reason
for the small di®erences between the Bundesbank and the hypothetical euro area
might be the fact that Germany possesses a very large weight in the calculation of
the hypothetical euro area interest rate due to its economic size and some authors
included merely a subset of all euro member countries in their studies.20
Furthermore, note that studies which allow the central banks to behave in a
forward-looking manner do not seem to di®er signi¯cantly from those which do not.
This result can be interpreted in di®erent ways. One possibility is that the period
of estimation has been relatively stable which would make actual measures of the
business cycle and the in°ation di®erential good indicators of (short-term) future
developments. In less stable environments { as arguably encountered by the ECB
in the last couple of years { this convenient attribute of contemporaneous measures
might fail.
With respect to actual ECB policy the story looks rather di®erent; the results
of Gerdesmeier and Ro±a (2003) and Ullrich (2003) { who use standard output
gap measures based on Hodrick-Prescott-¯ltered industrial production as described
above { contradict those of Four» cans and Vranceanu (2002) { who take annual
growth rate of industrial production as business cycle measure { and the literature
on Taylor rules for both Germany and the hypothetical euro area. While Four» cans
and Vranceanu (2002) ¯nd the ECB to react strongly to variations in the in°ation
rate and much less to output variations, Gerdesmeier and Ro±a (2003), Surico
(2003), as well as Ullrich (2003) estimate small reactions to in°ation movements {
suggesting a destabilising role of the ECB { and (both in relative and in absolute
terms) strong replies to output deviations. Furthermore, Ullrich (2003) observes a
structural break between pre-1999 and post-1999 monetary policy in the euro area.
18Recently, some authors have used ordered probit models to estimate the probability of discrete
policy interest rate changes rather than to explain interest rate levels with in°ation and output gap
measures (see, e.g., Carstensen, 2006; Gerlach, 2005; Ullrich, 2005). Since the estimation technique
and the interpretation of the parameters are very di®erent to the standard approach used in this
chapter, such papers are not included in table 3.1.
19The way the hypothetical euro area is being de¯ned slightly varies across the cited papers.
However, any measure is dominated by the three largest economies in the euro area, i.e. Germany,
France and Italy.
20The striking di®erence of Clausen and Hayo's (2002) value for euro area gy in comparison with
all other papers and their own value for the Bundesbank might be due to their special estimation
technique; they estimate a simultaneous equation model using full information maximum likelihood.Chapter 3 Using Taylor rules to understand ECB monetary policy 49
Table 3.1: Review of Taylor rule estimations for the euro area and the Bundesbank.
Study Type of rule Sample period ® g¼ gy ½
Germany
Clarida et al. (1998) Fwd. 1979:3-1993:12 3.14 1.31 0.25 0.91
(0.28) (0.09) (0.04) (0.01)
Peersman and Smets Fwd. 1979:1-1997:12 2.52 1.30 0.28 0.93
(1998) (0.32) (0.10) (0.05) (0.01)
Faust et al. (2001) Fwd. 1985:1-1998:12 2.85 1.31 0.18 0.91
(0.85) (0.35) (0.16) (0.03)
Clausen and Hayo (2002) Cont. 1979:I-1996:IV 3.83 2.89 0.49 0.88
Smant (2002) Fwd. 1979:3-1998:12 3.32 1.73 0.45 0.91
(0.26) (0.25) (0.17) (0.02)
Bohl and Siklos (2007) Fwd. 1982:1-1998:12 1.20 0.28 0.92
(0.20) (0.59) (0.03)
Hypothetical euro area
Peersman and Smets Fwd. 1980:I-1997:IV 3.87 1.20 0.76 0.76
(1998) (0.44) (0.09) (0.13) (0.13)
Gerlach and Schnabel Cont. 1990:I-1998:IV 2.40 1.58 0.45
(2000) (0.30) (0.09) (0.06)
Cont. 1990:I-1998:IV 2.65 1.51 0.49 0.32
Fwd. 1990:I-1998:IV 1.95 1.51 0.28 0.18
Clausen and Hayo (2002) Cont. 1979:I-1996:IV 4.07 2.15 2.12 0.86
Gerlach-Kristen (2002) Cont. 1988:I-1999:IV 1.72 0.91 0.75
(0.33) (0.28) (0.05)
Ullrich (2003) Cont. 1995:1-1998:12 1.97 1.25 0.29 0.23
Castelnuovo (2007)¤ Cont. 1980:I-2003:IV 1.15 0.98
(0.28) (0.22)
Fwd. 1980:I-2003:IV 1.00 1.80
(0.60) (0.85)
[Table continued on the next page]
To summarise, in contrast to the evidence of the Bundesbank and the hypo-
thetical euro area, the actual ECB policy since 1999 does not necessarily seem to
comply with the Taylor principle. In the rest of the chapter, we intend to shed some
more light on this issue by estimating several reaction functions of the ECB and
elaborating on the relevance of the output gap measures. Furthermore, we will go
into the forward-looking behaviour of actual monetary policy in recent years. Table
3.1 already reveals that all papers published after the working paper version of this
chapter (Sauer and Sturm, 2003) con¯rm the Taylor principle with a forward-looking
rule, but reject it with a contemporaneous one.Chapter 3 Using Taylor rules to understand ECB monetary policy 50
Table 3.1: (continued)
Study Type of rule Sample period ® g¼ gy ½
Actual euro area
Four» cans and Vranceanu Cont./ 1999:4-2002:2 1.22 1.16 0.18 0.73
(2002)x Fwd. (0.15) (0.04) (0.06)
Gerdesmeier and Ro±a Cont. 1999:1-2002:1 2.60 0.45 0.30 0.72
(2003) (0.20) (0.10) (0.03) (0.04)
Surico (2003) Cont. 1997:7-2002:10 3.77 0.77 0.47 0.77
(0.06) (0.11) (0.07) (0.03)
Ullrich (2003) Cont. 1999:1-2002:8 2.96 0.25 0.63 0.19
Four» cans and Vranceanu Cont. 1999:4-2003:10 1.80 0.84 0.32 0.90
(2004) Fwd. 1999:4-2003:10 -2.53 2.80 0.19 0.84
Belke et al. (2005) Cont. 1999:I-2005:II 0.02 0.49 1.94 0.75
(0.00) (0.19) (0.08) (0.02)
Fendel and Frenkel (2005) Fwd. 1999:1-2005:6 -1.26 1.67 0.57 0.86
(1.08) (0.48) (0.05) (0.02)
Fendel and Frenkel (2006) Fwd. 1999:1-2003:12 -0.68 2.00 0.53 0.84
(0.65) (0.30) (0.03) (0.01)
Hayo and Hofmann (2006) Fwd. 1999:1-2004:5 0.32 1.48 0.60 0.85
(1.77) (0.79) (0.10) (0.05)
Four» cans and Vranceanu Cont. 1999:1-2005:10 0.07 0.63 1.08 0.94
(2006) Fwd. 1999:1-2005:10 -0.34 4.88 0.66 0.96
Notes: Contemporaneous (Cont.) Taylor rules refer to equation (3.3), forward-looking (Fwd.)
Taylor rules to equation (3.5). If reported, standard errors are within parentheses.
¤This author employs a procedure developed by English, Nelson and Sack (2003) in order to test
for active interest rate smoothing (see also section 3.6). This test requires to estimate equations
(3.3) and (3.5) in ¯rst di®erences, i.e. using ¢it = it ¡ it¡1 as a dependant variable instead of it,
and these results are reported here.
xThese authors use so-called growth-rate cycles (instead of growth cycles) of industrial production.
As shown by, e.g., Nierhaus and Sturm (2003), a property of growth rate cycles is that business cycle
turning point usually show up sooner than in case of growth cycles. Relative to growth cycles, the
use of growth rate cycles therefore introduces a limited form of forward-looking behaviour. Sauer
and Sturm (2003, 2005) show that this actually explains the di®erence in results between these
and other authors using actual euro area data for 1999-2003.
3.4 Contemporaneous rules for the ECB
3.4.1 Using ex-post data
Columns (1) and (4) of table 3.2 report the results of estimating equations (3.2)
and (3.3) using ex-post data. In order to get a clearer impression of the institu-
tional changes related to the ECB taking up monetary policy in the euro area, the
regressions have been conducted for the period 1991:1-2003:10, the end of Wim
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the Bundesbank (1991:1-1998:12) and the ECB (1999:1-2003:10) period.21 In this
way, we can test whether signi¯cant changes have occurred. Without for the time
being going into the details of the di®erent regressions, the last two rows of the
table { presenting the results of this Chow test { clearly reject the assumption of
identical monetary policy reaction functions. Figure 3.1 suggests that this might be
mainly due to the transition period, i.e. the second half of 1998 and the ¯rst half
of 1999. To test this, Columns (2) and (5) do not take data from 1998:7-1999:6
into account. The results of the Chow test are hardly in°uenced by this. Hence,
Bundesbank policy for Germany during the 1990s clearly di®ers from ECB policy
under Duisenberg.
To explain in what way policies diverge, we look at the individual parameter
estimates. Column (1) shows the outcomes when estimating equation (3.2). The
in°ation parameter for the ECB period ( gECB
¼ ) is higher than the output parameter
( gECB
y ), but does, however, not exceed one. Hence, the ECB moves to accommodate
changes in in°ation, but does not increase it su±ciently to keep the real interest rate





, which reports the probability of the ECB in°ation parameter to exceed
one.
The middle half of table 3.2, reporting the extent to which ECB and Bundesbank
coe±cients di®er, shows that the Bundesbank did not pursue such an accommodative
strategy. The point estimate for gBuBa
¼ equals (0:47 + 0:90 =)1:37. The di®erence
between the two point estimates is highly signi¯cant. Hence, the Bundesbank more
clearly followed a policy stabilising in°ation as compared to the ECB. This ¯nding
is quite robust in the sense that the di®erence between the in°ation parameters is
signi¯cantly positive across almost all speci¯cations tested.
Furthermore, the row labelled gBuBa
y ¡gECB
y reports highly signi¯cant di®erences
between the Bundesbank and the ECB with respect to the output variable when
estimating equation (3.2). The ECB seems to respond much more to changes in the
business cycle than the Bundesbank has during the last years in which it determined
monetary policy.
A consistent feature of OLS estimates of such simple rules as equation (3.2) is a
high degree of serial correlation in the error term. Both the low Durbin-Watson sta-
tistic and the high maximum gap reported by the Durbin Cumulated Periodogram
test clearly indicate severe problems with respect to serial correlation in the error
term.22 Furthermore, the Engle and Granger (1987) cointegration tests indicate
21Changing the sample period for the Bundesbank to 1994:1-1998:12, i.e. excluding the aftermath
of German uni¯cation and the ERM crisis, does not alter our qualitative results.
22As we report Newey and West (1987) standard errors this should { in principle { not a®ect
our ability to interpret the reported standard errors.Chapter 3 Using Taylor rules to understand ECB monetary policy 52
Table 3.2: Estimated contemporaneous Taylor rules based on Hodrick-Prescott ¯l-
tered output gap, 1991:1-2003:10 (with and without transition period).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
yex¡post yex¡post yreal¡time yex¡post yex¡post yreal¡time
ECB-coe±cients
®ECB 2.49 1.54 1.93 4.81 5.75 5.27
(5.55) (4.44) (4.56) (2.82) (1.60) (0.81)
gECB
¼ 0.47 0.89 0.83 -0.84 -1.28 -0.27
(2.04) (5.24) (3.64) (-0.89) (-0.71) (-0.10)
gECB
y 0.38 0.43 0.19 1.45 1.52 3.01
(4.83) (5.40) (2.13) (1.99) (1.66) (0.65)
½ECB 0.94 0.95 0.98
(25.50) (22.68) (29.81)
Di®erence BuBa-ECB coe±cients
®BuBa ¡ ®ECB -0.72 0.01 -5.77 -6.78
(-1.44) (0.02) (-1.70) (-1.48)
gBuBa
¼ ¡ gECB
¼ 0.90 0.54 2.29 2.78
(3.74) (2.83) (2.19) (1.49)
gBuBa
y ¡ gECB
y -0.39 -0.44 0.08 -0.06
(-4.14) (-4.55) (0.04) (-0.04)
½BuBa ¡ ½ECB 0.04 0.03
(0.93) (0.68)
# Obs. 154 142 58 153 142 57
adj. R2 0.85 0.86 0.32 1.00 1.00 0.96
DW/Durbin's h 0.27 0.32 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
Cum. Per. Test 0.64 0.61 0.69 0.12 0.12 0.15
Engle-Granger -3.69 -3.91 -0.77 -11.36 -11.40 -7.15
Prob (gECB
¼ > 1) 0.01 0.27 0.22 0.03 0.11 0.32
Chow-test 39.15 37.55 20.10 18.32
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: Columns (1), (2) and (3) show the results for equation (3.2) using OLS with Newey and West
(1987) standard errors allowing for serial correlation up to order 3. Columns (4), (5) and (6) present
non-linear least squares estimates of equation (3.3) again using Newey and West (1987) standard
errors. Columns (2) and (5) exclude the transition period to EMU, i.e. 1998:7-1999:6. The output
gap is measured by the Hodrick-Prescott ¯ltered industrial production. Columns (3) and (6) take
detrended real-time industrial production, shifted back by two months, for the output gap variable.
The row identi¯ed as DW/Durbin's h presents the Durbin-Watson test statistic for Columns (1),
(2) and (3) and Durbin's h for Columns (4), (5) and (6). The Durbin Cumulated Periodogram
Test (Cum. Per. Test) { a test for general serial correlation using frequency frequency domain
techniques { shows the maximum gap between the theoretical spectral distribution of a white noise
process and the actual residuals. In case it is signi¯cantly di®erent from zero, we cannot reject
the null of general serial correlation. For Columns (1), (2), (4) and (5) the approximate rejection
limits for this test are 0.17 (1%), 0.14 (5%) and 0.12 (10%). In case of Columns (3) and (6)
these rejection limits are 0.24 (1%), 0.20 (5%) and 0.18 (10%). The row labelled Engle-Granger
denotes the t-statistics of the Engle and Granger (1987) cointegration test. The MacKinnon (1991)
critical value using 154 observations and 6 explanatory variables equals -5.41 at the 1 per cent level.
The MacKinnon (1991) critical value using 58 (57) observations and 3 (4) explanatory variables
equals -4.55 (-4.73) at the 1 per cent level. The next row shows the probability of the coe±cient
gECB
¼ being larger than 1. The null hypothesis of the Chow test is that the coe±cients for the
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that the residuals are non-stationary, which implies that at least some variables
are non-stationary and indicates that it might be problematic to interpret the es-
timated coe±cients the way we did.23 While interest rates and in°ation are likely
to be stationary in large samples, augmented Dickey and Fuller (1979, 1981) tests
nevertheless indicate the presence of a unit root in our sample (not shown).24
To cope with the non-stationarity of some of our series and to take a possible
cointegration relationship into account, we have also applied the fully modi¯ed es-
timator of Phillips and Hansen (1990).25 This method provides an alternative to
the use of error correction models (ECM) that are of growing popularity in em-
pirical research.26 As shown in Phillips (1988), the semi-parametric fully modi¯ed
method and the parametric ECM approach are asymptotically equivalent in some
cases. In other cases (characterised by feedback among the innovations) the fully
modi¯ed method is preferable in terms of asymptotic behaviour. The fully modi¯ed
estimation results (not shown) do not di®er much from the results presented in the
¯rst columns. The point estimate for the ECB in°ation parameter is even nearly
identical. The ECB output parameter, and the di®erences between the Bundesbank
and ECB period are generally found to be larger, albeit less signi¯cant.27
The other more conventional answer to the reported high serial correlation in
the residuals of equation (3.2) is to include a lagged interest rate as an additional
explanatory variable and hence turn to empirical estimates of equation (3.3). Col-
umn (4) of table 3.2 reports the results. The inclusion of the lagged interest rate
both improves the ¯t of the regression and lowers the degree of serial correlation
23We prefer the use of the Engle-Granger cointegration test, instead of the Durbin-Watson test
on cointegration, because `[t]he use of [the Durbin-Watson] statistic is problematic in the present
setting. First, the test statistic for co-integration depends upon the number of regressors in the
co-integrating equation and, more generally, on the data-generation process and hence on the
precise data matrix. Second, the bounds diverge as the number of regressors is increased, and
eventually cease to have any practical value for the purpose of inference. Finally, the statistic
assumes the null where [the residual vector] is a random walk, and the alternative where [the
residual vector] is a stationary ¯rst-order autoregressive process (...). However, the tabulated
bounds are not correct if there is higher-order residual autocorrelation, as will commonly occur.'
(Banerjee, Dolado, Galbraith and Hendry, 1993, p. 207).
24By using the Hodrick-Prescott ¯lter to calculate our measure of the output gap, this variable
is by construction stationary. This is con¯rmed by augmented Dickey-Fuller tests. However,
according to, e.g., Nelson and Plosser (1982) or Harvey and Jaeger (1993), the use of the Hodrick-
Prescott ¯lter might create arti¯cial business cycles in the output gap variable (if the underlying
industrial production series is non-stationary). A solution to this potential problem is the use of
(stationary) survey data.
25The underlying idea of cointegration is that non-stationary time series (such as interest and
in°ation rates) can move apart in the short run, but will be brought back to an equilibrium relation
in the long run.
26See in the present context Gerlach-Kristen (2003), for example.
27As the fully modi¯ed OLS method continues to produce similar outcomes to other methods,
we will in the remaining of the chapter neither report nor discuss them; these results are available
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in the errors. Both the Durbin-h statistic and the Durbin Cumulated Periodogram
test cannot reject the hypothesis that the residuals behave normal. Furthermore, the
Engle and Granger cointegration test clearly rejects non-stationarity of the residuals.
As compared to the ¯rst column, the ECB in°ation parameter reduces in value
and becomes even negative. Hence, its di®erence to that of the Bundesbank further
increases albeit becomes less signi¯cant. For the output gap parameter, the point
estimate for the ECB becomes larger. However, the di®erence between the Bundes-
bank and the ECB is no longer signi¯cant. Column (5) shows that these conclusions
are hardly driven by the inclusion of the period 1998:7 until 1999:6 in which the tran-
sition towards a single currency took place and appears to have a®ected monetary
policy (see ¯gure 3.1).
In general, these results con¯rm Gerdesmeier and Ro±a (2003) as well as Ullrich
(2003) and suggest that the ECB reacts to a rise in in°ation by raising nominal short-
term interest rates by a relatively small amount and thus letting real short-term
interest rates decline. As argued before, such accommodating behaviour constitutes
a destabilising policy with respect to in°ation. Hence, instead of continuing the
in°ation stabilising policy line as conducted by the Bundesbank, the ECB appears
to have followed a policy rather comparable to the pre-Volcker era of the Federal
reserve, for which, e.g., Taylor (1999) and Clarida et al. (2000) have found values
for g¼ well below one.
3.4.2 Using real-time data
A general critique to estimated policy rules such as (3.2) and (3.2) has been pro-
posed in a sequence of articles by Orphanides (2001, 2002, 2004). He suggests that
appropriateness of the Taylor rule requires the use of `real-time' data, i.e. data ac-
tually available to the central bank at the time of its decision making. The ¯rst
step to acknowledge this argument is by referring to expectations and the use of an
available information set to form these expectations. Often then { to get rid of the
problem of real-time data { rational expectations with unbiased forecast errors with
respect to the ¯nal data are assumed.28 However, as shown by Orphanides (2001,
2002, 2004), the actual use of real-time data in the case of the Federal Reserve for
the US can cause important di®erences. While he uses information provided by the
Greenbook for Federal Reserve Board meetings, we have to rely on publicly available
data for the euro area.
In accordance with Coenen, Levin and Wieland (2005), one way to solve this
problem is to take real-time data from the ECB's Monthly Bulletin statistics for the
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HICP and industrial production. The time lag of publication varies between one
and two months for the in°ation rate29 and three to four months for the industrial
production index.30 Coenen et al. (2005, Table 1), document the extent of revisions
of these ¯gures, which can be summarised as being negligible for the in°ation rate,31
but substantial and frequent for the industrial production index. For this reason,
we focus on the consequences of using real-time data for our measure of the output
gap.
Converting our business cycle measure into real time not only involves the use
of real-time industrial production data. In the previous section { and as usual
in this line of literature {, we have estimated potential output in one run using
all ex-post data available. However, policymakers do not have access to future
information necessary to properly calculate potential output. Our monthly measure
of the real-time output gap is therefore based only on data available up to two
months before the month in question, i.e. potential output is calculated using the
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) ¯lter for each month separately using each time 10 preceding
years of data.32 In each run, we use the ¯rst release of industrial production for the
six most recent monthly observations; ex-post data are used for older observations.
Hence, we assume that the major revisions will take place within the ¯rst half year
after release.33
Figure 3.2 shows, amongst others, the output gap measures as calculated us-
ing ex-post data (IP) and the version based on real-time data (real-time IP) since
1999:1, i.e. the ECB period. Especially during the period between the second half
of 2000 and the ¯rst half of 2002, the use of real-time data clearly underestimates
the expansionary phase in which the European industrial sector was situated. This
might explain the relatively low interest rate during that period as compared to the
Taylor rule shown in ¯gure 3.1.
29Since November 2001, Eurostat base their ¯rst estimate on only a selected number of countries.
This allows the ¯rst estimate to be published one month earlier than before.
30In fact, Eurostat releases its ¯gures already one month before they are published in the ECB
Monthly Bulletin. Therefore, we will assume that data for month t ¡ 2 is the latest information
available on industrial production in month t.
31The only noticeable exception is the major revision in March 2003 as mentioned in footnote
11. Nevertheless, using real-time in°ation rates does not a®ect any of our results in any notable
way.
32To circumvent the end-point problem in calculating potential output using the Hodrick-
Prescott ¯lter, we also experimented with taking an autoregressive method to forecast several
additional months which are then added to the series before applying the Hodrick-Prescott ¯lter.
This does not a®ect the outcomes in a substantial way. To not already introduce some form of
forward-looking behaviour, we decided to refrain from doing so at this stage of the analysis. When
estimating a forward-looking rule in section 3.5.2, the real-time output gap is based on 12-months
forecasts using an AR(3) process.
33We experimented with slightly di®erent procedures to construct the real time output gap.
The point estimates from the di®erent procedures do not di®er much and focusing on the method
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Figure 3.2: Di®erent indicators for the output gap of Germany and the euro area.
Notes: The data before 1999 refer to Germany, after 1999 to the euro area. The thin solid line
labelled IP stands for the detrended industrial production index. The Hodrick-Prescott ¯lter
(with ¸ = 14;400) has been used to detrend the series. The thick solid real-time IP line shows the
detrended European industrial production index this time only using real-time data as explained
in the text. The dashed line labelled ESIN depicts the European Economic Sentiment Indicator
from which its average over the relevant time period has been subtracted.
To investigate the consequences of this `under-estimation' in real time, Columns
(3) and (6) of table 3.2 show results when using a real-time HP measure of the
output gap instead of using ex-post data. In the speci¯cation of equation (3.2),
the use of real-time data results in the size of the in°ation parameter to increase
somewhat, without, however, exceeding one. Nevertheless, the last row of table 3.3
shows that, instead of having a probability of (nearly) zero of having the in°ation
parameter to exceed 1, this probability increases to 22 and 32 per cent, respectively.
Albeit the likelihood of the ECB to conduct a stabilising monetary policy has
increased to more than 20%, overall we have to conclude that the use of real-time
data does not lead to signi¯cantly di®erent results. The explanatory power { as
denoted by the adjusted R2 { even declines (somewhat).Chapter 3 Using Taylor rules to understand ECB monetary policy 57
3.5 Forward-looking rules for the ECB
The ECB Governing Council has on several occasions explicitly announced that price
stability is to be maintained over the medium term. Since monetary policy operates
with a lag, successful stabilisation policy therefore needs to be forward-looking.
Hence, an explicitly forward-looking version of the Taylor rule { with in°ation and
output forecasts as arguments { might be more appropriate than contemporaneous
versions as estimated above.
3.5.1 Using survey data
One way to include forward-looking elements into the analysis is to use survey
information to proxy business cycle movements. As survey information not only
becomes available much sooner than statistical information and in general includes
questions regarding future developments, it is nowadays widely believed that the
former is a good leading indicator for the latter.
Since 1962 { the year in which the ¯rst harmonised business survey in industry for
the EU was launched { there has been a spectacular growth of business and consumer
surveys. This allowed the scope and sectors covered by such surveys to expand over
time. Since 1985, the European Commission publishes the composite EU Economic
Sentiment Indicator (ESIN) on a monthly basis.34 The ESIN provides a picture of
economic activity one to two months before industrial production statistics become
available.35
Figure 3.2 shows the deviations of the ESIN from its average together with our
other two indicators for the output gap. In general, the patterns of these three
indicators are rather similar. The only clear di®erence is in volatility: the ESIN is
by far the least volatile measure. A somewhat less pronounced di®erence is that {
for the ECB period { the ESIN appears to lead the other two indicators.
By taking the ESIN as our output gap measure into the regressions, the in°ation
parameter gets close to { or even slightly larger than { one (Columns (1) and (3) of
table 3.3). The probability of the ECB stabilising in°ation increases to respectively
42 and 62 per cent, respectively (coming from close to zero in Columns (1) and (4) of
table 3.2). The output parameter reduces slightly in size without losing signi¯cance.
This suggests that ECB's apparent accommodative behaviour can be explained by
di®erences between contemporaneous and forward-looking data.
34The EU ESIN comprises of an industrial con¯dence indicator, a consumer con¯dence indicator,
a construction con¯dence indicator and a retail trade con¯dence indicator. In May 2004, i.e. after
the time period considered, a service sector indicator was added to ESIN.
35For the relevance of ESIN as a business cycle indicator for the EU, see, e.g., Goldrian, Lindl-
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Table 3.3: Estimated forward-looking Taylor rules using survey data, 1991:1-
2003:10.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
yESIN +¼forecast yESIN +¼forecast
ECB-coe±cients
®ECB 1.50 0.12 1.09 0.13
(3.61) (0.17) (2.16) (0.19)
gECB
¼ 0.96 1.95 1.08 1.85
(4.93) (4.73) (4.28) (4.63)
gECB
y 0.28 0.23 0.66 0.59




®BuBa ¡ ®ECB 0.33 0.34 -0.20 0.69
(0.72) (0.37) (-0.26) (0.71)
gBuBa
¼ ¡ gECB
¼ 0.39 -0.22 0.25 -0.45
(1.89) (-0.46) (0.81) (-0.85)
gBuBa
y ¡ gECB
y -0.13 -0.12 0.05 -0.42
(-1.31) (-1.75) (0.20) (-3.46)
½BuBa ¡ ½ECB 0.08 -0.01
(2.42) (-0.12)
# Obs. 154 118 153 117
adj. R2 0.87 0.76 1.00 0.98
DW/Durbin's h 0.28 0.20 0.26 0.26
Cum. Per. Test 0.65 0.67 0.10 0.08
Engle-Granger -3.51 -2.20 -12.72 -11.72
Prob (gECB
¼ > 1) 0.42 0.99 0.62 0.98
Chow-test 37.92 4.02 12.21 17.71
p-value 0.00 0.26 0.02 0.00
Notes: Columns (1) and (3) take the European Sentiment Indicator (ESIN) as output gap measure.
Columns (2) and (4) also use forecasted in°ation as published in The Economist instead of actual
in°ation. All parameters are estimated separately for the Bundesbank (1991:1-1998:12 in case of
(1) and (3), 1994:1-1998:12 in case of (2) and (4) ) and the ECB (1999:1-2003:10) period, based
on data for the respective region. See notes of table 3.2.Chapter 3 Using Taylor rules to understand ECB monetary policy 59
Instead of relying on statistical releases of the (contemporaneous) in°ation rate,
we can also use (forward-looking) survey results to get an idea of in°ation devel-
opments. The newspaper The Economist has published in°ation forecasts based on
a poll of a group of forecasters every month since 1994.36 Figure 3.3 shows these
survey forecasts together with our regular in°ation measure. The in°ation forecast
measure is less volatile.
Figure 3.3: Di®erent indicators for in°ation in Germany and the euro area.
Notes: The solid line labelled `In°ation' shows the year-on-year percentage change of the Har-
monised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for Germany and the euro area, respectively. The
dotted line shows the in°ation forecasts taken from The Economist for the respective regions.
Columns (2) and (4) of table 3.3 show the results in case we combine both
forward-looking survey measures, i.e. replace actual in°ation in Columns (1) and (3)
by this in°ation forecast measure. In both speci¯cations, the in°ation parameter
both for the Bundesbank and the ECB is { with a probability of close to 100 per cent
{ larger than one without signi¯cantly a®ecting the output parameter. Without the
interest rate smoothing term, the structural break between the Bundesbank and the
ECB disappears, while in column (4) the break is driven solely by the signi¯cantly
36Unfortunately, these ¯gures are only annual average in°ation rates, not true 12-month in°ation
forecasts. To convert these into monthly moving ¯gures, we take as the 12-month forecast of
in°ation the weighted average of the forecast for the current and the following year, where the
weights are x=12 for the x remaining months in the current year and (12 ¡x)=12 for the following
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smaller reaction of the Bundesbank to the German ESIN-output gap rather than
di®erent reactions to in°ation forecasts. Hence, taking these survey measures as
proxies for our theoretical output gap and in°ation variables shows that the ECB
has appeared to have followed a stabilising policy rule with respect to both.
3.5.2 Using HP-¯ltered industrial production
As survey measures also bear real-time aspects { they are usually available without
long time lags and without (substantial) revisions { it could be argued that the
improved results in table 3.3 (as compared to table 3.2) should be attributed to
the use of real-time data instead of taking a forward-looking perspective. However,
note that the use of real-time data in so-called contemporaneous rules (Columns (3)
and (6) of table 3.2) seems to reject that hypothesis. To nevertheless shed some
additional light on this, we will now estimate explicitly forward-looking models in
which ex-post and real-time data on industrial production are used.
As an enhancement of the standard Taylor-rule framework, many economists
follow Clarida et al. (1998) and use a forward-looking rule, where the target interest
rate i¤
t is set in response to expected in°ation and output. Expectations are based
on the available information set ­ at time t and reach k and l periods into the
future, respectively.
it = ® + g¼E (¼t+kj­t) + gyE (yt+lj­t) + "t (3.4)
it = (1 ¡ ½)® + (1 ¡ ½)(g¼E (¼t+kj­t) + gyE (yt+lj­t)) + ½it¡1 + "t (3.5)
Assuming rational expectations, these equations are estimated using the generalised
method of moments (GMM). Table 3.4 reports results for k = 6 and l = 3.37
Independent of whether we use ex-post or real-time data to measure the output
gap, the in°ation parameter is with high probability larger than one. Hence, by
explicitly including forward-looking behaviour on account of the ECB, monetary
policy in recent years has { at least ex ante { been su±ciently aggressive to stabilise
in°ation in the euro area. The use of real-time data as compared to ex-post data
does not seem to make much of a di®erence. From table 3.2, however, we know
that it is not su±cient to use real-time data in a contemporaneous set-up. Without
taking a forward-looking perspective, ECB's monetary policy cannot be considered
to have stabilised in°ation.
Comparing the results in table 3.4 with those in table 3.3 reveals that the use of
37The set of instruments are up to six lags of the in°ation and output gap corresponding to data
employed in the regression, and { in case we model interest rate smoothing { the money market
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Table 3.4: Estimated forward-looking Taylor rules using GMM, 1991:1-2003:10.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
yex¡post yreal¡time yex¡post yreal¡time
ECB-coe±cients
®ECB 1.15 0.15 -1.36 -6.23
(1.45) (0.18) (-1.10) (-0.61)
gECB
¼ 1.05 1.54 2.15 6.62
(2.88) (4.06) (3.83) (0.90)
gECB
y 0.22 0.01 1.10 9.24














½BuBa ¡ ½ECB 0.08
(2.44)
# Obs. 145 55 141 51
adj. R2 0.80 0.27 1.00 0.96
DW/Durbin's h 0.20 0.24 0.24 0.24
Cum. Per. Test 0.69 0.61 0.07 0.17
Engle-Granger -2.93 -2.04 -11.36 -9.01
Prob (gECB
¼ > 1) 0.55 0.92 0.98 0.77
Chow-test 93.65 8.62
p-value 0.00 0.07
Notes: Under rational expectations, forward-looking estimates of in°ation and the output gap
are used, i.e. we set k = 6, l = 3 in equation (3.4) and (3.5). The results are estimated by the
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) with Newey-West heteroscedasticity and serial correlation
robust estimators. As instruments, we use up to six months lagged in°ation and output gaps
corresponding to data employed in the regression, and { in case we model interest rate smoothing
{ interest rates. Columns (1) and (3) use ex-post data. Columns (2) and (4) take detrended real-
time industrial production, shifted back by two months, for the output gap variable. For Columns
(1) and (3), the approximate rejection limits for the Durbin Cumulated Periodogram Test (Cum.
Per. Test) are 0.17 (1%), 0.14 (5%) and 0.12 (10%). In case of Columns (2) and (4) these rejection
limits are 0.24 (1%), 0.20 (5%) and 0.18 (10%). The MacKinnon (1991) critical value using 145
observations and 6 explanatory variables equals ¡5:43 at the 1 per cent level, or ¡4:57(¡4:99)
when using 55 (51) observations and 3 (4) explanatory variables. See notes of table 3.2.Chapter 3 Using Taylor rules to understand ECB monetary policy 62
survey data results in a better ¯t than does the use of industrial production data in
forward-looking speci¯cations like equation (3.4) or (3.5).
3.6 Concluding remarks
In this chapter, we have explored di®erent ECB Taylor rules for the euro area. We
have asked ourselves, whether or not the ECB has in its ¯rst years of existence under
the presidency of Mr. Duisenberg been following a stabilising or a destabilising rule.
Already Faust et al. (2001) argue that the ECB puts too high a weight on the output
gap relative to in°ation and in comparison to the Bundesbank.
Looking at contemporaneous Taylor rules, the presented evidence clearly con-
¯rms previous research and suggests that the ECB is accommodating changes in
in°ation and hence follows a destabilising policy. The di®erences between the Bun-
desbank and the ECB are signi¯cant. Such an interpretation gives rise to the con-
jecture that the ECB follows a policy quite similar to the pre-Volcker era of US
monetary policy, a time also known as the `Great In°ation' (Taylor, 1999).38
However, this impression seems to be largely due to the lack of a forward-looking
perspective. Either assuming rational expectations and using a forward-looking
speci¯cation as suggested by Clarida et al. (1998), or using expectations as derived
from surveys result in Taylor rules which do imply a stabilising role of the ECB.
In such forward-looking cases, at least the weights attached to the in°ation rate by
the Bundesbank and the ECB do no longer signi¯cantly di®er. The use of real-time
industrial production data, as suggested by Orphanides (2004), hardly helps in this
respect.
Our preferred speci¯cation involves the use of survey data; their real-time char-
acter combined with their forward-looking nature seems to produce the best results,
in the sense that its explanatory power is the largest and the parameters do con¯rm
a stabilising role for the ECB. Furthermore, an important advantage of survey data
is that one does not have to rely upon (arti¯cial) decomposition methods like the
Hodrick-Prescott ¯lter introducing several additional problems { problems which we
barely touched upon in this chapter.
The chapter so far concentrated on the empirical analysis of the `Duisenberg-
era' from January 1999 to October 2003. In November 2003, Jean-Claude Trichet
succeeded Wim Duisenberg as the president of the ECB. Table 3.5 provides a com-
parison of a contemporaneous Taylor rule with our preferred speci¯cation based on
38Taylor (1999) ¯nds values of g¼ = 0.81 and gy = 0.25 with ex-post data for the US for that
period, while Orphanides (2004) estimates a forward-looking rule with real-time data and reports
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survey data for the full ECB sample for which data are available, i.e. 1999:1-2006:12.
The results con¯rm the evidence for the shorter sample period: Based on the con-
temporaneous speci¯cation, the ECB appears to have followed a destabilising policy
with respect to in°ation; the estimated weight on in°ation is even signi¯cantly nega-
tive. Using survey data, however, provides similar results to Column (4) in table 3.3
and thus corroborates the view that the ECB follows a forward-looking, stabilising
policy with respect to in°ation expectations and output developments.













# Obs. 93 95
adj. R2 0.98 0.98
DW/Durbin's h 0.05 0.06
Cum. Per. Test 0.12 0.14
Engle-Granger -9.97 -11.39
Prob (gECB
¼ > 1) 0.00 0.83
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) present non-linear least squares estimates of equations (3.3) and (3.5),
respectively, using Newey and West (1987) standard errors. Column (1) repeats the estimation of
Column (4) in table 3.2, but for the sample 1999:1-2006:10. Column (2) re°ects Column (4) in
table 3.3 for the sample 1999:1-2006:12. See notes of table 3.2.Chapter 3 Using Taylor rules to understand ECB monetary policy 64
We have also largely abstracted from the second pillar of the ECB's monetary
policy strategy, the monetary analysis. Formally, results from the monetary analysis
serve to `cross-check' the shorter-term in°ationary risks emerging from the economic
analysis and the ECB has emphasised its relevance on numerous occasions. Empir-
ically, however, Four» cans and Vranceanu (2004) and Fendel and Frenkel (2006) ¯nd
that simply adding money growth as an additional explanatory variable to equa-
tions (3.2) to (3.5) has no statistically signi¯cant impact on the estimation.39 In a
recent paper, Hofmann, Sauer and Strauch (2007) report a positive, systematic role
of monetary aggregates on interest rates only for di®erent empirical speci¯cations
re°ecting the idea of `cross-checking' in a more elaborate way.40
A ¯nal result of this chapter is that the data show a large degree of partial
adjustment in the interest rate, i.e. short-term interest rates tend to be changed
in several sequential steps in one direction. In principle, this could imply that
policy responds too little and too late to changes in the economic environment.
Rudebusch (2002, 2006) reports comparable outcomes for the US. In contrast to
the conventional wisdom that the Federal Reserve smoothes adjustments in the
interest rate, Rudebusch argues { based on quarterly data { that this view is an
illusion and the apparent inertia rather re°ect persistent shocks to the economy.41
Castelnuovo (2007) tests for Rudebusch's hypothesis using data for the hypothetical
euro area from 1980 to 2003. His results42 suggest that the observed gradualism
in the interest rate is to a signi¯cant extent endogenous, i.e. stemming from the
systematic component of monetary policy in the hypothetical euro area. Whether
this is also true for the ECB since 1999 is a question that is left for future research.
39Berger, de Haan and Sturm (2006) construct indices measuring the di®erent aspects of the
ECB's strategy in its monthly press statements explaining interest rate decisions. They obtain no
signi¯cant impact of the index related to monetary developments on actual interest rate decisions.
40Inter alia, they include in°ation projections based on information from monetary aggregates
rather than the monetary aggregates themselves in empirical reaction functions as additional vari-
ables.
41Sack and Wieland (2000) o®er three explanations of interest-rate smoothing: forward-looking
behaviour by market participants, measurement error associated with key macroeconomic vari-
ables and uncertainty regarding relevant structural parameters. Goodfriend (1991) stresses the
¯nancial instability associated with potential market overreactions in response to volatile policy
interest rates. Ellis and Lowe (1997) emphasise that repeated changes in the direction of interest
rate adjustments may be perceived by the public as policy `mistakes' and weaken the announce-
ment e®ect of interest rate changes in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Further
arguments in favour of interest rate smoothing involve the zero lower bound on nominal interest
rates (Reifschneider and Williams, 2000) and the history dependence of optimal monetary policy
as advocated by Woodford (2003a,b) and analysed in chapter 2 of this thesis.
42The results of the estimated reaction functions are reported in table 3.1.Chapter 3 Using Taylor rules to understand ECB monetary policy 65
Appendices
3.A Theoretical foundations of the Taylor princi-
ple
The Taylor principle, i.e. the increase of the nominal interest rate it by more than
one-for-one in response to an increase in in°ation ¼t or in°ation expectations Et¼t+1
in order to raise the real interest rate, has proven to be a robust guideline for pru-
dent monetary policy in a wide range of macroeconomic models. In this appendix,
we derive the Taylor principle in two models that have a non-vertical short-run ag-
gregate supply curve, an aggregate demand relationship that depends on the real
interest rate and a loss function or an explicit interest rate rule for the central bank.
3.A.1 Backward-looking model
Svensson (1997) uses a model of the economy, where the transmission lag of interest
rate changes to real activity is one period and to in°ation two periods:43
¼t+1 = ¼t + °yt + "t+1 (3.6)
yt+1 = ±yt ¡ '(it ¡ Et¼t+1 ¡ r
¤) + ´t+1; (3.7)
where Et denotes expectations conditional upon information available at t. °;±;'
are positively de¯ned parameters and "t and ´t i.i.d. are shocks with mean zero.
Equation (3.6) represents a backward-looking, accelerationist Phillips curve, (3.7)










Plugging (3.7) in (3.6) shifted forward by one period yields
¼t+2 = ¼t + °yt + "t+1 + °f±yt ¡ '[it ¡ (¼t + °yt) ¡ r
¤] + ´t+1g
and the expected in°ation rate
Et¼t+2 = (1 + °')¼t + °(1 + ± + °')yt ¡ °'(it ¡ r
¤): (3.9)
43The timing of the model is consistent with results from a number of VAR-studies, if one
interprets one period as roughly one year (see, e.g., Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 1996).Chapter 3 Using Taylor rules to understand ECB monetary policy 66
Since the central bank can in°uence in°ation with its instrument it only with a














, Et¼t+2 = ¼
¤ (3.10)
Combining the expected in°ation rate (3.9) and the ¯rst-order condition (3.10) gives
the optimal interest rate rule
it = r











Equation (3.11) corresponds to the Taylor rule (3.1) with general weights instead of
0.5 as initially suggested by Taylor (1993). In particular, the rule (3.11) ful¯lls the
Taylor principle as 1
°' > 0. In line with the second pillar of the ECB's monetary
policy strategy, the output gap is useful in forecasting future in°ation and therefore
enters the reaction function of the central bank even when it has a strict in°ation
target.44
3.A.2 New Keynesian model
Using the forward-looking New Keynesian model of chapter 2, Woodford (2003a)
shows that the Taylor principle must hold in order to determine the price level with
an interest rate rule. Let the forward-looking New Keynesian Phillips curve (3.12)
and the aggregate demand relationship (3.13) based on intertemporal optimisation
be given by
¼t = ¯Et¼t+1 + ayt + ut (3.12)
yt = Etyt+1 ¡ b(it ¡ Et¼t+1) + vt (3.13)
with a;b as positively de¯ned parameters, ut;vt i.i.d. shocks with mean zero and the
natural real interest rate r¤ = 0. The model is closed with a general interest rate
rule in which the central bank reacts only to the in°ation rate and not to the output
gap:
it = Á¼¼t: (3.14)
44Svensson (1997) shows that the Taylor principle also holds in the optimal interest rate rule
if the loss function explicitly includes an output gap term, i.e. the period loss function is Lt =
(¼t¡¼¤)2+!y2
t. The loss function (3.8) re°ects the special case with a weight ! = 0 on the output
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The rule is not explicitly derived from a loss function and the in°ation target ¼¤ = 0





































which can be summarised as
Etzt+1 = Azt + Bet:
Since et is stationary by assumption, the rational expectations equilibrium is de-
terminate if and only if the matrix A has both eigenvalues outside the unit circle.
Given that the trace trA = 1 + ¯¡1(1 + ab) > 1 and the determinant detA =
¯¡1(1 + abg¼) > 1, Woodford (2003a) shows that the eigenvalues of A ful¯ll this
condition if and only if detA ¡ trA > ¡1, i.e.
¯
¡1(1 + abg¼) ¡ 1 ¡ ¯
¡1(1 + ab) > ¡1;
which simpli¯es to the Taylor principle
g¼ > 1:
In a recent working paper, Cochrane (2006) challenges the conventional wisdom
and argues that 1) the Taylor principle would not determine the price level or the
in°ation rate in the New Keynesian model and that 2) the Taylor rule coe±cients
could not be identi¯ed in a Taylor rule regression. The ¯rst conjecture is based on the
observation that the Taylor principle guarantees only a unique local equilibrium as
it is derived from a log-linear approximation of the true non-linear model. Cochrane
relates this to the ¯scal theory of the price level which claims that the government
satis¯es its budget constraint only in equilibrium and only this equilibrium condition
could determine the price level. For example, Buiter (2002) provides a thorough
critique of the ¯scal theory of the price level.
Cochrane's second conjecture crucially depends on the assumption that the in-
terest rate shock xit in the interest rate rule
it = g¼¼t + xit
represents the only state variable in the system. If there are other state variables
such as cost-push shocks ut, demand shocks vt or lagged in°ation rates and out-Chapter 3 Using Taylor rules to understand ECB monetary policy 68




For the nominal interest rate of the euro area, we take the Euro Overnight Index
Average (EONIA). In case of Germany, we use the Frankfurt Interbank O®ered
Rate Overnight. Both interest rates are provided as monthly averages by the Bun-
desbank's time series data base: http://www.bundesbank.de/stat/zeitreihen/
index.htm
3.B.2 In°ation rates
Annual in°ation for the euro area is measured by the harmonised index of consumer
prices (HICP). This series is not adjusted for seasonally e®ects and is taken from
the ECB website: http://www.ecb.int/stats/mb/eastats.htm.
For Germany, we take the annual in°ation rate based on the consumer price
index (CPI) (not seasonally adjusted) as published by the Federal Statistical O±ce
Germany.
Real-time in°ation for the euro area is based on ¯rst published ¯gures for the
respective month as available in the ECB Monthly Bulletins. The in°ation forecasts
are based on data published by the newspaper The Economist. In that case, the
calculation of each monthly data point is described in footnote 36.
3.B.3 Output gap measures
As ¯rst measure for the output gap, we take the European industrial production
index starting in 1985, apply a standard Hodrick-Prescott ¯lter with the smoothing
parameter of ¸ = 14;400 and calculate the output gap as the deviation of the
logarithm of actual industrial production from trend. Our measure of the euro area
industrial production index excludes construction, is seasonally and working day
adjusted, and is taken from the ECB website.
Alternative estimates of the output gap include a `real-time' industrial produc-
tion index and the European Sentiment Indicator (ESIN). The former consists of
¯rst published ¯gures for the respective months and is collected from the ECB
45I have developed this argument in joint research with Agostino Consolo.Chapter 3 Using Taylor rules to understand ECB monetary policy 69
Monthly Bulletins. The latter, which is a weighted combination of an industrial con-
¯dence indicator, a consumer con¯dence indicator, a construction con¯dence indica-
tor, and a retail trade con¯dence indicator, is taken from the European Commission
website: http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy finance/indicators/business
consumer surveys/bcsseries en.htm
German industrial production is seasonally adjusted and taken from Eurostat.Chapter 3 Using Taylor rules to understand ECB monetary policy 70
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Liquidity risk and monetary policy
Abstract
This chapter provides a framework to analyse emergency liquidity assistance of cen-
tral banks on ¯nancial markets in response to aggregate and idiosyncratic liquidity
shocks. The model combines the microeconomic view of liquidity as the ability to
sell assets quickly and at low costs and the macroeconomic view of liquidity as a
medium of exchange that in°uences the aggregate price level of goods. The cen-
tral bank faces a trade-o® between limiting the negative output e®ects of dramatic
asset price declines and more in°ation. Furthermore, the anticipation of central
bank intervention causes a moral hazard e®ect with investors. This gives rise to the
possibility of an optimal monetary policy under commitment.
4.1 Introduction
Liquidity is an important concept in ¯nance and macroeconomics. The microeco-
nomic literature in ¯nance views liquidity roughly as the ability to sell assets quickly
and costlessly. In macroeconomics, liquidity refers to a generally accepted medium
of exchange or, in brief, money. Money is the most liquid asset due to the fact that
it does not need to be converted into anything else in order to make purchases of
real goods or other assets. This feature makes money valuable in both perspectives.
This chapter uses this common perspective of money and links liquidity risk on
an asset market with aggregate demand and aggregate supply on a goods market.
Spillover e®ects from the asset market to the goods market can justify a central
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bank intervention on the asset market even if the central bank does not take the
welfare of investors on the asset market into account. Hence, the model provides
a framework to analyse the perceived insurance against severe ¯nancial turmoil by
the Federal Reserve under Alan Greenspan, which has been termed the `Greenspan
put' in the popular press and `liquidity provision principle' by Taylor (2005).
Liquidity provision has been studied in the literature with a focus on the role
of ¯nancial intermediaries (see, e.g., Allen and Gale, 1998; Diamond and Dybvig,
1983; Diamond and Rajan, 2001, 2005; Goodhart and Illing, 2002). Considerably less
research looked at liquidity provision by ¯nancial markets (see, e.g., Allen and Gale,
1994; HolmstrÄ om and Tirole, 1998). Furthermore, all of these papers use models
with real assets and claims. If the aim is to analyse optimal monetary interventions
on ¯nancial markets, however, it seems to be natural that one has to use a model in
nominal units, since modern central banks provide nominal ¯at money but not real
goods. Only recently, Gale (2005) and Diamond and Rajan (2006) have made ¯rst
steps in that direction and developed models with nominal assets.1 Contributing to
this literature, I develop an analytical framework based on the cash-in-the-market
pricing model of Allen and Gale (1994, 2005) that directly links monetary policy
and liquidity on ¯nancial markets.
Before I turn to the details of the model, the following two sections provide em-
pirical and historical evidence of the role of liquidity on asset prices and in ¯nancial
crises.
4.1.1 Empirical evidence for the role of liquidity on asset
prices
One of the ¯rst studies that empirically links asset pricing and liquidity is Amihud
and Mendelson (1986), who show that shares' excess returns increase in the size of
the average bid-ask spread, a well-known measure of an asset's level of liquidity.
Recent research has provided further important empirical evidence on the relevance
of time-varying market-wide liquidity on asset pricing and of the e®ects of monetary
expansions on liquidity during crisis periods.
Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) measure market liquidity as the equally weighted
average of individual shares' expected return reversal. The authors start from the
idea that a sell (buy) order should be accompanied by a negative (positive) price
1Allen and Gale (1998) contains discussions about both monetary policy to limit some ine±-
ciencies of bank runs and the e®ects of an asset market. Gale (2005, p. 2) himself, however, argues
that this and more recent papers by Allen and Gale that use the same methodology are `essentially
real (non-monetary) models' and `focus on banks and banking, to the exclusion of other parts of
the ¯nancial system.'Chapter 4 Liquidity risk and monetary policy 78
impact that one expects to be partially reversed in the future if the share is not
perfectly liquid. Sharp declines in this measure coincide with market declines and
`°ight to quality' or `°ight to liquidity' episodes in which investors want to shift
from relatively illiquid medium to long-term assets such as shares into safe and
liquid government bonds or cash. Examples of such incidents are discussed in the
following section 4.1.2. Market-wide liquidity as measured by Pastor and Stambaugh
(2003) appears to be a state variable that is important for share prices. Shares whose
returns are more sensitive to aggregate liquidity have substantially higher expected
returns, even as the authors control for exposures to the market, size and value
factors of Fama and French (1993) and a momentum factor.
Acharya and Pedersen (2005) derive and estimate a liquidity-adjusted capital
asset pricing model. In addition to the standard market beta, their model has three
betas representing di®erent forms of liquidity risk. One beta resembles the analysis
in Pastor and Stambaugh (2003): Investors are willing to accept a lower expected
return on an asset with a high return in times of market illiquidity. Futhermore,
Acharya and Pedersen (2005) show that investors require a higher expected return
for a security that becomes illiquid when the market in general becomes illiquid.
Finally, investors require a lower expected return for an asset that is liquid if the
market return is low. In the authors' estimations, the last e®ect appears to have the
strongest impact on expected returns.
Most importantly for this chapter, Chordia, Sarkar and Subrahmanyam (2005)
establish an empirical link between the macro- and the micro-perspective of liquidity.
The authors ¯nd that `money °ows (...) account for part of the commonality in
stock and bond market liquidity.' Furthermore, they use vector autoregressions
to provide evidence that a loose monetary policy, measured as a decrease in net
borrowed reserves or a negative interest rate surprise,2 is associated with lower bid-
ask spreads, i.e. increased liquidity, in times of crises.
4.1.2 Historical liquidity crises and central banks' reactions
Besides these empirical studies, there is also a lot of anecdotal evidence how central
banks reacted to liquidity crises, since the last decades have shown a number of such
crises on ¯nancial markets. For example, Davis (1994) describes ¯ve severe liquidity
crises in international markets: The Penn Central Bankruptcy in 1970, the crisis in
the °oating-rate notes market in the UK in 1986, the failure of the US-High Yield
2Net borrowed reserves represent the di®erence between the amount of reserves banks need to
have to satisfy their reserve requirements and the amount which the Fed is willing to supply. A
negative interest rate surprise is de¯ned as a drop of the federal funds target rate below market
expectations (Chordia et al., 2005, pp. 112-113).Chapter 4 Liquidity risk and monetary policy 79
bond market in 1989, the Swedish Commercial Paper crisis in 1990 and the collapse
of the ECU bond market in 1992. Greenspan (2004) highlights three crises during
his chairmanship at the Federal Reserve (Fed), in which market participants wanted
to convert illiquid medium to long-term assets into cash because they favoured safety
and liquidity over uncertainty: The stock market crash in 1987, the LTCM-crisis
1998 and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. This section provides a brief
review of these three events and the central banks', in particular the Fed's, reactions
to them.
On 19 October 1987 (`Black Monday'), the Dow Jonex Index dropped by 22.6%.
Many commentators blamed institutional investors that followed a portfolio insur-
ance investment strategy for the dramatic crash in prices.3 Similar to stop-loss-
orders, portfolio insurance implies automatic sell orders when the value of a port-
folio or single shares falls below a certain threshold. If the absorption capacity of
the market is limited, portfolio insurance can cause a vicious circle of price falls and
further sell orders (see also section 4.4.3).
Grossman and Miller (1988) describe the events on 19 and 20 October against the
background of their model in which market liquidity is determined by the demand
and supply of immediacy, i.e. the willingness to trade immediately rather than to
wait some time for a possibly better price. They argue that order imbalances were
so great4 that market makers became incapable of supplying further immediacy.
Market illiquidity materialised as delays in the execution and con¯rmation of trades
and as the virtual impossibility of executing market sell orders at the quoted prices
at the time of order entry.
As chairman of the Fed, Alan Greenspan managed to improve the con¯dence of
investors and the liquidity of the market by issuing the following statement at 9am
on 20 October 1987:
The Federal Reserve, consistent with its responsibilities as the Nation's
central bank, a±rmed today its readiness to serve as a source of liquidity
to support the economic and ¯nancial system (Greenspan, 1987).
The Dow Jones regained 5.9% and 10.1% on this and the following day, respec-
tively. Garcia (1989) discusses the di®erent tools the Fed used to limit the extent
of the stock market crash. These included, besides communication via the quoted
statement, mainly open market operations and the use of the discount window to
3For example, Gammill and Marsh (1988) report o±cial statistics that show that institutional
investors who followed a portfolio insurance investment strategy were the heaviest net sellers on
the New York Stock Exchange and in the S&P 500 index futures market.
4After a more than 10% decline of the Dow Jones between Wednesday, 14 October, and Friday,
16 October, Gammill and Marsh (1988) note an `overhang of incomplete portfolio selling' by
portfolio insurers which caused additional selling pressure on the morning of Black Monday.Chapter 4 Liquidity risk and monetary policy 80
provide liquidity in the form of additional money to the market. The handling
of the crisis by Alan Greenspan, who had been appointed as Fed Chairman only
two months earlier, laid the foundations for the belief in an insurance against stock
market losses, the alleged `Greenspan put' (see also section 4.5.1).
In September 1998, the near-collapse of the hedge fund Long-term Capital Man-
agement (LTCM) caused severe turmoil on ¯nancial markets.5 After years of ex-
traodinary performance, LTCM experienced below-average returns in 1997 and even
losses in the ¯rst half of 1998. In response, LTCM increased its leverage, i.e. its
debt/equity ratio, and focused even more on investments in relatively illiquid as-
sets. The Russian default in August 1998 caused a °ight to quality into liquid
government bonds, while the prices of more illiquid assets fell dramatically. Margin
calls forced LTCM to sell its assets into the falling market, which exacerbated the
crisis. Other market participants could not (and some did not want to, see Brunner-
meier and Pedersen, 2005) step in and buy assets, not least because they had copied
LTCM's trading strategies and were constrained in their available funds. LTCM's
supposedly sophisticated risk management system had not taken this endogeneity of
risk su±ciently into account and its imminent collapse threatened the functioning of
the Treasury bond market because of LTCM's large short-positions on this market.
On 23 September, the New York Fed organised a private bailout of LTCM by 14
banks that had lent to the fund. In the following weeks, the Fed lowered its policy
rate three times by 25 basis points in order to provide su±cient liquidity for ¯nancial
markets. Both Greenspan (2004) and Meyer (2004), who was on the Fed's Board
of Governors at that time, admit that the purpose of these rate cuts was to calm
¯nancial markets rather than to stimulate the still expanding real economy. Indeed,
the second cut boosted ¯nancial markets6 and, for example, considerably lowered
spreads on repos, swaps, corporate bonds and o®-the-run treasuries, which all had
increased dramatically after the Russian default (IMF, 1998, p. 39). Nevertheless,
the Fed still feared the downside risks and lowered its policy rate a third time on
17 November despite lingering positive GDP data. Given the subsequent rise in
in°ation and equity prices until 2000, Meyer (2004, p. 121) later regretted this last
cut.
The terrorist attacks in the morning of 11 September 2001 represented a very
di®erent form of a liquidity shock to ¯nancial markets. Liquidity evaporated from
the ¯nancial system not because of margin calls, portfolio insurance strategies or a
preference shock, but rather because large parts of the communication system and
5For a more detailed analysis of the LTCM-crisis, see e.g. IMF (1998), Jorion (2000) or Sauer
(2002).
6The cut was implemented between two scheduled meetings of the Federal Open Market Com-
mittee on 15 October 1998, a very rare step by the Fed under Alan Greenspan.Chapter 4 Liquidity risk and monetary policy 81
a lot of back o±ces in lower Manhattan were physically destroyed. One immediate
response of the authorities was to leave the New York Stock Exchange, the American
Stock Exchange and NASDAQ closed until 17 September. Hence, liquidity problems
concentrated in the payment and settlement system and did not a®ect the stock
market immediately. In that sense, the e®ects were limited and the Fed could quickly
withdraw the additional 108 billion US-$ in discount window credits, overnight repos
and check °oats it had supplied to banks until 13 September already by 20 September
(Lacker, 2004, table 1).
In Europe, the European Central Bank (ECB) immediately issued the following
press statement on 11 September:
After the unprecedented and tragic events in the United States today,
the Eurosystem stands ready to support the normal functioning of the
markets. In particular, the Eurosystem will provide liquidity to the
markets, if need be. (ECB, 2001a)
Furthermore, the ECB conducted two one-day ¯ne-tuning operations on 12 and
13 September with a volume of 69.3 and 40.5 billion Euro, respectively, in which all
bids were satis¯ed. It also entered into a swap agreement with the Fed over 50 billion
US-$ to provide dollar liquidity to European banks on 12 September (ECB, 2001b).
However, the ECB left its key interest rates unchanged on its regular meeting on 13
September.
Just before U.S. stock markets reopened on the morning of Monday 17 Sep-
tember, the Fed cut its target rate by 50 basis points. The ECB followed suit
and also lowered its key interest rates by the same amount. The Fed continued to
cut rates on 2 October, 6 November and 11 December, while the ECB reduced its
rates only on 9 November. Although Lacker (2004, p. 961) argues that `the [Fed]
interest rate cuts following September 11 are probably best viewed as addressing
the medium- and longer-term macroeconomic consequences' rather than a neces-
sary response to disruptions in the payment system, the contemporaneous action of
central banks worldwide on 17 September7 hints that this move was also aimed at
rebuilding con¯dence and signalling that central banks would continue to provide
liquidity if necessary. Indeed, on 17 September the Dow Jones opened only 3.2%
below the closing value on 10 September. Until 21 September, the Dow lost 14.3%
compared to 10 September, but regained quickly in the following weeks and reached
the pre-terrorist attacks level already in October.
A common feature of these crises is that the Fed lowered its interest rate to
provide emergency liquidity to the market, although the mandate of the Fed in
7Besides the Fed and the ECB, also the Bank of England, the Swedish Riksbank, the Bank of
Canada and other central banks worldwide lowered their policy rates on the same day.Chapter 4 Liquidity risk and monetary policy 82
Figure 4.1: Federal funds target rate (solid line) and Taylor rule rate (dashed line)
in the U.S. during the crises in 1987, 1998 and 2001.
Notes: The Taylor rule rate is based on equation (4.1) with ¼t measured as the annual growth
rate of the consumer price index and yt measured as the quarterly OECD-output gap transformed
into monthly data with a cubic spline. The Taylor rate is adjusted for time-varying r¤
t and ¼¤
t by
matching the average Taylor rate in the six months prior to the respective crisis with the average
Federal funds target rate over this period. Data source: Thomson Financial Datastream.
the Humphrey-Hawkins Act of 1978 focuses on price stability and full employment.
Taylor (1993) suggested a simple interest rate rule to capture these two goals:
it = r
¤
t + ¼t + 0:5(¼t ¡ ¼
¤
t) + 0:5yt: (4.1)
The nominal interest rate it should rise with the natural real rate r¤
t, in°ation ¼t
relative to its target rate ¼¤
t and the output gap yt. The comparison of the actual Fed
funds target rate with the recommendation from this Taylor rule provides a simple
test for the liquidity provision principle, i.e. a temporary departure of interest rates
from the Taylor rule during ¯nancial crises (Taylor, 2005) in order to avoid negative
spillover e®ects from the asset to the goods market. Figure 4.1 shows that the Fed
decreased its policy rate in the months following all three crises as noted above.
The Taylor rule, however, recommended a rise of the interest rate after the crises
of 1987 and 1998. Therefore, monetary policy appears expansionary for about six
months until April 1988 and even more so after the LTCM-crisis 1998. In contrast,
the Taylor rate matches the actual Fed funds rate after the terrorist attacks in
2001 quite closely. From the beginning of 2002, actual monetary policy looks even
restrictive compared to the Taylor rule.
Figure 4.2 reveals considerable di®erences in the development of in°ation in
the aftermath of the crises. For comparison, in°ation is measured as the annual
growth rate of both the consumer price index (CPI) and the personal consumption
expenditure index (PCE), but the di®erences appear to be negligible. The average
in°ation rate one and a half to two years after the crises compared to average
in°ation in the six months up to the crises increased by 0.8 percentage points afterChapter 4 Liquidity risk and monetary policy 83
Figure 4.2: CPI (solid line) and PCE (dashed line) in°ation rates in the U.S. after
the crises in 1987, 1998 and 2001.
Notes: In°ation is measured as the annual growth rate of the consumer price index (CPI) and the
personal consumption expenditure index (PCE). Data source: Thomson Financial Datastream.
1987 and 1.7 points after 1998.8 In contrast, in°ation decreased by 0.4 (PCE) or 0.9
(CPI) points after 2001. Therefore, expansionary monetary policy via the liquidity
provision principle appears to have contributed to price increases after 1987 and
1998, while a normal or even restrictive stance of monetary policy added to a decline
of in°ation after 2001.
All three historical episodes of liquidity crises demonstrate that central banks,
and in particular the Fed under Alan Greenspan, stood ready to provide liquidity
in times of ¯nancial crises. Greenspan (2004, p. 38) states that the `immediate
response on the part of the central bank to such ¯nancial implosions must be to
inject large quantities of liquidity,' roughly in line with the traditional Bagehot
(1873) principle for a lender of last resort activity to `lend freely at a high rate
against good collateral.' But the events also indicate that not all ¯nancial crises are
alike and central banks face a di±cult task to decide on the optimal policy, which
depends on the associated costs and bene¯ts. The rest of this chapter develops a
stylised model of an asset market and a goods market which provides a framework
to analyse the relevant trade-o®s for the central bank.
4.1.3 The model in a nutshell
The model consists of two separate markets, an asset market and a goods market.
The main focus is on developments on the asset market, but these developments have
important implications for the goods market. Although the monetary authority only
cares about deviations of goods prices and quantities from the optimal values, the
spillover e®ects from the asset market may require a central bank intervention on
this market.
8Besides the rise in consumer prices, expansionary monetary policy may also have contributed
to the boom and bust period of equity prices in the ¯ve years following the LTCM-crisis.Chapter 4 Liquidity risk and monetary policy 84
In the model, investors can invest on an asset market in liquid money and poten-
tially illiquid, but productive assets, called shares, in order to optimally satisfy their
uncertain consumption needs on the goods market over two periods. Two channels
link the goods market to the asset market: First, the amount of money held by in-
vestors determines together with the size of a liquidity shock the aggregate demand
of investors on the goods market which is subject to a cash-in-advance constraint.
Second, a dramatic decrease of the asset price negatively in°uences the goods supply
in the ¯nal period because it forces investors to costly liquidate their asset. Hence,
the central bank faces a trade-o® between in°ating a demand shock today, which
causes higher losses today, and limiting a negative supply shock tomorrow, which
will cause higher losses tomorrow. Expectations of central bank intervention give
rise to a moral hazard e®ect with additional investment in less liquid, but productive
shares. If the central bank has the possibility to commit to some future policy, it
should optimally weight these productivity gains against the expected intervention
costs.
Section 4.2 analyses the basic model under certainty and aggregate risk. Section
4.3 provides further insights into the trade-o® the central bank faces and derives
the optimal central bank intervention before section 4.4 discusses the impact of




A continuum of ex ante identical investors i is uniformally distributed on an intervall
I = [0;1]. They can invest on an asset market and buy goods for consumption on a
separate goods market. An investor i derives utility from consumption ct in periods
t = 1 and 2 according to the utility function
Ui(c1;c2) = °³i lnc1 + ¯ lnc2: (4.2)
°³i represents a liquidity shock that consists of an aggregate liquidity shock ° and an
individual liquidity shock ³i. The distribution functions of both shocks are assumed
to be uncorrelated, symmetric, having a positive support and an expected value of




¡1 ³if(³i)d³i = 1.
Every investor is endowed with nominal wealth w that can be invested in t = 0 in
nominal money m and a real asset s, called shares, on a primary market with price
q0 = 1 ¯xed and s endogenous. The asset pays a ¯xed nominal return R in t = 2Chapter 4 Liquidity risk and monetary policy 85
Table 4.1: Payo®s of money and shares in t = 0;1;2.
0 1 2











and can be traded at the nominal price q on a secondary asset market in t = 1 after
the realisation of the liquidity shock °³i, but before goods are traded on the goods
market. Besides, investors have access to a costly real liquidation technique, which
transforms z units of the asset s into ½z units of additional consumption goods in
period 1 with ½ < 1. The individual cost of liquidation is the missed nominal return
Rz in t = 2 and the social cost is a reduction of aggregate supply in t = 2 by ¢(z).9
The asset s can also be interpreted as a nominal bond with a ¯xed interest rate R
and a real put option with a strike price of ½. Table 4.1 summarises the payo®s of
m and s in t = 0;1;2.
At the beginning of t = 1 and 2, homogenous, in¯nitely divisible and non-
storable consumption goods are produced with capital and labour input from workers
who can participate only on the goods market and receive a nominal wage Ãt that
is determined at t ¡ 1.10 These goods must be bought by investors and workers
with money, i.e. they are subject to a cash-in-advance constraint. The price of
consumption goods pt is determined by demand for goods from workers and investors
and the aggregate supply of goods. Markets are competitive but incomplete. Figure
4.3 summarises the timing of the model.
9For example, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) and Allen and Gale (1998) contain a discussion of the
costs of premature liquidation of assets. The costly liquidation technology shall represent investors
possibility to a) partly liquidate their capital, b) sell their capital to less productive owners or c)
cut down replacement investments because ¯rms' re¯nancing possibilities depend on their share
price as in the ¯nancial accelerator model by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). In this model,
the assumption ½ < 1 guarantees that money is not fully dominated by the asset given the price
determination on the goods market as explained in section 4.2.2 and the absence of central bank
interventions. For the corresponding condition with central bank intervention, see Corollary 4.2
on page 105.












































Figure 4.3: Time structure of the model.
4.2.2 Under certainty
Investors' problem and asset market
Before I analyse the e®ects of liquidity shocks °³i, I solve the model under certainty,
i.e. ° = ³i = 1. The individual investor maximises her utility function (4.2) subject
to her budget constraint and her cash-in-advance constraint (CIA) in t = 1.11 She
controls her initial investment in the asset s, her consumption ct in t = 1 and 2
bought on the goods market with cash, her demand for additional assets in t =






1;c2) = ln(c1 + ½z) + ¯ lnc2 s.t. (4.3)
p1c1 + p2c2 · w ¡ s + Rs + (R ¡ q)^ s ¡ Rz
p1c1 + q^ s · w ¡ s
0 · z · s
Note that an investors' total consumption in t = 1, c0
1, is the sum of the consumption
purchased via the goods market, c1, and the real return from the possible liquidation
11The budget constraint implicitly includes the CIA for t = 2 as the investor holds only cash
when she enters the goods market in t = 2.
12The Cobb-Douglas utility function (4.2) makes ct > 0 as long as w > 0.Chapter 4 Liquidity risk and monetary policy 87
of assets, ½z. Solving the maximisation problem with the Lagrangian
max
s;c1;c2;^ s;z
¤ = ln(c1 + ½z) + ¯ lnc2
¡ ¸[p1c1 + p2c2 ¡ (w ¡ s) ¡ Rs ¡ (R ¡ q)^ s + Rz]
¡ ¹[p1c1 + q^ s ¡ (w ¡ s)]






¡ ¸p1 ¡ ¹p1 = 0 ¡! ¹ + ¸ =
1













= ¡¸ + ¸R ¡ ¹ = 0 ¡! ¹ = ¸(R ¡ 1) (4.4c)
d¤
d^ s












½ ¡ ¸R · 0 (4.4e)
d¤
d¸
= ¡p1c1 ¡ p2c2 + (w ¡ s) + Rs+(R ¡ q)^ s ¸ 0 (4.4f)
d¤
d¹
= ¡p1c1 ¡ q^ s + (w ¡ s) ¸ 0 (4.4g)
and dL
dzz = 0, dL
d¸¸ = 0 and dL
d¹¹ = 0 as complementary slackness conditions.13
Since the costly liquidation is ine±cient for p1½ < 1, investors will not use it
under certainty, and z = 0.14 As will become clear from the discussion of the goods
market in the next section, the price of goods p1 equals its expected value, i.e. p1 = 1,
under certainty, so ½ < 1 is a necessary and su±cient condition for z = 0.
(4.4c) and (4.4d) show that q = 1 in the equilibrium under certainty because
holding money would be dominated from t = 0 to t = 1 for q > 1 such that s = w,
while holding shares would be dominated from t = 0 to t = 1 for q < 1 such that
s = 0. For q = 1, money and shares are equivalent assets from t = 0 to t = 1. Since
money is dominated by shares over the long run, the CIA is binding in t = 1.15 The
only possible symmetric equilibrium is ^ s = 0 , i.e. there is no trade on the asset
market in t = 1, and money is only held for consumption in t = 1: (4.4g) reduces to
p1c1 = w¡s. The combination of (4.4a) and (4.4b) shows that a binding CIA drives
13The second-order conditions for a maximum are ful¯lled, since (4.3) maximises a strictly con-
cave utility function under linear constraints and the optimum is an interior solution.
14By plugging ¹ from (4.4c) in (4.4a), solving for ¸ and then plugging ¸ in the inequality (4.4e),
it can be shown that d¤=dz is negative and thus z = 0 as long as p1½ < 1.
15Since R > 1 by assumption and ¸ > 0 from (4.4b), the ¯rst-order condition for optimal
investment in s yields ¹ > 0.Chapter 4 Liquidity risk and monetary policy 88
a wedge ¹, the marginal utility of cash's liquidity services, between the marginal








According to (4.4c), the wedge ¹ equals the marginal utility of wealth, ¸, times the
excess return of shares over money, R ¡ 1, such that the marginal rate of intertem-







Given the optimal consumption in t = 1 and 2, the budget constraint (4.4f) and the


















Finally, the investment and consumption decisions of individual investors i can
be aggregated to aggregate investment and consumption. Let capital letters denote
aggregate values of the respective variable, i.e. W ´
R
i2I wdi, M ´
R
i2I mdi, S ´
R
i2I sdi, C1 ´
R
i2I c1di and C2 ´
R
i2I c2di. Given I = [0;1], the following Proposition
4.1 summarises the situation under certainty:
















p2(1+¯)W. The asset price q = 1 and no assets are traded in the symmetric
equilibrium.
Plugging R = 1=¯ into the results of Proposition 4.1 yields a special result:
16Note that ¹ ¸ 0 represents the standard complementary slackness condition: If the CIA is
not binding (¹ = 0), the marginal utility of money's liquidity services is zero; but if the marginal
utility of money's liquidity services is positive, the liquidity constraint becomes binding (¹ > 0).
17For completeness, the Lagrangian parameters are ¸ =
1+¯
Rw and ¹ = ¸(R ¡ 1).Chapter 4 Liquidity risk and monetary policy 89
Corollary 4.1 If the interest rate R equals the discount rate 1=¯, investors spend
the same amount of money in both periods, i.e. p1C1 = p2C2, and consume the same
amount of goods, i.e. C1 = C2, if prices remain constant.
To concentrate on the intertemporal substitution e®ects of liquidity preference
shocks, I start from the situation in Corollary 4.1 with perfect consumption smooth-
ing and thus assume ¯R = 1 where useful below.
Goods production and goods market
Because I want to focus on events on the asset market, in particular on the e®ects
of emergency liquidity provision by the central bank in section 4.3, and the direct
spillover e®ects to the goods market, the model includes a very stylised version
of a goods market. Non-storable goods are produced by a mass of 1 of identical
competitive ¯rms at the beginning of periods t = 1;2 with total labour input Nt = ¹ N
from identical workers who cannot participate on the asset market and capital input





with 0 < ® < 1. Trade on the goods market takes place after the realisation
of the liquidity shock for investors and after trade on the asset market. While
aggregate supply is already produced and thus ¯xed at Yt, aggregate demand consists
of demand from workers based on their nominal labour income Ãt and from investors
as derived in the previous subsection.
Given a Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns to scale and
perfect competition, the Euler theorem states that production factors are paid their
marginal product times the respective factor input. With the production function
(4.5), workers should receive the share of total output Yt that re°ects their relative
importance in production as captured by 1¡®, while capital owners should receive
®Yt. Furthermore, I assume that investors' demand Ct represents the whole factor
income of capital, such that Ct = ®Yt and that the real investment S determines
the constant producible aggregate real supply ¹ Y with @ ¹ Y =@K ¢ dK=dS > 0.18
Since I have a model in nominal units, labour income for period t is determined
in nominal wage negotiations between workers and ¯rms19 at the end of period t¡1
such that their expected real income is ªt = (1 ¡ ®)Yt. Hence, the agreed nominal
18Although this is an obvious departure from a full general equilibrium model where the income
from capital is directly linked to the marginal product of capital, the crucial e®ects of the model
should still hold in general equilibrium under the assumption of a cash-in-advance constraint for
investors and limited asset market participation.
19Firms only produce consumption goods and negotiate wages in the model.Chapter 4 Liquidity risk and monetary policy 90
wage is Ãt = ªtEt¡1[pt] = (1 ¡ ®)YtEt¡1[pt] given the expected price level Et¡1 [pt].
E0[p1] is normalised to 1.20 For simplicity, I assume that workers build their price
expectations based on the quantity equation, i.e. they expect that investors use all
their available nominal funds for the purchase of consumption goods in the respective
period.21 Hence, money holdings M = W ¡S = E0 [p1C1] and the supply of goods ¹ Y
represent the information set for the wage negotiations in t = 0. The nominal return
from the investment RS plus any unused M from t = 1 equal E1 [p2C2]. Together
with Y s
2 , this provides the information for the negotiations in t = 1. The expected
nominal demand Et¡1 [ptCt] in turn has to be equal to the expected income share of
capital, Et¡1 [pt]®Yt. Due to the normalisation E0 [p1] = 1, C1 = ®¹ Y .22
Under certainty, this also means that E1 [p2] = p2 = 1 as well if ¯R = 1 because
the CIA binds (¹ > 0) and investors transfer no money to t = 2. Hence, investors'
nominal funds are thus identical in t = 1 and 2. If ¯R 6= 1, investors' nominal funds
di®er in both periods under certainty. The nominal wage negotiations in t = 1
determine Ã2 such that the price p2 adjusts such that workers receive 1 ¡ ® and
investors ® of the constant aggregate supply ¹ Y in t = 2. Hence, aggregate demand
Y d







+ Ct = ªt + Ct and (4.6)
Y
s
t = ¹ Y : (4.7)
To summarise the equilibrium on the goods market under certainty for ¯R = 1,
the expected price of goods Et¡1 [pt] equals the actual price pt = 1 for t = 1;2.
Investors consume C1 = C2 = W=(1 + ¯), while total production equals Y1 =
Y2 = W=[®(1 + ¯)] and workers consume 1¡®
® times investors' consumption, i.e.
ª1 = ª2 = 1¡®
® W=(1 + ¯).
4.2.3 Aggregate risk
What is the e±cient response to a positive aggregate demand shock in t = 1? If the
supply of goods can be adjusted to the increased demand, it will be increased until
the marginal costs of doing so equal the marginal bene¯t. In this model, production
takes place before the shock, so the liquidation technology o®ers the only way to
increase supply in t = 1. Since the liquidation costs are very high, investors will
20This assumption avoids any problems with a possible indeterminacy of the price level.
21For example, Illing (1997) and Walsh (2003) model aggregate demand with a quantity equation.
22Actually, C1 is determined by W, S and p1 (see table 4.2). With nominal W and real C1 = ®Y
¯xed, p1 is no free parameter any more. But the link between S and K and thus ¹ Y could be
normalised such that E0[p1] = 1.Chapter 4 Liquidity risk and monetary policy 91
use it only for large shocks. In an intermediate range, prices adjust such that the
marginal rate of intertemporal substitution equals the relative prices.
Since the optimal investment strategy in t = 0 depends on expectations about
developments on the asset and the goods market in t = 1 and 2, the model has to
be solved by backward induction. Hence, the allocations on the goods market in
t = 2 and t = 1 as well as the in°uence of the shocks on the optimal behaviour of
investors on the asset market in t = 1 have to be taken into account when one solves
the utility maximisation problem of investors in t = 0. For illustrative purposes,
however, it will be easier to begin with the description of the asset market, turn to
the goods market afterwards and then solve the initial investment problem given
the behaviour in t = 1;2.
Asset market









(° ln(c1 + ½z) + ¯ lnc2)f(°)d° s.t. (4.8)
p1c1 + p2c2 · w ¡ s + Rs + (R ¡ q)^ s ¡ Rz
p1c1 + q^ s · w ¡ s
0 · z · s:
The solution to this maximisation problem in section 4.A of the appendix uses the












¡ ¸p2 = 0 (4.9b)
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½ ¡ ¸R · 0 (4.9d)
@¤
@¸
= ¡p1c1 ¡ p2c2 + w + (R ¡ 1)s + (R ¡ q)^ s ¡ Rz ¸ 0 (4.9e)
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@¹
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and @¤
@zz = 0, @¤
@¸¸ = 0, @¤
@¹¹ = 0 and d¤
dsE0[s] = 0 as complementary slackness
conditions.23
Since all investors are identical without idiosyncratic risk, they all want to sell or
buy assets in response to an aggregate liquidity shock ° at the same time in t = 1 in
order to adjust their money holdings optimally to their desired consumption which is
subject to the CIA. As the aggregate stock of assets is determined in t = 0, however,
they cannot sell or buy in the aggregate. Hence, the asset price q has to adjust to
exclude any excess demand or supply of assets, i.e. market clearing in t = 1 requires
that ^ S =
R
i2I ^ sdi = 0.
Depending on the realisation of the liquidity shock °, the asset price q, the
Lagrangian parameters ¸ and ¹ and the choice variables c1;c2 and z lie in three
di®erent ranges. For ° <
¯(W¡S)
RS ´ CIA, investors want to transfer wealth into
the next period. This drives up the asset price q, which is bounded by R: Nobody
would be willing to pay more for the asset than the asset's ¯xed payo® in the next
period. In this case, the CIA becomes non-binding (¹ = 0).
For greater values of °, however, the CIA is binding and the asset price de-
pends on the cash in the market as in Allen and Gale (1994, 2005). As long as








. For su±ciently large liquidity shocks ° >
¯(W¡S)
p1½S ´ LIQ,
the asset price q falls to a level where the investors become indi®erent between liqui-
dating the asset and selling the asset. Since they cannot sell in the aggregate, they
costly liquidate part of their assets (z > 0). Table 4.2 summarises the equilibrium
values of the relevant variables in the three ranges of °.24 Figure 4.4 illustrates the
asset price q and the two Lagrangian parameters on the budget constraint and the
CIA as a function of ° for R = 1=¯ = 1:1;W = 1;S =
¯
1+¯W and ½ = 0:7. The
possibility of a severe drop in q captures the microeconomic view of liquidity, as an
illiquid asset cannot be sold quickly without costs.
Turning to the optimal investment decision in t = 0, the ¯rst-order condi-
tion for optimal investment in the asset is given by equation (4.9g). Using the
results for ¸ and ¹ from table 4.2 and the de¯nitions of the cumulative distri-
bution function F (x) ´
R x
¡1 f (°)d° of the liquidity shock ° and the function
G(x) ´
R x
¡1 °f (°)d°, section 4.A in the appendix shows that the determination of
the optimal investment s requires an explicit parameterisation of the shock's den-
23As for the maximisation problem (4.3) under certainty, the second-order conditions for a max-
imum are ful¯lled since (4.8) maximises a strictly concave utility function under linear constraints
and the optimum is an interior solution.
24Note that the Cobb-Douglas preferences (4.2) determine the relative expenditures p1c1 to p2c2
such that c1 is independent from p2 and c2 is independent from p1 in general. Only for ° > LIQ
and thus z > 0, c2 depends on p1½ because this is the nominal value of liquidation in t = 1.
Without central bank intervention, p1 = 1 in this case as demonstrated in the next section 4.2.3.Chapter 4 Liquidity risk and monetary policy 93
Table 4.2: Summary of the values of the asset price q, the Lagrangian parameters

























































Figure 4.4: q;¸;¹ as a function of ° and given di®erent parameter values.Chapter 4 Liquidity risk and monetary policy 94
Table 4.3: Summary of f(°);F(°);G(°) in t = 1.
































sity function f (°). I assume ° to be uniformly distributed between a and b with
0 < a < b. Table 4.3 provides a summary of f(°);F(°) and G(°) in t = 1 which is
derived in the appendix.
There is only one variable left that depends on the realisation of °, namely the
goods price p1, which is determined on the goods market as described in the following
subsection. As noted above, however, the utility function (4.2) implies that p1 only
matters for ¸;¹;Ct in the range ° ¸
¯(W¡S)
p1½S . Table 4.2 shows that in this range
investors use all their nominal funds w ¡s to buy consumption goods on the goods
market. The detailed description of the goods market in the next section 4.2.3 shows
that p1 = 1 in this case. Given this information, one can now solve for the optimal
investment in the asset s.
Figure 4.5 illustrates that the optimal investment is decreasing in the standard
deviation of °, ¾ (°) = b¡a
2
p
3, while this e®ect is more pronounced for a lower real
payo® of the liquidation technology ½. Without aggregate risk, Proposition 4.1 states
that investors hold S =
¯
1+¯W ¼ 0:4762 for R = 1=¯ = 1:1 and W = 1. Initially,
introducing aggregate risk does not a®ect S because the asset price q absorbs the
full impact of the liquidity shock for the chosen parameter values, i.e. the CIA
always binds (F (CIA) = 0) and no assets are liquidated (F (LIQ) = 1) given the
equilibrium S. Further increasing ¾ (°) makes the risk-averse investors reduce their
investment S. As the real payo® of liquidations Z increases in ½ and the liquidation
threshold LIQ decreases in S, the reduction in S caused by increased aggregate risk
is dampened by a greater ½ and the solid line (½ = 0:9) lies above the dashed line
(½ = 0:5) in ¯gure 4.5.
This is the solution of the model with aggregate risk and access to a costly
real liquidation technology for investors. The analysis of an emergency liquidity
assistance by the central bank requires at ¯rst a deeper discussion of the goods
market in the next subsection. Furthermore, the costs and bene¯ts of such an
intervention need to be based on an explicit welfare function for the central bank. IChapter 4 Liquidity risk and monetary policy 95
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Figure 4.5: Optimal investment S for R = 1=¯ = 1:1 and W = 1.
turn to this issue in section 4.3.
Goods market
Investors' liquidity shocks in t = 1 can spill over to the goods market via a demand
e®ect in t = 1 and a supply e®ect in t = 2. Let ´ denote the ¯rst channel that
links the asset market and the goods market: For small realisations of the liquidity
shock ° < CIA, the CIA of investors becomes non-binding and they do not use all
their money for consumption in t = 1. This represents a negative nominal aggregate
demand shock on the goods market, represented by ´ < 0. If the liquidity shock
° is in the range of CIA · ° · LIQ, the asset price q absorbs the full e®ect of
the liquidity shock as noted in the previous section and investors' nominal demand
p1C1 = W ¡ S. For large liquidity shocks ° > LIQ, investors liquidate part of
their assets and thus increase the total resources available for consumption in t = 1
beyond ¹ Y . Since investors satisfy ½Z of their desired consumption goods with the
liquidation technology, they still demand p1C1 = W ¡ S on the goods market. If,
however, the central bank intervenes on the asset market and injects additional
money in case of large realisations of ° as will be shown in the following section 4.3,
investors' nominal demand rises above the level expected in the wage negotiations.
This is represented by a positive aggregate demand shock ´ > 0.
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determined in nominal wage negotiations at t ¡ 1 as explained in section 4.2.2:
Perfect competition and the Cobb-Douglas production function (4.5) require that
workers can consume (1 ¡ ®)Yt in t given the expected price level Et¡1 [pt] which
is normalised to 1 for t = 1. Workers build their price expectations based on the
quantity equation, i.e. they expect that the total amount of money held by investors
at the time of the wage negotiations is spent in t = 1. Hence, the expected nominal
demand E0 [p1C1] = W ¡S has to be equal to the expected capitalists' income share
E0 [p1]®Yt = ®¹ Y as E0 [p1] = 1.25 Therefore, the aggregate demand relationship




Ã1 + W ¡ S + ´
p1
; (4.10)
while aggregate supply is again ¯xed to26
Y
s
1 = ¹ Y :
Note that the price impact of nominal demand shocks ´ originating from the asset
market is less than 1 as Ã1 is constant. Hence, the ¯rst channel that links the asset
with the goods market, ´, causes a redistribution e®ect from investors' consumption
share at p1 = 1 towards workers for ´ < 0 and from workers towards investors for
´ > 0. Given the determination of E0 [p1] described above, positive price shocks
can only occur with additional money from the central bank which will be discussed
extensively in the following section 4.3.
The exercise of the real put option acquired with the asset s, i.e. the application
of the costly liquidation technique, in response to large liquidity shocks ° > LIQ
with no or insu±cient emergency liquidity assistance by the central bank causes
the second link between the asset market and the goods market: Without costly
liquidations, the capital stock Kt is ¯xed over the time horizon of this model and
aggregate output is ¹ Y , given the initial investment S. If investors choose to liquidate
part of their shares, i.e. Z > 0, this liquidation takes place after production in t = 1
and increases the real resources available for consumption in t = 1, but reduces K2:
25This assumption is a short-cut from the rational Erat
0 [p1C1] because investors will spend all
their money in t = 1 only as long as their CIA binds, i.e. ° ¸ CIA, and less for ° < CIA.
This implies Erat
0 [C1] < C1 (° ¸ CIA) and E0 [´] < 0 without central bank intervention. Hence,
workers get more than their expected share of aggregate supply ¹ Y in t = 1 on average and are thus
implicitly compensated for their real income risk in t = 1. To summarise, the way workers form
their expectations and the normalisation of E0[p1] determine the size of the redistribution e®ect
of investors' nominal demand on workers after the realisation of °, but not the possibility of such
redistributions.
26 ¹ Y may be di®erent from the one under certainty, however, since it depends on S which may
decrease with the extent of aggregate risk as demonstrated in ¯gure 4.5.Chapter 4 Liquidity risk and monetary policy 97
The lower capital input in t = 2 lowers ¹ Y by ¢(Z), with d¢




2 = ¹ Y ¡ ¢(Z): (4.11)
Any risk has disappeared from the model at the time of the nominal wage negotia-
tions for t = 2. Workers build their price expectations E1 [p2] based on investors' safe
nominal revenues R(S ¡ Z), potentially unused money holdings W ¡S ¡p1C1 and
the known Y s
2 . Again, perfect competition allows them to consume ª2 = (1 ¡ ®)Y2,
which implies a nominal wage of Ã2 = E1 [p2](1 ¡ ®)Y2.27 The aggregate demand




Ã2 + R(S ¡ Z) + W ¡ S ¡ p1C1
p2
: (4.12)
and equals aggregate supply at p2 = E1 [p2] in equilibrium:
ª2 + C2 = ¹ Y ¡ ¢(Z):
p2 and its expected value adjust relative to p1 such that investors' real consumption
C2 = ®
£¹ Y ¡ ¢(Z)
¤
. For example, if investors' liquidity shock ° is within the
intermediate range CIA · ° · LIQ, the CIA is binding and W ¡ S = p1C1, but






and p2 = p1 = 1 for ¯R = 1 and a su±ciently small variance of ° that leaves
S = ¯=(1 + ¯)W from the certainty case una®ected (see also ¯gure 4.5). Since
investors' Cobb-Douglas-preferences smooth nominal expenditures over t = 1 and
2, p2 has no e®ect on investors' behaviour in t = 1 given S.
To summarise, the two direct channels that link the asset market to the goods
market in this model are the aggregate demand shock ´ in period 1 and the aggregate
supply shock ¢ in period 2, which both depend on the realisation of the liquidity
shock ° in t = 1.
27Note again that investors do not react to possible changes of p2 relative to a constant p1 because
the Cobb-Douglas-preferences determine the expenditure share rather than real consumption in
each period. Hence, given the constant produceable aggregate supply ¹ Y and workers' desired
income of (1 ¡ ®)Y2, p2 would have to deviate from p1 even if ° = E0 [°] = 1 for example if
¯R 6= 1 in order to equate investors' intertemporal rate of substitution to the relative price p1=p2
for constant real consumption C2 = C1 = ®¹ Y .Chapter 4 Liquidity risk and monetary policy 98
4.3 Central bank intervention
4.3.1 Welfare function
The direct spillover e®ects from the asset market to the goods market mean that the
central bank may intervene on the asset market even if it does not take investors'
welfare into account. The loss function L of the central bank consists of the weighted
sum of two parts: The increase of p1 above the desired price level p¤
1 because of the
associated real income loss of workers and the deviation of aggregate supply Y s
2 from
¹ Y caused by liquidations Z, ¢(Z):28






2 ¡ ¹ Y
¢
: (4.13)
! re°ects the weight on the real income loss of workers in t = 2 relative to the
weight on the real income loss of workers in t = 1 caused by a rise in p1 and thus
implicitly includes the central bank's time discount factor. Let p¤
1 be normalised to
1 and thus equal the expected price level E0 [p1]. It is su±cient to concentrate on p1
and Y s
2 in this stylised model because Y s
1 is produced before any shocks occur and
thus not directly in°uencable by monetary policy under discretion29 and nominal
wage negotiations for t = 2 take place after any shocks and determine p2 such that
workers receive ªt = (1 ¡ ®)Y s
2 .
The concentration on goods markets can be justi¯ed with several arguments:
From a positive perspective because price stability and { di®erently accentuated {
output stability are the mandate of most central banks in the world, where price
stability is generally interpreted as a low but positive growth rate of some form
of a consumer price index. From a political economy perspective, since people
living mainly from their nominal labour income represent the majority of voters in
a society and, as I show in this chapter, this focus may even improve the welfare
of investors as well. Finally, also from a normative perspective within the New
Keynesian framework as argued by Woodford (2003) because asset prices are in
general a lot more °exible than goods prices and the monetary authority should
focus on a measure of relatively sticky core in°ation to limit the distortions caused
by nominal rigidities.30
28The discussion below shows that the central bank cannot intervene symmetrically in this model.
Hence, the linear loss function represents a useful simpli¯cation. The results of the model are robust
to a loss function that is quadratic in in°ation and output deviations from their respective targets,
but the comparative static analysis and the restrictions on some parameter values become more
complex (see section 4.B in the appendix).
29The indirect e®ect of central bank intervention on aggregate supply will be analysed in section
4.3.5. Section 4.3.6 discusses how optimal monetary policy can take the indirect e®ect into account.
30Note, however, that the normative argument has been subject of a long discussion in macro-
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4.3.2 Asset market
The central bank has the possibility to prevent the costly liquidation of shares if it
acts as a lender or rather liquidity provider of last resort to the ¯nancial market.
That means it can enter repurchasing agreements with investors at a price (just)
high enough to prevent liquidations and thus provide extra liquidity to the market.
In such an emergency repurchasing agreement, the central bank buys l assets at a
nominal price q and sells them to the same investor in t = 2 for the asset's nominal
payo® R. The total amount L ´
R
i2I ldi of assets bought, their buying price q and




L all depend on the preferences of the
central bank in (4.13).31 As in section 4.2.3, I begin with the asset market and an
investors' optimal behaviour.
The possibility of a central bank intervention alters the optimal investment de-









(° ln(c1 + ½z) + ¯ lnc2)f(°)d° s.t. (4.14)





p1c1 + q^ s · w ¡ s + ql
0 · z · s; 0 · l · s; l + z · s:
The problem (4.14) is solved as in section 4.2.3. While the ¯rst-order conditions
(4.9a) to (4.9d) and (4.9g) remain unchanged, the derivatives with respect to the
neglects the information content of asset prices about future consumer price in°ation that was
emphasised by Alchian and Klein (1973). These authors concluded that asset prices should receive
a very high weight in the price index that the central bank tries to stabilise; their argument was
rejected mostly for practical reasons (see Cecchetti, Genberg, Lipsky and Wadhwani (2000), for
example).
The modern discussion rather ranges between, e.g., Bernanke and Gertler (1999), who argue
that asset price changes are only relevant for monetary policy insofar as they change the forecasts
of consumer price in°ation and output, while, e.g., Cecchetti et al. (2000) favour a more direct
response to asset prices because this should limit the extent of asset price bubbles and thus dampen
the volatility of output and in°ation. The discussion below shows that the spillover e®ects from
the asset to the goods market justify a direct monetary policy response to asset prices even if the
central bank neglects the welfare of asset holders and there are no bubbles.




l represent a deadweight loss in
the model. Actually, these costs equal the nominal seigniorage income for the central bank. Section
4.3.6 includes a discussion of the optimal use of this seigniorage income.Chapter 4 Liquidity risk and monetary policy 100
Lagrangian parameters (4.9e) and (4.9f) become
@¤
@¸




l ¸ 0 (4.15a)
@¤
@¹
= ¡p1c1 ¡ q^ s + w ¡ s + ql ¸ 0 (4.15b)







+ ¹q · 0; l ¸ 0 (4.16)
is added to the system.
In order to limit the increase of the price level on the goods market p1 caused by
the extra liquidity in the market, the central bank will provide this liquidity at the
highest cost for investors that still prevents the costly liquidation, i.e. q is as low as





= ¹ for l > 0, it is obvious from (4.9c)
that q = q in equilibrium in this case. At the same time, the discussion in section





= ¹ for z > 0, i.e. ° > LIQ. q = p1½ = q causes
investors' indi®erence between consuming by liquidating assets (z > 0) or by buying
c1 for p1 on the goods market with cash from selling the asset at q to the central
bank or at q on the asset market. Hence, q = p1½ is the lowest price at which the
central bank can prevent costly liquidations in response to large liquidity shocks °.
4.3.3 Goods market
A closer look at the goods market in t = 1 and 2 illuminates the mechanism of the
model and the trade-o® the central bank faces. In particular, the central bank needs
to quantify the costs and bene¯ts of additional liquidity to determine the optimal
amount of nominal aggregate liquidity provision.
As in section 4.2.3, the aggregate demand shock ´ in (4.10) can be negative in
t = 1, as investors transfer money into t = 2 for ° < CIA. Due to the central
bank intervention, however, ´ can also be positive. For ° > LIQ, the central bank
increases the amount of money available for consumption purchases in the economy
by qL. Since aggregate supply is already produced at the beginning of t = 1,
the additional nominal funds qL cause a rise in the price of goods p1 by ¿qL.32
Given workers' ¯xed nominal wage Ã1, this price increase reduces workers' real
consumption ª1 and increases the amount of goods investors can buy on the goods
market with money. Investors' total consumption C0
1 is then the sum of goods bought
32Using the parameters and variables of the model, the price impact can be expressed as ¿ =
®p1½=(W ¡ S). To simplify the exposition of the arguments, I continue to use ¿ for the price
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on the goods market C1 with initial money holdings plus the liquidity provision
qL and the proceeds from the real liquidation ½Z that the central bank optimally
admits. Crucially, once the nominal wage Ã is ¯xed based on the expected nominal
demand such that workers expect to receive (1 ¡ ®) ¹ Y , a liquidity provision by the
central bank that exceeds workers' expectations, independently of their expectation
formation mechanism, will always induce this redistribution e®ect and increase the
amount of real funds available for investors' consumption in t = 1.
At the same time, the real liquidation of Z assets causes a reduction of aggre-
gate supply in t = 2 by ¢(Z) = ·Z.33 As the central bank intervention reduces
the amount of liquidations by L, it increases Y s
2 proportionately by ·L. Hence,
aggregate supply Y s
2 = ¹ Y ¡·Z, where Z denotes the amount of optimally admitted




Ã2 + R(S ¡ Z ¡ L) + W ¡ S ¡ p1C1
p2
: (4.17)
Since any risk in the model is dissolved by the time of the wage negotiations for t = 2,
the nominal wage Ã2 guarantees a real consumption of ª2 = (1 ¡ ®)
¡¹ Y ¡ ·Z
¢
and
E1 [p2] = p2. As in section 4.2.3, p2 = p1 = 1, if ° 2 [CIA;LIQ], ¯R = 1 and
S = ¯=(1 + ¯)W, for example.
4.3.4 Optimal central bank intervention
The trade-o® between the price impact ¿ and the output e®ect · determines the
optimal amount of liquidity L¤ provided by the central bank. I de¯ne Z¤ as the





p1½(¯+°) with z =
°p1½s¡¯(w¡s)
p1½(¯+°) taken from table 4.2 in
section 4.2.3. The liquidation of Z¤ produces an output loss of ·Z¤ in t = 2 with
· > 0. An intervention of L causes an increase in p1 of ¿qL with ¿ > 0 above the
expected price level E0 [p1] = 1. At the same time, it reduces the extent of actual
liquidations Z by L, which increases aggregate supply in t = 2 by ·L. I assume
!· > ½¿ such that the value of the output gain is su±ciently high for a positive
level of L in response to large shocks °. The endogeneity of the lowest intervention
33The linearity of the output loss serves again the purpose of expositional ease. Given the way
the size of the economy ¹ Y is linked to the amount of assets S, · = R=(®p2).Chapter 4 Liquidity risk and monetary policy 102
price q = p1½ implies that
p1 = 1 + ¿qL





and requires ¿½L < 1 for an equilibrium. Given this information about the price
and output impacts of its intervention, the central bank optimises
min
L
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In the optimum, the marginal costs of higher prices p1 just equal the marginal bene¯t
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dL > 0 since the goods price increase associated with L > 0 makes the
real liquidation technology more attractive. The optimal liquidity provision L¤ that








!·¿½[¯ + ° ¡ ¯ (W ¡ S)¿]
: (4.21)
Proposition 4.2 The optimal amount of assets purchased by the central bank L¤
increases in the size of the liquidity shock °, the weight on the output gap ! and
its marginal reduction of output losses ·. L¤ decreases in its marginal price impact
¿, the real payo® of the liquidation technology ½ and the amount of money W ¡ S
initially held by investors if !· > ½¿ and ° > LIQ.Chapter 4 Liquidity risk and monetary policy 103
Proof. The derivatives of L¤ in equation (4.21) are positive with respect to °;!;·
and negative with respect to ½;¿ given the assumptions about the parameters.
Proposition 4.2 shows that the central bank will provide more liquidity in re-
sponse to a greater shock ° because it reduces the indirect marginal costs of inter-
vening.34 The opposite is true for larger money holdings W ¡S and more investment
in the illiquid asset S: More initial liquidity increases the marginal costs of L as the
same endogenous rise of p1 raises the desired liquidations Z¤ by more. Furthermore,
L¤ increases with the weight on output gap stabilisation relative to price stabilisa-
tion, !, because this makes an output loss due to liquidation more costly relative
to a price increase due to central bank intervention. A greater output impact · of
an intervention or a smaller price impact ¿ also improve the bene¯ts of intervening
relative to its costs and thus raise L¤. Finally, a greater ½ ampli¯es the price impact
of the necessary intervention ceteris paribus and thus lowers L¤.
A special situation emerges if the central bank provides so much liquidity that p1
rises until p1½ = q = R. A further increase of q means that the central bank actually
pays investors not to liquidate their assets and ¹ < 0 from (4.9c). But q > R may
become necessary as it is the nominal value of the asset's real put option in t = 1,
p1½, that determines Z, not the asset's ¯nal payo® R (see table 4.2). This situation










Taking L¤ from (4.21) and neglecting the indirect marginal costs of L that only

















is a su±cient condition for p1 < R
½ and thus q < R.
4.3.5 Welfare implications and the moral hazard e®ect
How is the utility and the behaviour of investors a®ected by the central bank inter-
vention? First, the central bank chooses q such that it can prevent the real liquidation
34If the loss function (4.13) was quadratic in the output gap in t = 2, also the marginal bene¯t
of L would increase with Z¤ and thus with ° (see section 4.B in the appendix).Chapter 4 Liquidity risk and monetary policy 104
of L¤ assets at the lowest price impact, i.e. q = p1½. At this price, the individual
costs of liquidating the asset (R¡p1½) and the costs of selling it to the central bank
in exchange for cash (R ¡ q) are identical. (4.9c), (4.9d) and (4.16) show that indi-
vidual investors are indi®erent between liquidating, selling to the central bank and
selling on the market as q = p1½ = q. Nevertheless, the central bank intervention
raises the welfare of investors ceteris paribus because it lessens the cash-in-advance
constraint via the endogenous rise of p1 and the corresponding increase in the value
of the asset in t = 1, p1½ = q = q.35 Since the nominal income of workers and the
supply of goods Y s
1 = ¹ Y are ¯xed, the price increase causes a redistribution from
workers to investors in t = 1.
The anticipation of central bank intervention also a®ects the initial investment







[¸(R ¡ 1) ¡ ¹]f (°)d° = 0: (4.22)
In the optimum, the excess return of the asset over money (R ¡ 1) evaluated with the
expected marginal utility of wealth ¸ equals the expected marginal utility of money's
liquidity services ¹. Investors anticipate that the central bank will provide extra
liquidity for some realisations of °. These interventions raise the rationally expected
price of goods E0 [p1] relative to the one without expectations of interventions. The
higher expected price level lowers the value of money's nominal payo® relative to the
liquidated asset's real payo® of ½ in t = 1, or, in nominal terms, raises the nominal
value of a liquidated asset p1½ relative to the constant nominal payo® of money of
1. Since the asset becomes more valuable relative to money, investors will increase
their investment s. This represents the so-called moral hazard e®ect of central bank
intervention because investors increase their holdings of the asset whose value is
possibly subject to liquidity risk as they anticipate the liquidity provision by the
central bank.
Proposition 4.3 The anticipation of a central bank intervention in t = 1 to limit
the extent of real liquidations of the asset S causes an increase in the investment in
S in t = 0 relative to the case without the possibility of a central bank intervention.
Proof. The moral hazard e®ect arises for two reasons. Taking the aggregate in-
vestment level S as given, the higher goods price p1 ¯rst raises the optimal amount
of assets liquidated or sold to the central bank because @z
@p1j°>LIQ > 0 (for z;¸;¹,
see the last column of table 4.2). This is re°ected in (4.22) in a lower expected
marginal utility of money,
@¹
@p1j°>LIQ < 0, and a greater marginal utility of wealth,
35See also ¯gure 4.6 and the discussion of the moral hazard e®ect below.Chapter 4 Liquidity risk and monetary policy 105













Figure 4.6: q;¸;¹ as a function of ° and di®erent parameter values for p1 = 1:2
(solid line) and p1 = 1 (dashed line).
@¸
@p1j°>LIQ > 0. Second, the increase in p1 lowers the threshold of the realisation
of °, LIQ =
¯(W¡S)
p1½S , for which Z and L become positive. Since CIA =
¯(W¡S)
RS
remains unchanged for a given S, the lower LIQ reduces the intermediate range
CIA · ° · LIQ for which the e®ect of the liquidity shock is fully absorbed by the
asset price and consumption remains unchanged (see table 4.2). The constant con-
sumption levels imply that the marginal utility of wealth, ¸, is also constant in this
range, while the cash-in-advance constraint becomes very costly, i.e. ¹ rises rapidly
with °. Equation (4.22) shows that a greater expected marginal utility of wealth
and a smaller expected marginal utility of money increase the optimal individual
investment s. This raises also the aggregate investment S =
R
i2I sdi in equilibrium.
The two e®ects can be seen in ¯gure 4.6 which replicates ¯gure 4.4 for the case of
no central bank intervention. It shows the shift to the left of the threshold LIQ, i.e.
the right kink in the three curves, and the higher values of ¸ and the lower values of
¹ in the range of ° > LIQ for a greater price p1 due to a central bank intervention.
The moral hazard e®ect of Proposition 4.3 can be so severe that investors stop
holding money as stated in the following Corollary 4.2:
Corollary 4.2 Holding no money from t = 0 to t = 1 represents an equilibrium if
investors expect the central bank to intervene at a price q greater than 1.Chapter 4 Liquidity risk and monetary policy 106
Proof. Assume all investors except i hold only the asset, i.e. S = W. Then,
CIA = LIQ = 0 and the central bank has to intervene with certainty. Equation













> 1 as ° has a positive support, cov(°;q) > 0 and the denominator
w+(q¡1)s > 0. Hence, investing the full endowment w in the asset will be optimal
for i, i.e. s = w, and S = W represents an equilibrium.
Corollary 4.2 implies that the parameters of the model, for example the real
payo® of liquidation ½ or the weight on output stabilisation !, have to be chosen





than 1 in order to prevent the possibility of a complete moral hazard scenario caused
by full insurance against liquidity shocks provided by the central bank.
What happens to the welfare of workers? Given the investment S, their welfare
clearly rises if the central bank's relative weight on output in the loss function (4.13),
!, represents their own preferences. The central bank sets L¤ and the corresponding
price q such that the marginal cost of the price increase equals the marginal bene¯t
of less liquidated assets in equation (4.20). The increase in S due to the moral
hazard e®ect is double-edged, however: The higher real investment causes a rise in
producible output ¹ Y as @ ¹ Y =@K ¢ dK=dS > 0. At the same time, it increases the
extent of desired liquidations Z¤ and central bank intervention L¤ ceteris paribus.
In general, the overall welfare e®ect for workers depends on the gain from greater
output ¹ Y due to the increase in S relative to the associated costs in t = 1;2. The
following section discusses the optimal monetary policy when the central bank takes
this additional trade-o® into account. That section also examines what happens if
not only investors, but also workers anticipate the central bank intervention.
4.3.6 Monetary policy under commitment and further model
extensions
In section 4.3.4, the optimal central bank intervention in t = 1 was calculated
based on the central bank loss function (4.13) after the realisation of the liquidity
shock and given aggregate investment S. This re°ects the absence of a commitment
possibility of the central bank in this model. In other words, the solutions presented
so far represent optimal monetary policy under discretion. The optimal second-
best solution given the cash-in-advance constraint, however, could be achieved by a
central bank with the possibility to commit to a speci¯c intervention policy in t = 1
at t = 0.
In that case, the central bank has to optimally weight the increased aggregate
supply ¹ Y associated with the moral hazard-e®ect against the costs of liquidationsChapter 4 Liquidity risk and monetary policy 107
and interventions in t = 1 and 2. More generally, if private investors anticipate
a liquidity insurance by the central bank, they hold less liquidity and invest their
funds more productively. A lower level of aggregate liquidity, however, makes the
¯nancial sector less resilient, such that ¯nancial crises and central bank interventions
become more likely.
Hence, the loss function (4.13) has to be extended to take the productivity gain
from the moral hazard e®ect into account. As before, the loss increases in p1 ¡ p¤
1
and the output costs of liquidations ¢(Z). Additionally, the loss decreases with










to ¯nd the optimal level of private investments S and the optimal liquidity provision
L conditional on the realised liquidity shock.
So far in this chapter, workers build their price expectations based on the money
holdings W ¡ S of investors (see sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3). The question what hap-
pens if not only investors, but also workers anticipate the central bank intervention,
is related to the brief discussion in footnote 25 of the e®ects if workers' formed
their price expectations in the wage negotiations with rational expectations rather
than the quantity equation. For a given level of S, the central bank will provide
extra liquidity if ° > LIQ. This increases the expected amount of cash available
for purchases of consumption goods relative to the situation without central bank
intervention and thus raises the expected price of consumption goods or { in a re-
peated version of the model { the expected in°ation rate. Since rational workers
want to be compensated for the higher expected price with higher nominal wages,
this leads to an `in°ation bias' which the central bank should consider in the op-
timal monetary policy under commitment.36 But once wages are determined, the
central bank can always provide more liquidity than expected. Hence, the trade-o®
in t = 1 between redistribution losses for workers today versus less supply tomorrow
continues to exist, independently of the way workers form their price expectations.
Another important feature of the central bank intervention is the possibility of
a sterilisation of its intervention before the additional money causes price increases
on the goods market. The example of September 11 in section 4.1.2 shows that the
Fed was indeed able to quickly sterilise the emergency liquidity issued directly after
the terrorist attacks. But this liquidity crisis was mostly limited to the payments
36Note that although the moral hazard e®ect lowers private money holdings W ¡ S, the central
bank intervention still raises the expected overall nominal demand from investors on the goods
market. The reason is that investors reduce their money holdings precisely because they expect
an easing of their CIA on average relative to the situation without central bank intervention.Chapter 4 Liquidity risk and monetary policy 108
and settlement system. In the other two examples of section 4.1.2, the crises in 1987
and 1998, the Fed had to lower interest rates despite buoyant GDP growth and
rising in°ation and provide liquidity for a much longer time to calm the markets
(see ¯gure 4.1 and the discussion in section 4.1.2). In these cases, the trade-o®
analysed in this chapter increases in relevance for the optimal policy response to
the crises as demonstrated by the di®erent developments of in°ation after 1987,
1998 and 2001, illustrated in ¯gure 4.2.37 Nevertheless, a sterilisation-possibility
of interventions could be easily included into the model by making the nominal
aggregate demand shock ´ that spills over from the asset to the goods market a
function of the sterilisation possibilities of the central bank.





represented a deadweight loss. Actually, these costs for investors correspond to
seigniorage income for the central bank. If the central bank or the government used
this seigniorage to buy consumption goods in t = 2, the aggregate demand equation




L in the numerator. The welfare e®ects
depend on the use of the real seigniorage income and should be taken into account
accordingly when the central bank provides liquidity in t = 1. The inclusion of
seignorage does not change the general trade-o®s in the model, but it reduces the
costs of liquidity provision if the seigniorage income is distributed to workers.
Finally, the traditional Bagehot (1873) principles suggest that the central bank
should provide liquidity only to an illiquid, but solvent bank. The judgement be-
tween illiquidity and insolvency requires a lot of information about banks' assets and
liabilities on behalf of the lender of last resort, the central bank. This identi¯cation
problem transfers to ¯nancial markets, where the central bank faces the question
if asset price declines are caused by illiquidity or by deteriorating fundamentals.
In contrast to the case of ¯nancial intermediaries, this judgement seems to be less
di±cult on ¯nancial markets since a number of illiquidity measures exist and are
easily observable: For example, bid-ask spreads, the quoted depth, i.e. the number
of shares available at the bid/ask price, respectively, the volatility of returns and
the size of order °ows (see, e.g., Chordia et al., 2005). If all of these criteria signal
liquidity problems, the central bank most probably faces a liquidity crisis. It should
then act as a `liquidity provider of last resort' and judge its actions according to the
framework developed in this chapter.38
37Taylor (2005) supports the liquidity provision principle and thus a temporary departure of
interest rates from the recommendations of a Taylor rule that includes only in°ation and output.
But he argues that policy should have returned to a standard rule more quickly after the crises in
1987 and 1998, i.e. sterilised the liquidity provision (Taylor, 2005, p. 114).
38Besides, my model could also easily capture worsening fundamentals by a lower real value of
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4.4 Idiosyncratic risk
Having analysed the asset market, the goods market and central bank interventions
under aggregate risk in the previous sections, I now focus on the question under
which circumstances idiosyncratic shocks can in°uence asset prices. If liquidations
are optimal for individual investors, the optimal central bank intervention and the
spillover e®ects to the goods market are identical to the case under aggregate risk.
Hence, this section concentrates on the asset market.
4.4.1 Standard model
The optimal investment decision problem for an individual investor under idiosyn-









(³i ln(c1 + ½z) + ¯ lnc2)f(°)d° s.t. (4.24)





p1c1 + q^ s · w ¡ s + ql
0 · z · s; 0 · l · s; l + z · s
and is solved analogically. The ¯rst-order conditions are the same as in section 4.3.2
with ³i replacing °.40 Again, market clearing in t = 1 requires that ^ S =
R
i2I ^ sdi = 0.
Hence, the asset price q has to adjust to equalise excess demand and supply of assets
by individual investors. The crucial di®erence to the case with only aggregate risk
is that the market clearing condition does not imply that ^ s = 0 and no assets are
traded.
The demand for shares in t = 1 by investor i, ^ si, is determined by
^ si =
¯ (w ¡ s) ¡ q³is
q (¯ + ³i)
: (4.25)
Note that that the Cobb-Douglas utility function (4.2) implies that ^ si is a convex
function of ³i for a given asset price q as @2^ si=(@³i)
2 > 0.41
Assume that each investor has an ex-ante probability of one half of belonging to
group A who receive a shock ³A and to group B with shock ³B, respectively, and
³A ¸ ³B without loss of generality. The condition E[³i] = 1 and the positive support
39In order to explicitly exclude short sales, the constraint ^ s ¸ ¡s had to be added to (4.24).
Footnote 41 shows that this is redundant given the speci¯cation of the model.
40That means equations (4.9a) to (4.9d), (4.9g), (4.15a), (4.15b) and (4.16).
41Furthermore, ^ si > ¡s as ¯(w ¡ s) > ¡q¯s such that the short sale constraint is redundant.Chapter 4 Liquidity risk and monetary policy 110
of ³i imply ³A 2 [1;2), (³A + ³B)=2 = 1 and the absence of an aggregate shock. As
usual, market clearing requires
Z
i2A
¯ (w ¡ s) ¡ q³As




¯ (w ¡ s) ¡ q³Bs
q (¯ + ³B)
di = 0:
The pricing kernel for q becomes
q = min
·
¯ (1 + ¯)(W ¡ S)




¯ (W ¡ S)
S
¸ p1½ (4.26)
with W and S de¯ned as before. Without idiosyncratic shocks, i.e. ³i = 1, equation
(4.26) simpli¯es to q = ¯ (W ¡ S)=S, the same asset price as for ° = 1 in section
4.2.3. The condition ¯ (W ¡ S)=S ¸ p1½ excludes liquidations z > 0 for ³i = 1.42
Note that q in (4.26) increases in the heterogeneity of A and B, i.e. in the
absolute value j³i ¡ 1j. The reason is the convexity of ^ si in (4.25) mentioned above.
The convexity implies that the additional demand of the agents with the low liquidity
shock ³B is always su±ciently large such that agents with the high shock ³A do not
need to liquidate their asset. Figure 4.7 illustrates the convexity of ^ si for R = 1=¯ =
1:1 and S = ¯=(1 + ¯)W, the investment in the case of certainty. The solid line
represents the excess demand for the asset which is 0 for ³A = 1, given an asset
price of q = 1 in the left panel. For ³A > 1 (and thus ³B = 2 ¡ ³A < 1), ^ sB rises
faster than ^ sA falls, the excess demand becomes positive and q > 1 for ³A > 1. For
³A ¼ 1:413, the asset price increases to q = R, since the excess demand is 0 at this
combination of q and ³A in the right panel. For ³A > 1:413, investors hit by the low
shock ³B transfer money into t = 2 as their CIA becomes unbinding.
To summarise the e®ects, the structure of the model, in particular the Cobb-
Douglas utility function (4.2) that causes the convexity of ^ si and the dissolution of
risk in t = 1, imply that idiosyncratic shocks alleviate the CIA given a ¯xed initial
investment S. In general, however, idiosyncratic shocks can have a negative impact
on asset prices if the absorption capacity of the market is limited. This happens
in reality and in other models for example if investors are risk-averse and future
returns are risky (see, e.g., Huang and Wang, 2006). A further feature of reality
is the presence of brokers and market-makers on ¯nancial markets rather than a
Walrasian auctioneer. As they smooth price °uctuations by providing liquidity to
¯nancial markets, they earn income in the form of bid-ask spreads. Models that
analyse the microstructure of ¯nancial markets explain the behaviour of these market
participants and the implications for transaction prices. The following subsection
presents an extension to the standard model of this section that includes transaction
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Figure 4.7: Convexity of ^ si: ^ sA, ^ sB and §b si = ^ sA + ^ sB as a function of ³A for
q = 1 and q = 2.
costs in the form of bid-ask spreads, and section 4.4.3 discusses di®erent mechanisms
how small shocks can have large impacts on asset prices.
4.4.2 Model with transaction costs
The market microstructure literature has developed models based on order-handling
costs, asymmetric information or strategic behaviour, where idiosyncratic shocks can
have (severe) impacts on asset prices. As Biais, Glosten and Spatt (2005, p. 218)
formulate it:
In perfect markets, Walrasian equilibrium prices re°ect the competitive
demand curves of all potential investors. While the determination of
these fundamental equilibrium valuations is the focus of (most) asset
pricing, market microstructure studies how, in the short term, transac-
tion prices converge to (or deviate from) long-term equilibrium values.
A full market microstructure model is beyond the scope of this chapter, but
the most important literature in this ¯eld is discussed in section 4.5.3. A simple
way to summarise the relevant issues of market microstructure as developed, e.g.,
in O'Hara (1995) and Biais et al. (2005), is to assume transaction costs in the formChapter 4 Liquidity risk and monetary policy 112
of a bid-ask spread ¥ that decreases in total liquidity M =
R
i2I mdi available and







.43 Market-makers buy the asset
in t = 1 at a bid price of qbid from investors with the high shock ³A > 1 and sell it
to the low-shock types B with ³B = 2 ¡ ³A at an ask price qask = qbid + ¥. They
earn the spread ¥, with which they buy consumption goods on the goods market in
t = 1 such that aggregate demand for goods is not directly a®ected by the presence
of market-makers in the model.
The transaction cost ¥ is a measure of an asset's liquidity from the micro-
perspective44 and has a number of interpretations beyond completely exogenous
transaction costs as, e.g., in Vayanos (2004) and Favero, Pagano and von Thad-
den (2006): It represents the time-varying illiquidity cost of shares in Acharya and
Pedersen (2005) as ^ s varies with the size of the shock.45 It also captures search
costs from search and matching models of ¯nancial markets as developed by, e.g.,
Du±e, G^ arleanu and Pedersen (2005) because more available liquidity increases the
probability of quickly ¯nding a buyer, but larger orders decrease it. A further inter-
pretation of ¥ are the random order-execution delays in Weill (2007). They are low
in normal times but can become severe in times of liquidity crises such as October
1987 or September 1998 as described in section 4.1.2. These are precisely the times
when order sizes tend to be large and aggregate liquidity tends to be low, at least
until a central bank intervention calms markets.
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qbid for ³i = ³A
qask = qbid + ¥(M; ^ s) for ³i = ³B:
43For the positive relation between order size and bid-ask spreads, see chapters 3 and 6 in O'Hara
(1995), for example. M represents a proxy for the size of the market making sector, which has a
negative impact on the size of the spread as demonstrated in di®erent models in O'Hara (1995).
It also captures the public good character of liquidity as discussed below. Amihud and Mendelson
(1986) provide empirical evidence for the role of bid-ask spreads in asset pricing.
44Other measures of liquidity such as the size of order °ows were listed in section 4.3.6.
45Furthermore, M may be time-varying in a dynamic model in which this three-period game is
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In the equilibrium with ³A > ³B, investors of group A cannot be buyers of s in t = 1,
i.e. ^ sA · 0, such that their constraints are based on qbid, while investors of group B
cannot be sellers of s, i.e. ^ sA ¸ 0, and their constraints include qask.
The spread drives an additional wedge between the assets ¯nal payo® R and
the achievable price for sellers, qbid. Hence, costly liquidation (z > 0) is optimal
for a wider range of parameters and shocks, which in turn leads to an extension of
central bank intervention as the central bank optimally weights the output costs of
intervention against the price increase associated with additional money.
Finally, the negative dependence of ¥ on aggregate liquidity M = W ¡ S intro-
duces the public good character of liquidity and ¯nancial stability into the model.46
While a decrease in S would lower the expected bid-ask spread and thus decrease
the probability of costly liquidation in t = 1, the individual investor does not take
this external e®ect into account in t = 0 since she is a price taker, i.e. dM=ds = 0.
4.4.3 From small shocks to large impacts:
Propagation mechanisms
It may be questionable if transaction costs ¥ can become so large that idiosyncratic
shocks can cause ¯nancial crises. But modern ¯nancial systems exhibit a number of
feedback mechanisms that can amplify small shocks once the price impact exceeds
a certain threshold.47 These propagation mechanisms include margin calls, capital
adequacy ratios, marking to market accounting rules and modern risk management.
Margins serve as collateral on markets for derivatives and for credit-¯nanced in-
vestments. Combined with some form of a ¯nancing constraint, they can generate
negative feedback mechanisms. In Morris and Shin (2004), `liquidity black holes'
arise because of exogenous loss limits for traders. Extending the market microstruc-
ture model of Grossman and Miller (1988), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2007) use
the concepts of market liquidity and funding liquidity: In normal times, capital con-
strained traders use external funds to smooth price °uctuations and provide market
liquidity. If traders' outside ¯nanciers cannot distinguish illiquidity shocks from
fundamental ones48 and increase the required margins in response to an increase in
price volatility, they can create a vicious circle: A negative liquidity shock causes
losses and higher margins for traders, which reduces their ability to provide market
46Other papers that model liquidity as a public good include HolmstrÄ om and Tirole (1998),
Huang and Wang (2006) and Illing (2007). For a practitioner's view, see Geithner (2006).
47In the model of this chapter, this may be particularly relevant if idiosyncratic shocks are
combined with positive aggregate shocks.
48Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2007) borrow this idea from the performance-based arbitrage
argument in Shleifer and Vishny (1997), which is also applied for example in Gromb and Vayanos
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liquidity and thus further increases traders' losses and required margins. Schnabel
and Shin (2004) use the ¯nancial crisis in northern Europe in 1763 as a historic
example of such negative feedback e®ects. Sauer (2002) adopts the stylised model
of Schnabel and Shin (2004) to explain the LTCM-crisis in 1998.
Closely related to margin calls for leveraged investors are capital adequacy ratios
for banks. Shin (2005a,b) and Illing (2007) show that capital adequacy requirements
for banks can set o® a vicious circle of asset sales similar to the one triggered by the
funding constraints in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2007).49 Recent international
reform proposals of accounting rules suggest to extend the use of market prices
in accounting of ¯nancial ¯rms instead of valuations based on historical costs, an
approach already common among hedge funds, for example. While such marking
to market gives a clearer picture of the true value of ¯rms in general, it may cause
excessive price volatility, i.e. volatility not re°ecting fundamentals, and exacerbate
or even trigger a ¯nancial crisis. In the model by Shin (2005a,b), marking to market
is not necessary (Illing, 2007, p. 10), but accelerates the feedback e®ects via banks'
balance sheets. Plantin, Sapra and Shin (2005) describe in a global games setup,
how marking to market accounting rules can cause large losses in less liquid markets
because asset sales are strategic complements under this accounting regime. They
¯nd that the damage done by marking to market is greatest when claims are long-
lived, illiquid and senior. Cifuentes, Ferrucci and Shin (2007) combine marking to
market accounting with regulatory solvency requirements to show that balance sheet
interlinkages among ¯nancial institutions and contagion via changes in asset prices
can cause contagious failures of ¯nancial institutions as a result of small shocks.
Financial risk management is a core competence of modern ¯nancial institutions
and continuously evolving, not least in response to ¯nancial crises. In the 1980's,
portfolio insurance became a popular form of risk management for investment funds.
The discussion of the 1987-crash in section 4.1.2 highlights the negative impact of
portfolio insurance during the crash. Today, value at risk (VaR) has become the
standard risk measure used by ¯nancial institutions. Banks' capital requirements
in the Basel-I accords have been linked to market risk based on VaR-calculations
since 1998. Yet, VaR is no panacea, either. For example, G^ arleanu and Pedersen
(2007) show that a feedback e®ect can arise between tighter risk management and
a reduction in liquidity. The former reduces the amount of liquidity provided to
the market and the latter increases the e®ective risk of positions because it takes
49In Shin (2005b), ¯nancial intermediaries also want to maintain a minimum level of leverage.
This creates a `virtuous circle' of rising asset prices and increased lending. Thus, `booms can
be understood as a mirror image of liquidity drains.' While Shin (2005a) just mentions possible
asymmetries due to default or ine±cient liquidations, Illing (2007) extends Shin's model with a
kinked net supply curve of assets, in this case property, due to information asymmetries. These
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longer to sell them. The heart of the problem is the endogeneity of risk as described
by Danielsson (2001) and Danielsson and Shin (2003). Financial market risk is not
given exogenously by nature, but depends on the actions of market participants.
This property becomes particularly important if ¯nancial institutions follow very
similar investment strategies50 and use the same standardised methods for their risk
management (IMF, 1998).
Stress testing or liquidity-adjusted VaR measures are ways to incorporate liquid-
ity risk into risk management. Nevertheless, the fundamental problem of ¯nancial
risk's endogeneity remains unsolved.51 In particular, individuals neglect the exter-
nal e®ect of their decisions on aggregate liquidity. The public good character of
liquidity, however, becomes most relevant during ¯nancial crises.
4.5 Related theoretical literature
Besides the di®erent propagation mechanisms discussed in the previous section, the
model developed in this chapter is linked to a number of theoretical contributions in
the literature. This section reviews papers that analyse the Greenspan put option,
segmented asset and goods markets as well as market microstructure theory and
papers on the public supply of liquidity.
4.5.1 Greenspan put option
The `Greenspan Put', i.e. the supposed insurance against severe ¯nancial turmoil by
the Federal Reserve under Alan Greenspan, has become a well-known argument in
the popular ¯nancial press. To my knowledge, only Miller, Weller and Zhang (2002)
and Illing (2004) have developed an explicit theoretical analysis of the Greenspan
put, focusing on the situation in which the central bank insures against asset price
declines caused by a deterioration of the fundamental value of the asset.
In Miller et al. (2002), the expected present value of all current and future divi-
dends determines the fundamental value of shares. Better management of ¯nancial
crises by the Fed under Alan Greenspan, as indicated by the examples of 1987 and
1998 in section 4.1.2, may have fundamentally reduced the risk of shares and thus
increased their fundamental value. But Miller et al. (2002) argue that investors
additionally hold the erroneous belief that the Fed could insure them against any
fall in asset prices, i.e. not only against price drops that are due to a ¯nancial crisis
50Many proprietary traders of investment banks copied the until then highly pro¯table strategies
of LTCM in 1998 (see, e.g., Morris and Shin, 1999, p. 52).
51In G^ arleanu and Pedersen (2007), the feedback e®ects are even stronger for a liquidity-adjusted
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but also against `normal' declines that are due to a decrease in current and future
dividends. For example, lower productivity growth than expected may reduce divi-
dends and thus justify and require a revaluation of shares. Hence, investors appear
to have overcon¯dence in the ability of the Fed to put a lower bound, a put option,
on the share price and this leads to an overvaluation of shares which represents a
bubble. The bubble is, however, completely independent of actual monetary policy,
which is the focus of the present chapter.
Illing (2004) uses a model that concentrates on nominal debt and ¯nancial inter-
mediation. Equity owners have a residual claim on the risky payo® of ¯rms that are
leveraged with nominal bank debt. A severely negative aggregate shock to the fun-
damental value of ¯rms limits their ability to repay their debt, which in turn leads
to the threat of bank runs by depositors. The collapse of banks would extinguish
the knowledge capital from relationship lending in the economy and prompts the
central bank to provide liquidity to the banks. The additional money reduces the
real value of ¯rms' nominal debt, which represents a capital gain for equity owners.
The anticipation of the monetary injection causes a bubble ex ante, as it raises the
¯rms' share price above its fundamental value. Illing (2004) notes that the central
bank in his model faces a trade-o® between the bubble created by moral hazard, i.e.
the expected capital gain, and the risk associated with the disruption of ¯nancial
intermediation.
The model by Illing (2004) can be easily classi¯ed in terms of the framework
provided in this chapter, although I focus on ¯nancial markets rather than inter-
mediation and leverage is not crucial in my model. After the realisation of the
aggregate shock, the central bank in Illing's model does not face any trade-o® be-
cause ex post it is always optimal to prevent bank runs and keep banks' knowledge
capital.52 This is di®erent in my model where the central bank optimally chooses
between in°ation today and an output loss tomorrow after the shock. The trade-o®
emphasised by Illing only arises if the central bank has the possibility to commit to
a speci¯c intervention policy in response to a negative shock. This situation is akin
to the optimal commitment solution discussed in section 4.3.6 in my model.
Both Miller et al. (2002) and Illing (2004) analyse the central bank insurance
against asset price declines caused by a deterioration of the fundamental value of the
asset, either erroneously expected or actually conducted. This represents probably
a part of the public perception of the alleged `Greenspan put'. But the analysis in
my model is more closely related to a `liquidity provision principle', i.e. a temporary
deviation of central bank policy from a standard Taylor rule that responds only
52A similar e®ect occurs in Illing (2007) within a di®erent model with propagation e®ects as
discussed in section 4.4.3. There, the central bank always lowers interest rates to prevent ¯re sales
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to output and in°ation in order to inject large quantities of liquidity in a ¯nancial
crisis (Taylor, 2005). It is the dramatic increase in ¹, the marginal utility of cash's
liquidity services, that induces investors to partly liquidate their assets and triggers
the central bank's response, not a change in the fundamental pay-o® of the asset
R. Hence, it is the microeconomic view of liquidity, the missing ability to sell assets
quickly and costlessly, that causes a monetary injection in my model.
4.5.2 Market segmentation
A crucial assumption in the model relates to the limited participation on the asset
market, as workers cannot buy assets. If they could do so and their liquidity needs
were not perfectly correlated with investors liquidity shocks, they might provide
the extra liquidity needed to smooth investors liquidity shocks. The assumption of
segmented markets follows the models in Allen and Gale (1994, 2005) and Huang and
Wang (2006), where limited market participation emerges from participation costs.53
The same impact has the assumption of separate cash-in-advance constraints on the
asset and the goods market for all agents in Gale (2005). Gale (2005) uses his
model to show that liquidity must be costly in order to guarantee the determinacy
of the price level. Furthermore, the asset price °uctuates without a®ecting the
goods price as the central bank stabilises the goods prices via its real seigniorage
income. Both features are present in my model as the cash-in-advance constraint
never binds (¹ = 0) if the central bank provides liquidity for free, i.e. q = R. Asset
price volatility without spillover e®ects to the goods market occurs in my model in
the intermediate range of CIA · ° · LIQ. The main contributions of my chapter
are the analysis of ¯nancial crises and the focus on emergency liquidity provision
rather than on seigniorage income as in Gale (2005).
In reality, participation in asset markets is limited because economic agents lack
the required expertise, have limited attention, institutional barriers or other costs
of entry (Gale, 2005). Empirically, Landon-Lane and Occhino (2006) use Bayesian
techniques to estimate the fraction of households participating in ¯nancial markets
to be approximately 22%, while Campbell and Mankiw (1989) ¯nd that about 40%
to 50% of the population in the U.S. consume only their current income rather than
smooth their consumption via savings and dissavings. Statistics from the Survey
of Consumer Finances 2004 reported in Bucks, Kennickell and Moore (2006) show
that merely 20.7% of U.S. households hold publicly traded shares directly and only
53In Allen and Gale (1994), private agents decide about their participation on the asset market
before liquidity shocks occur, in Huang and Wang (2006) after the realisation of idiosyncratic
shocks which can thus have aggregate e®ects. Other papers that use models with limited market
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48.6% hold some shares either directly or indirectly, e.g. via retirement accounts.
4.5.3 Market microstructure theory
The literature on market microstructure analyses the trading mechanism for ¯nan-
cial securities and its impact on short-term asset price behaviour. O'Hara (1995)
provides an excellent summary of the earlier literature, Biais et al. (2005) survey
more recent developments. Amihud, Mendelson and Pedersen (2005) review the con-
nection between liquidity as derived from the theoretical and empirical microstruc-
ture literature and asset pricing.
A common feature of this literature is that it does not distinguish between nom-
inal and real assets and payo®s. Technically, most models maximise agents' ex-
pected utility of terminal wealth and thus abstract from real goods (see the models
in O'Hara, 1995). For example, Grossman and Miller (1988) model liquidity as the
price of immediacy. Market makers are willing to smooth temporary order imbal-
ances for an asset with a risky ¯nal payo® if they can expect a positive excess return
compared to the investment in a riskless asset.
An alternative way to model asset trading and possible illiquidity is the search
and matching literature that has been inspired by Du±e et al. (2005). Again, these
models do not di®erentiate between nominal and real payo®s as an asset pays one
unit of a consumption good per period that serves as num¶ eraire. One application
of the model by Du±e et al. (2005) are endogenous feedback e®ects between risk-
management and liquidity in G^ arleanu and Pedersen (2007) as discussed in section
4.4.3.
By providing a framework that links asset price developments caused by liquidity
shocks to the real sector of the economy via two spillover e®ects, this chapter makes
one of the ¯rst steps to link the ¯ndings from the market microstructure literature
with the analysis of optimal monetary policy in the macroeconomic literature.
4.5.4 Public supply of liquidity
A prominent paper that investigates the public provision of liquidity is HolmstrÄ om
and Tirole (1998), but it di®ers from the model in this chapter in important respects.
First, liquidity is de¯ned as the availability of instruments to transfer wealth across
periods rather than to sell assets quickly and costlessly. Furthermore, the paper looks
at the production side of the economy as ¯rms may have a demand for liquidity to
re¯nance their investment projects. Firms ¯nancing is subject to an agency problem
such that ¯rms cannot pledge the full value of the ¯rm as collateral for credit lines or
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uncertainty given the right private institutions such as banks, private `liquidity' is
insu±cient in the presence of aggregate uncertainty. The government can overcome
the agency problem and issue government bonds that are not subject to the agency
problem because it can enforce tax payments. The social optimum in the model
can be achieved with state-contingent government bonds, i.e. an active management
of public liquidity, as their existence averts any private excess liquidity. Hence,
HolmstrÄ om and Tirole (1998) is not a paper about ¯nancial crises but rather about
the involvement of the state in the ¯nancial system in normal times.
More generally, however, public provision of liquidity refers to the lender of last
resort activity of a public authority, usually the central bank, as emergency liquidity
assistance to the ¯nancial system. Most of the literature on the lender of last resort
concentrates on banks and the interbank market. The collection of a wide range of
papers on the lender of last resort in Goodhart and Illing (2002) includes only one
paper by Kaufman (2002) that discusses the response to ¯re sales on asset markets
in an informal way. More recent treatments like Freixas, Parigi and Rochet (2004)
also neglect liquidity crises on asset markets, which are the focus of my chapter.54
Given the substantial growth of ¯nancial markets relative to traditional banking
in continental Europe and the continuous introduction of new ¯nancial instruments
like credit derivatives, an appreciation of the e®ects of liquidity provision in response
to liquidity crises on ¯nancial markets appears to be necessary.
4.6 Conclusion
The di®erent speci¯cations of the general model in this chapter help to provide
guidance for central banks in the event of liquidity crises. Confronted with a liquidity
crisis, the central bank faces a trade-o® between injecting liquidity and thus incurring
risks to price stability and negative supply e®ects in the future. The size of the
optimal intervention increases in the size of the liquidity shock, the weight on output
relative to in°ation and the extent of negative supply e®ects of the crisis. It decreases
in the size of the associated in°ation in goods prices which is linked to the possibility
to sterilise the intervention and the amount of liquidity initially held by investors.
Furthermore, the anticipation of central bank interventions by private investors
leads to a moral hazard e®ect in the form of less private liquidity provision and
54One exception is Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2007) who develop a model of ¯nancial crises
based on liquidity shortages and Knightian uncertainty aversion in which public and private liquid-
ity serve as complements: The promise by the central bank to provide liquidity in extreme events,
i.e. a `double wave of liquidity shocks' in the model, but not for intermediate events, i.e. only `one
wave' of liquidity shocks, makes private agents provide their own liquidity for intermediate events
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thus an increase in the likelihood of ¯nancial crises. At the same time, less liquidity
provision means more productive investment and thus greater aggregate supply in
the absence of a ¯nancial crisis. Optimal monetary policy under commitment has
to take these additional e®ects into account.
Motivated by the actual behaviour of the Fed under Alan Greenspan, the chap-
ter has concentrated on the optimal monetary policy response to liquidity crises.
However, this does not exclude the possibility that other policy tools exist to limit
the probability and the extent of such crises. Regulatory measures represent an
obvious candidate for appropriate ex ante action, in particular in the light of the
external e®ects of private liquidity provision. A promising proposal seems to be the
introduction of procyclical liquidity requirements for ¯nancial institutions. Such
requirements could help to prevent the buildup of excessive positions in illiquid as-
sets during boom periods via balance sheet feedback e®ects converse to the ones
described in section 4.4.3 and at the same time limit vicious circles during market
downturns (see, e.g., Illing, 2007). But even with an appropriate regulatory envi-
ronment, liquidity crises may emerge and the trade-o®s emphasised in this chapter
remain relevant.
Finally, in view of the substantial growth of ¯nancial markets relative to tra-
ditional banking in particular in continental Europe and the introduction of new
¯nancial instruments like credit derivatives, the concentration on the banking sys-
tem for ¯nancial stability as common in the literature appears to be inadequate.
Instead, the understanding of the interlinkages between money, liquidity on ¯nan-
cial markets, ¯nancial crises, in°ation and real production is very important for
¯nancial stability and the continuation of successful monetary policy in the future.
The increased tendency of major central banks such as the ECB, the Bank of Eng-
land or the Swedish Riksbank to publish `Financial Stability Reports' that take a
very broad perspective on risks to the stability of the ¯nancial system represents
a widely visible evidence that central bankers acknowledge this development. This
chapter has provided a theoretical contribution to a better understanding of the
relevant arguments. The obvious next step is to transfer this model into a sto-
chastic dynamic general equilibrium framework and thus gain additional insights, in
particular about the optimal monetary policy under commitment.Chapter 4 Liquidity risk and monetary policy 121
Appendices
4.A Solution to investors' problem under aggre-
gate risk
The Lagrangian for the optimal investment decision problem for an individual in-




f° ln(c1 + ½z) + ¯ lnc2
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¡ ¹[p1c1 + q^ s ¡ (w ¡ s)]gf (°)d°:
Using the Leibniz-Rule d
dx
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¡1 sf (°)d° = 0 as complementary slackness conditions.
To derive the expected values of the Lagrangian parameters ¸ and ¹ in t = 0,
it is easier to use the optimal values of c1;c2; ^ s;z given a realisation of ° in t = 1
and then to integrate over all possible values of ° afterwards. This is equivalent
to solving for the optimal values of c1;c2; ^ s;z given the partial derivatives of theChapter 4 Liquidity risk and monetary policy 122
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½ ¡ ¸R · 0 (4.29d)
@¤
@¸
= ¡p1c1 ¡ p2c2 + w + (R ¡ 1)s + (R ¡ q)^ s ¡ Rz ¸ 0 (4.29e)
@¤
@¹
= ¡p1c1 ¡ q^ s + w ¡ s ¸ 0 (4.29f)
and @¤
@zz = 0, @¤
@¸¸ = 0 and @¤
@¹¹ = 0 as complementary slackness conditions. Equa-
tions (4.29a) to (4.29f) and equation (4.28g) are equations (4.9a) to (4.9g) in section
4.2.3.
The ¯rst-order condition for optimal investment in the asset is given by equation
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Solving this using G(x) ´
R x
¡1 °f (°)d° and F (x) ´
R x
¡1 f (°)d° with CIA ´
¯(W¡S)
RS and LIQ ´
¯(W¡S)
p1½S gives
¯ (R ¡ 1)
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F (CIA) +
(R ¡ 1)
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+
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+
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w + (p1½ ¡ 1)s
[1 ¡ F (LIQ)] +
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[1 ¡ G(LIQ)]
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In equilibrium, all investors follow the same investment strategy and the assumption
of a mass 1 of ex-ante identical investors makes s = S. The de¯nition of conditional
expectations








°f (°)d° = F (x)E [°j° < x];
but this does not allow to solve for s without explicitly parameterising the density
function of the liquidity shock f (°). Assuming a uniform distribution for °, i.e.
F (x) = x¡a
b¡a for a · x · b, gives the conditional expected value of E [°j° · x] =
1


















. Table 4.3 in section 4.2.3
summarises this information.
4.B Optimal central bank intervention with a
quadratic loss function
In section 4.3, the loss function (4.13) of the central bank is linear in the increase of
p1 above the desired price level p¤
1 and the deviation of aggregate supply Y s
2 from ¹ Y
caused by liquidations Z, ¢(Z). This section shows that the results of the model are
robust to the loss function (4.30) that is quadratic in in°ation and output deviations
from their respective targets, but the ¯rst-order condition and thus the comparative
static analysis become more complex:
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The optimisation problem (4.19) for the central bank becomes
min
L
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Overall, the quadratic loss function has an impact on the relative size of direct and
indirect marginal costs and bene¯ts, but it does not change the general structure of
the ¯rst-order condition. In particular, the direct marginal cost continues to increase
in L, while the indirect marginal cost and the marginal bene¯t decrease with L as
d(Z¤ ¡ L)=dL < 0 given the assumptions about the parameters. The optimal L¤
becomes the solution to a fourth-degree polynomial. With a linear loss function,
the last two e®ects are constant, instead, and L¤ is the solution to the quadratic
equation (4.20).Chapter 4 Liquidity risk and monetary policy 125
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